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Many government policies redistribute resources between generations: public pensions,
public health care, public debt, investment in public education or infrastructure. In the
Netherlands for example, the contribution rate for the Pay-As-You-Go public pension
system is 14010 of total earnings of an individual to a maximum of fl. 6000; per year. The
total contributions amount to about 6010 of GDP. This is a pure redistribution from the
working population to the elderly. In case of public health care, the costs for an 85-year
old are approximately 9 times as high as for an 45-year old. However, the contribution of
an 85-year old does certainly not offset this. Investment in public education, which redis-
tributes from current working and retired to the youngest generations, is approximately
5Qlo of GDP. In the 70s and 80s a large increase in debt levels occured (from a debt~GDP
ratio of about 4001'o in 1975 to almost 80~1o in 1995) implying a transfer of resources from
the future to the present. The situation in the Netherlands does not differ much from
the situation in other Western countries. Taking all the different redistributive policies
at some point in time into account, it can be calculated which generations are the net
recipients and which are the net contributors at that point in time. The youngest gener-
ations, i.e. those to the age of about 20, and the oldest generations, i.e. the pensioners,
are the net recipients. The younger generations hardly pay taxes but do benefit from
expenditures on child benefits and education. The elderly, compared to benefits they re-
ceive in the form of pensions or public health care, pay less than an equivalent amount of
taxes. The working generations, who are the major tax payers, are the net contributors.
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Though real data on redistributive flows between generations are lacking, the numbers
above give an impression of the flow of resources between the different generations at
a certain point in time. One step further is to calculate the total of transfers received
and payed over the lifecycle, i.e. the generational accounts. Calculations for the US by
Auerbach et al. (1994) indicate that tax rates have to rise considerably in the future
if the government wants to obey its intertemporal budget constraint. This indicates a
redistribution from the future to the present. Calculations by the OECD for some other
countriesr give similar results. Considering public pensions, public health care, public
spending on education and child benefits, it appears that for the Netherlands, gener-
ations born between 1935 and 1955 are paying more than they receive, with a minímum
for the benefit~cost-ration of about 0.7. The opposite holds for generations born before
1935 and after 1955, with a maximum for the benefit~cost-ration of about 1.3. Due to
the ageing of the population, generations born since 1990 are likely to be net contributors
as well (cf. Verbon et al. (1995)). These accounts suggest that some generations are
more successful than other generations in redistributing resources towards them. This
raises the question what causes this outcome?
The decisions on the size and composition of these redistributive policies are made in the
political arena. It is there where proponents and opponents of certain policy measures
meet and decide what policy to enact. In most countries, these decisions are taken in
representative democracies by politicians who are elected to represent the interests of
their voters. Besides, interest groups may exert pressure on the politicians to enact the
policy most preferred by that interest group. Therefore, the policies chosen often are a
political compromise between the groups involved. Focusing on the intergenerational as-
pects of redistributive policies, these groups are the different generations involved. Given
that these policies are the result of a political conflict between the generations involved,
the question then is: How can this conflict be modelled, what are the determining fac-
tors and how do they affect the outcome of this conflict? This is the central question of
this thesis and, therefore, the analysis performed in this thesis can be labelled as positive.
Thus, focusing on intergenerational conflict and redistribution, what are the factors
explaining the outcome of this conflict? Besides traditional explanatory factors like
1Norway, Germany, Italy and Sweden. OECD ( 1995).
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interest rates or rates of time preference, the age structure of the population also forms
an important factor in explaining the size and composition of these redistributive policies.
For example, a relatively large number of elderly can give them more political influence
because, as a group, they possess a relatively large number of votes and, depending on
their degree of organization in political pressure groups, lobbying and similar activities
will be more successful. As a result, redistribution from young to elderly might be larger.
Moreover, these explanatory factors are not constant over time. E.g. real long-term
interest rates varied between 3PIo and 12~o between 1960 and 1992. And also the age
structure of the population changes over time. Table 1.1 provides data on the devel-
opment of the dependency ratios, í. e. the number of elderly relative to the number of
young, for some major industrial countries. From this table, an increase in the depen-














0.249 0.301 0.363 0.318 0.323 0.332 ~ 0.374 0.495
0.254 0.299 0.329 0.298 0.322 0.339 0.367 0.489
0.192 0.192 0.195 0.215 0.247 0.258 0.315 0.460
0.222 0.261 0.298 0.327 0.322 0.323 0.408 0.529
0.265 0.296 0.317 0.284 0.298 0.315 0.353 0.460
0.223 0.263 0.335 0.309 0.323 0.399 0.440 0.589
0.199 0.223 0.262 0.285 0.318 0.364 0.398 0.477
0.194 0.230 0.249 0.253 0.265 0.287 0.368 0.549
0.225 0.280 0.317 0.352 0.347 0.312 0.362 0.484
0.176 0.204 0.246 0.254 0.277 0.308 0.311 0.370
0.242 0.285 0.329 0.374 0.377 0.360 0.446 0.528
0.250 0.282 0.327 0.341 0.343 0.334 0.369 0.461
0.199 0.237 0.243 0.254 0.268 0.257 0.293 0.420
a: The figures for Germany are for former West-Germany
Source: United Nations (1992)
Table 1.1: 60-~~15-59 ratio's since 1950
dency ratios can be observed. From between 0.17 and 0.25 in 1950, they now range
between 0.27 and 0.34 and are expected to increase further in the future. In 2025 they
are expected to range between 0.37 (Spain) and 0.59 (Germany). In many countries, de-
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pendency ratios in 2025 will be at least 1.5 times as high as they are in 1990. In Germany
almost twice as high and in the Netherlands even more than twice as high. Hence, the
economic and political situation changes continuously. This puts redistributive policies
under constant political pressure to change as well.
The redistributive policies considered in this thesis are public debt, public pensions
and public investment. These types of policies capture the effects of most other types
of redistributive policies as well. E.g. public health care redistributes in a similar way
as public pensions, namely from young to elderly. Expenditure on public education has
similar redistributive effects as investment in infrastructure. Next, a short introduction
into these types of policies will be given. The focus is on the intergenerational con-
flict over these policies. Besides, some historical background as well as some normative
aspects will be considered.
1.2 Public debt,......
Of the many topics economists have worried about, both theoretically and empirically,
there are a few which had constant attention. One of these is public debt. Public debt
redistributes resources from the future to the present2. For current generations, issuing
debt implies more resources available because taxes decrease or public expenditures rise.
Issuing debt also implies that at some future date, taxes have to increase or expendi-
tures have to be cut in order to redeem this debt, including the interest obligations since
foreign and domestic lenders will prevent a government from continuously issuing debt
without repaying anything of the existing debt or its interest obligations. Hence, the
generations then alive see their spending possibilities decrease. Conflicts of interest arise
if some part of the current population, notably the current older generations, reasonably
expects to avoid these future tax repayments and therefore prefer debt issuance. Younger
generations may expect that the tax burden associated with debt redemption will fall
onto their shoulders anyhow, either now, or some day in the future. Younger generations
may prefer, therefore, less debt to avoid a large increase in future taxes since they want to
smooth consumption over their lifetime. Besides, the current demographic development
implies a decrease in the future tax base. In anticipation on this development, current
2This assumea that Ricardian Equivalence does not hold. Cf. footnote 6 and Chapter 2.
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younger generations may even prefer a lower level of debt.
How have scholars in the past dealt with politics and public debt? In the writings
of classical economists like Smith, Ricardo or Mill, great concern was expressed about
the use of public debt. Especially Smith3 and Ricardo4 were strongly opposed to the
use of debt. Both held the opinion that even in times of large public expenditures (e.g.
war), these expenditures should be paid out of tax revenues or revenues from govern-
ment property. In their view, myopia5 on the side of the politicians and the general
public would lead to profuse public expenditures and should therefore be avoideds. Mill~
was less strongly opposed and noted that if taxes were too distortionary this might be a
reason to use debt. Also the fact that future generations of tax payers could benefit from
current expenditures could be a reason to use debt since he considered it not unreason-
able to confront these future generations with a part of these expenditures. However,
also Mill warned for the misuse of public debt. This classical view on public debt was
dominant in the political discussion until World War II and was reflected in the norms
on the budget adopted by many countries. The strongest of these was the requirement to
balance the budget. This was the prevailing norm ir, most countries in the 19th century,
though it was not always strictly obeyed. In the early 20th century, less restrictive norms
were used allowing the government to borrow, to a certain extent, for public investment.
Then, after World War II, due to Keynes, things changed dramatically. For Keynes'
demand-side economics, public debt was an instrument to stimulate aggregate demand
in times of recession, to be redeemed in economically better times. In the Keynesian
view, not all economic resources are fully employed because individuals may be myopic
or liquidity constrained. This causes current consumption to be very sensitive to changes
in current disposable income. Hence, a debt-financed decrease in taxes will increase con-
3Smith (1776,1976), Book V, Chapter III, pp. 441-486.
4Ricardo(1817,1951), Chapter XVII and Ricardo (1820,1951)
SMyopia hete meana: not taking long-term conaequences into account. In the upcoming chapters,
the word 'myopia' or `myopic' is also uaed but with a alightly different meaning. In the context of thís
thesis it meana: not taking the utility of future generationa into account.
aHowever, Ricardo noted an equivalence between debt and taxea, which has become known as Ri-
cardian Equivalence, since the gift of a bond to a citizen doea not make the citizen richer or poorer,
because the value of the bond is offset by the value of the future tax liability. See Chapter 2 for further
detaila on this.
7Mi11 (1848,1985), Booka IV and V
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sumption and, hence, investment and national output. Thus, the economy is lifted to
a higher level of welfare. These theoretical prescripts, developed in the 1930s, became
popular in the political debate in the 1950s and beyonds. Many countries tried to cope
with the economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s by demand stimulating debt-financed
policies. Debts and deficits have increased hugely since then and are generally regarded
as too high. Some have argued9 that these large debts prove the failure of Keynesian
policy. The reason for this failure is that politicians did not act as farsighted philosopher
kings but acted myopically, exactly the behaviour the classical economists warned for.
Thus, the behaviour of politicians is important for understanding the evolution of public
debt. The classical economists held the view that politicians were myopic, in Keynes'
view politicians were farsighted and acted like philosopher kings. Today, there is a var-
iety of views on behaviour of politicians. They may pursue their own private interests
or the interests of the group they represent and these interests need not coincide with
the `general' interest. Besides, they may be subjected to all kinds of political pressures.
Most existing studies on politics and public debt, however, deal with direct democracies
where the median voter is decisive, e.g. Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), Tabellini and
Alesina (1990), Tabellini (1991). Thus, the voters directly decide on a debt policy, not
the politicians. In Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), voters differ in their human and non-
human capital endowments. The current median voter may prefer a positive amount
of public debt because his children are wealthier than he is and altruism towards his
children is weak. Then, public debt is an alternative way to leave a negative bequest.
In Tabellini and Alesina (1990), voters have different preferences on the composition of
government expenditure. The current median voter uses debt to tie a future median
voter, with different preferences, to a certain policy. Tabellini (1991) deals with the
possibility of debt repudiation which redistributes from elderly to young and from rich
to poor. In his two-period model, voters in the first period differ in their income. In
other studies, public debt is used strategically by a government to tie a future govern-
ment with different policy preferences, to a policy preferred by the current government
(Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini 1990)). For a more extensive review
of these studies, the reader is referred to the introduction to Chapter 3. The model in
sThe first country to adopt a Keynesian policy norm was the U.S. in 1947 (Stevers (1993)).
9See e.g. Buchanan and Wagner (1977).
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Chapter 3 differs from the literature mentioned above because it uses a representative
democracy setting since this is the political system in most western countries. Each
period, the government, formed by the representatives of the generations alive, chooses
a level of debt which optimizes the welfare of the generations where each generation is
weighed with its (relative) political importance. Since they will not be confronted with
the repayments, present old generations prefer a maximum level of debt. This maxi-
mum is determined by foreign and domestic lenders. Because of this maximum level,
the present young may expect a large increase in future taxes if debt is increased to its
maximum level. Because of preference for consumption smoothing, they prefer a smaller
level of debt or maybe even a surplus. The evolution of public debt, due to this conflict,
is studied. Besides, the effects on this evolution due to changes in the interest rate, the
population growth rate, the individual rate of time preference and the political weight
are analysed.
1.3 ......public pensions.....
In many countries, private and public pension schemes exist side by side. Whereas pri-
vate pension schemes are usually funded according to a capital reserve (CR) scheme, i.e.
each individual saves for its own retirement, many public pension schemes are financed
using a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) scheme. I.e. current pension payments are financed
by current contributions. Thus, PAYG pension schemes redistribute from the current
young to the current elderly. The intergenerational conflict is clear. In the absence of
altruism, the elderly favour a pension transfer from the young whereas the young gen-
erations prefer not to give a pension at all, even if they anticipate to receive a pension
transfer themselves. They are not bound by an ( implicit) social contract, so that their
pension depends on the pension transfer they give to the current elderly. In absence of
altruism or social contracts, the political power of the elderly prevents the current young
from completely bleeding the elderly dry.
The development of the dependency ratios, given in table 1.1, may put severe politi-
cal pressure on the current size of the PAYG scheme. If current levels ( in terms of
welfare) of public pensions are to be maintained, this implies that pension premiums
would have to increase substantially. For countries like Germany and the Netherlands
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they would even have to become twice as high. Alternatively, keeping pension premiums
at their current level would imply a considerable decrease in pensions for the future eld-
erly. Both options are extreme and therefore not realistic. A political compromise with
lower pensions, together with higher contribution rates, seems more likely in the future
though conversion into a capital reserve system has been discussed as well. However,
pension reform is a touchy subject in politics because, in general, it is not Pareto im-
proving. An illustration of this were the proposals for pension reform in the Netherlands
in 1994 by the Christian-Democrats. These proposals were met with severe opposition
from the elderly and they were forced to retract them. In the elections shortly after-
ward, the elderly, organized in two political parties, even managed to get sufficient votes
for a number of seats in parliament. Not surprisingly, most of these votes came from
individuals who used to vote for the Christian-Democrats.
The example above illustrates that state provided public pensions are regarded as a
natural part of the modern welfare state. However, the existence of public pensions
is only a quite recent development. The first public pension scheme was enacted in
Germany in 188910. Since then many countries followed. For social security systems to
be feasible, a certain basic level of development is necessary. Hence, it was only after the
industrial revolution that many countries started to develop social security programs.
But, as argued by Verbon (1988), it was also the case that due to the industrial revol-
ution, traditional old age care was broken down. Before the industrial revolution people
lived mainly in small communities with strong social ties. These personal ties guaran-
teed some form of care for the elderly. Due to the industrial revolution, these ties were
broken which created a need for a more general social security program. However, this,
in itself, was no guarantee that social security systems were indeed installed. In the early
days of the industrial revolution some social security was provided through small private
insurance schemes (England) or guilds (Germany). But, towards the end of the 19th cen-
tury larger state intervened social security programs were installed. Several reasons are
put forward for this development. First, the working class became increasingly organized
in that period, which on the one hand led to increased political influence of the working
class, positively affecting decisions on public pensions. On the other hand, it is argued
loSee Verbon (1988) for an extensive description of the history of pension achemes in Germany, the
Netherlanda and the United States. Some basic facts concerning social security syateme are also given
in Sala-i-Martin (1994).
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that social security systems were enacted to take the wind out of the working class' sails
and prevent social unrest. Second, social security increased labor productivity and, due
to the economic development, it could now be afforded. Third, politicians might depend
on the working class' votes. As noted by Verbon (1988), none of these explanatory fac-
tors is by itself sufficient or even necessary, but they are all part of the storyll. It is clear
that not only the economic development but also changes in the political situation play
an important role in the emergence of social security systems.
Until World War II, most social security systems were financed on a capital reserve
basis. Since then, many countries switched to a Pay-As-You-Go financed system for a
variety of reasons. Besides, economic development and population growth were such that
a PAYG pension scheme was indeed feasible. The emergence and evolution of PAYG
social security systems has been the subject in many theoretical studies. Some authors
have modeled the social security system as the outcome of a voting process in a direct
democracy (Browning (1975), Boadway and Wildasin (1989)). Others have used altru-
ism as an important explanatory factor (Hansson and Stuart (1989), Veall (1986)). In
Hansson and Stewart (1989) the decisions on the PAYG system are based on a unanimity
rule, each present generation has veto power on proposed amendments to the system. In
Veall (1986) the working generation decides. Sjoblom (1985) and Verhoeven (1993) have
used the notion of a social contract to explain the existence of PAYG public pensions.
In these papers, current young generations give a pension to the current elderly if they
are supposed to do so according to the (implicit) social contract since, otherwise, they
are `punished' by the next period young who will not give a pension transfer to the
current young when old. Again others explain the existence of PAYG social security in a
representative democracy where each generation involved has political influence (Verbon
(1988), Verbon and Verhoeven (1992)). This is the approach followed in Chapter 4 and
it is used to study the evolution of a PAYG pension scheme.
It is not hard to guess that there is a link between debt and PAYG pensions. Both
redistribute between generations though in a different way. Whereas public debt redis-
tributes between generations over periods, PAYG public pensions redistribute between
11In a tecent paper by Sala-i-Martin (1994), the emergence of social security systems is linked to the
literatute on endogenous growth. Social security is a way to get older, less ptoductive workers out of
the labor force. Thia increases labor productivity.
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generations within periods. However, a PAYG pension can be seen as an implicit form
of debt. Current young generations give a pension transfer to the current elderly and
future generations repay this `debt' by giving a pension transfer to the current young
when they retire. Public debt and PAYG pensions do have different effects, howeverr2.
Hence, public debt and PAYG pensions can exist side by side. E.g. Homburg (1990) and
Breyer and Straub (1993) use public debt to transform a PAYG public pension scheme
to a CR pension scheme in the presence of distortionary taxes. Public debt is used to
compensate current generations for the loss incurred in terms of utility because of the
conversion. In Tabellini (1991), young voters, motivated by the desire to avoid intra-
generational redistributions through debt repudiation (elderly differ in wealth and, thus,
in the number of governments bonds they owe), may accept a transfer to the elderly
even if they would have opposed such a transfer if it was voted on in isolation. The
reason is that by issuing public debt, the intergenerational redistribution is tied to the
intragenerational consequences of choosing how much debt to repay (Tabellini (1991), p.
354).
1.4 ......and public investment.
In case of public investment, the redistributive impact depends on the type of invest-
ment. Public education is an example of redistribution from the current working and old
generation to the youngest generations. Investment in infrastructure is redistribution
from older to younger generations as well. Infrastructural investment often takes a con-
siderable time to build and many costs are incurred long before the investment generates
revenues in the form of, e.g., a higher productivity of private capital. Financing in-
vestments out of current tax revenues may put a large share of the burden onto the
shoulders of current older generations relative to the benefits of the investment they
have, since these benefits are partly realized in future periods when they are no longer
alive. Therefore, current older generations may not favour public investment but may be
more interested in tax cuts or more public consumption. Current young generations may,
due to the public investment, receive higher wages in the future if they are still working
or, if not, the interest revenues on their old-age savings may increase. In addition, there
1zIf Ricardian Equivalence does not hold, otherwise they are essentially the same as e.g. demonstated
in Calvo and Obstveld (1988) or Buiter and Kletzer (1990). Ricardian Equivalence ia treated in more
detail in Chapter 2.
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may be spillovers to future generations who also receive a higher wage. This increases
the future tax base which makes, e.g., higher PAYG pensions possible. This is beneficial
to the current young.
Until recently, economists have dealt with public investment mainly from a normative
point of view. In this sense, the importance of the government with respect to invest-
ment in capital was already recognized by Adam Smith who in his Wealth of Nations
called it a duty of a government `erecting and rrcaintaining those public institutions and
publíc works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great
society, are, however of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expence to
any individual or snzall number of individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected
that any individual or small group of individuals should erect or maintainn3 The types
of investment Smith had in mind were defence, justice, infrastructure and education14.
Since the days of Smith, economic thought has developed and notions like `public goods',
`externalities', etcetera, and, more general, `market failures', have been developed. The
normative role of government in correcting for market failures is widely recognized and
accepted. Besides, there is a role for government in providing the right institutional
environment for markets to operate in, like a legal system protecting property rights,
comparable to what Smith called `justice'. By correcting market failures, a government
can increase economic efficiency (i.e. Pareto efficiency)'s. Public goods like defence's
can best be provided by a government. Infrastructure also has characteristics of a public
good and, besides, has external effects, which makes provision by the government justifi-
able. Education is a typical example of a good which in principle could be fully provided
through the market. However, because of positive external effects and, in addition, for
13Smith (1776,1976), p. ii 244.
14Smith, however, treats defence and justice separately and calls them the first and second duty of the
sovereign. This quote is about the third duty of the sovereign. However, Smith links this duty to the first
two by explicitly mentioning `puólic institutions and puólic works necessary for the defence of society,
and for the administration of justice' (Smith (1776,1976) p. ii 244) before mentioning inftastucture and
education.
1sProblems arise if the government has not aufficient inatruments to attain the first-best allocation.
Then it has to make a trade-off between the efficiency gain on the one hand and the efficiency loss due
to the use of a distortionary instrument on the other hand.
1sIt can also be argued that defence is, like justice, also necessary for markets to operate since it e.g.
protecs against (foreign) invaders.
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reasons that go beyond economic efI'iciency, and have to do with equity and other ethical
reasons, education is provided (to a certain extent) by governments. Today, the types
of goods mentioned by Smith are still mainly provided by governments. But, besides
the points raised above, which can be found in every textbook on public finance, and
are treated there in more detail, public investment in these goods received little extra
attentionl~. This lasted until the mid-eighties. Then three developments put public
investment again at the forefront of economic analysis.
First, in 1989, a series of emprical investigatíons by Aschauer18 appeared dealing with
the question whether the decline in productivity in the United States and some other
countries could be attributed to a shortage of public capital. A survey of these studies
can be found in Gramlich (1994) or Munnell ( 1992). The divers results obtained make it
hard to judge whether there has been a shortage of public capital in general or of some
types of public capital in particular and whether this shortage persists (cf. Gramlich
(1994)). Second, an increase in focus on investment in public capital was caused by the
literature on endogenous growth. One way of generating growth endogenously is by in-
vestment in public capital, e.g. investment infrastucture or investment in human capital
by (publicly provided) education (Barro ( 1990)). In a standard neo-classical production
function there are diminishing returns to scale for each production factor. Hence, steady-
state growth is only caused by exogenous factors like the population growth rate. Public
capital increases the rate of return of private capital such that there is constant return
to a broad sense of capital ( i.e. private and public and~or human capital). As a re-
sult, the growth rate becomes endogenous (cf Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). Third,
the increased integration of the European countries and the world-wide integration of
financial markets puts public investment high on the political agenda. As fiscal policy
becomes increasingly harmonized in Europe, competition between countries may shift
to the provision of the best environment for firms to operate in. Needless to say that
infrastructure is an important aspect of this. E.g. in the Dutch memorandum on the
national budget 1995 ( `Miljoenennota 1995') it is noted that `high-quality infrastructure,
~.....~, is inextricably bounded up with the competitiveness of an economy and the ability
to create employment. In the globalizting world economy structural factors determining
17A notable exception is Arrow and Kutz (1970).
18Aschauer (1989a, 1989b)
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the location of businesses are eventually decisive; the quality of infrastructure is an im-
portant consideration in that. a9
This renewed interest also raises questions on what determines public investment. How-
ever, studies approaching public investment from a positive point of view by taking the
political aspects into account are scarce. There are a few exceptions. One exception is
Jappelli and Ripa di Meana (1994), which deals with public investment in a represen-
tative democracy. In their model, the government has to choose between spending on
public investment or public consumption. The weight given to the elderly lowers the level
of public investment. Their analysis, however, contains some serious flaws20. An other
study is e.g. Konrad (1993) where the elderly solely decide on the level of public capital
and on a social security tax. They choose a positive level of public capital because it
raises the tax base for the social security tax. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), who focus on
the relation between inequality and growth, let the decision on the level of public capital
be made in a direct democracy where voters differ according to income and wealth. The
voter with the median income and wealth prefers a level of public capital which is higher
than the level that maximizes economic growth. Public capital is financed by a tax on
capital. Because the median voter, who is endowed with some labour income, prefers a
higher tax rate on capital than the growth maximizing tax rate, there is overinvestment
in public capital. In Van der Ploeg and Van de Klundert (1991), short-sighted poli-
ticians, who have a higher rate of time preference than the private sector, increase public
consumption at the expense of public investment. This gives lower economic growth. In
the introduction to Chapter 5, these studies are reviewed in more detail.
The model used in Chapter 5 focuses on the intergenerational conflict over the level
of public investment. While current old generations do not benefit from public invest-
ment, current young generations benefit from public investment in the form of a higher
future return on savings. Besides, investment in public capital generates spillovers to
future generations in the form of higher wages. In a Barro (1990) fashion, public capital
is included in the private production function21. Three sets of policy instruments are
1sMiljoenennota 1995, p. 33 (original text in Dutch).
ZoThese are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
~'One could also imagine that it entere the ptivate utility functions. E.g. a better road increases the
utility of the individuals using it. This approach is, however, not followed here.
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analysed. Two of them are balanced budget policies. In the first, the government can tax
both generations at an uniform level only. In the other, the government is able to tax gen-
erations differently. The third set of policy instruments reflects that some countries have
policies or policy proposals allowing the government to use debt for investment expendi-
tures to a certain extent. In Germany, the constitution explicitly limits the government
in using debt. The increase of public debt may never exceed the increase of investment
in public capital (Fehr and Gottfried (1993)). In the Netherlands, before World War II,
debt finance was only allowed for public investment (Stevers (1993)). Reestablishment
of this norm has been discussed. It is included in the coalition agreement of the current
government22.
1.5 Outline of the rest of this thesis
The focus of this thesis is: intergenerational redistribution and conflicts between gen-
erations. In the following chapters, redistribution between elderly and young, between
current and future generations, is analysed in a representative democracy setting. I. e.
the government only takes the utilities of the current living generations into account.
When choosing its policy, the government weighs each generation according to its rela-
tive political influence. Chapter 2 analyses, in some detail, how the intergenerational
conflict is modelled in this thesis. What type of model to use, which behavioural as-
sumptions to make, how others dealt with the intergenerational conflict, etcetera.
Chapter 3, which is based upon Meijdam, Van de Ven and Verbon (1995), develops
a positive model of political decision making on public debt in a representative democ-
racy. Non-altruistic older generations favour public debt since it enables them to shift
the burden of taxation into the future. Younger generations may be more interested in
smoothing the burden of taxation over their lifetime. Since future policies are relevant
for current generations, the government does take the effect of the current debt policy on
future policy choices into account. An analytical solution is derived for the time path of
debt and taxes. Decreasing as well as increasing debt levels can be obtained. Conditions
are given determining which of these patterns prevails. Also the effects of anticipated
~~However, these norms have received criticisms as well since short-sighted politicians will try to mark
certain consumption expenditures as investment expenditures so that they are able to use debt finance.
1.5 Outline of the rest of this thesis 15
and unanticipated shocks in the exogenous parameters on the time path are analysed.
The chapter concludes with a summary and a comparison with actual debt policy after
World War II.
Chapter 4, which is based upon Van de Ven (1995a), analyses the evolution of a PAYG
pension scheme in a representative democracy. Non-altruistic elderly favour a pension
transfer from the current young generation. The willingness of the current young gen-
eration to participate in a PAYG pension system depends on the pension they expect
to receive themselves when they retire. Therefore, as in Chapter 3, the effect of current
policy choices on future policy choices is taken into account. The size of the PAYG
pension system depends on the relative political weights of the present generation and
not on some social contract. The resulting policy is compared to the policy chosen if
future policy is taken as given. A comparison is also made to the policy choice of a
government maximizing a social welfare function where also the utility of future gener-
ations is included. Also, the welfare effects of the introduction of a PAYG scheme in a
representative democracy setting for the current generations is analysed. Furthermore,
changes in the exogenous parameters, like the population growth rate and the interest
rate, are analysed.
Chapter 5, based upon Van de Ven (1995b), studies investment in public capital in
a similar representative democracy setting as used in Chapters 3 and 4. The chap-
ter starts with a discussion of the definition of a command solution in a representative
democracy. Next, the decentralized solution is derived. Public capital has several effects
on the economy. Depending on the substitutability and complementarity between pri-
vate and public capital, there is crowding-in or crowding-out of private capital. Public
capital also has effects by the way it is financed, by taxes or by public debt. There-
fore, the effects of different sets of policy instruments on the level of public capital are
analysed. Compared to the command level, over- or underinvestment is possible. Two
types of balanced-budget policies are studied, one where the government has to tax all
existing generations uniformally, and another where the government can discriminate
between different generations. The latter tax system operates as PAYG pension scheme.
Furthermore, the case where the government is allowed to use debt to finance public
investment is studied.
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In the previous chapter an introduction was given to the topic of this thesis, intergener-
ational conflict and intergenerational redistribution. Generations have different prefer-
ences over the size and composition of public expenditures, including those expenditures
that redistribute resources between generations. It is the government that decides on
these expenditures and in most countries it operates in a representative democracy set-
ting. In this setting, the government is formed by politicians who are elected to represent
the interests of their voters. Besides, interest groups may exert pressure on the politicians
to persuade them to enact that policy which is preferred by that interest group. The
policy chosen is therefore often a political compromise between the different preferences
of the groups involved. When dealing with intergenerational redistribution, the groups
involved are the different generations present.
The assumption of a representative democracy has interesting consequences since it
implies that each period there is a new government, formed by the representatives of
the then living generations. But, policy choices of past governments affect current policy
options. Moreover, since generations live longer than one period, policy choices by future
governments may be relevant for (some) present generations since they will still be alive
at that time. These present generations may therefore anticipate on these future policy
choices when deciding on their own preferred policy today. An additional point concerns
determination of a command solution, i.e. the policy chosen by a dictator which can
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directly set consumption and capital levels. If the scope for policy-making for the dicta-
tor is confined to one period then behavioural assumptions with respect to future policy
choices may have to be made. If the dictator not only cares about present generations
but about future generations as well, apart from the difference in instruments, there is
an additional source of difference between the dictator's policy and the decentralized
representative government's policy, namely, the disregarding of these future, yet unborn,
generations.
This chapter deals with how to model intergenerational conflict and how to deal with the
relation between current and future policy choices. For that purpose this chapter can be
divided into two parts. The first part, sections 2.2 and 2.3, discusses the choice of the
necessary inputs like overlapping-generations models and game theory. In the second
part, section 2.4, first, other studies dealing with political conflicts are reviewed. Next,
the inputs developed are used to construct a model of a government in a representative
democracy as it is used in the following chapters. Besides, the relation to a social wel-
fare maximizer and a dictator is discussed. These are both used to compare the policy
choice of a representative government to. The final section discusses some specific details
related to the following chapters.
2.2 Redistribution and overlapping generations
The focus of this thesis is intergenerational conflict and redistribution via public debt,
public pensions and public investment. Analysing intergenerational conflict implies
studying relatively long-term phenomena. Neoclassical economics, often distinguised
as dealing with long-term tendencies of economies (cf. Bernheim (1989b)), is therefore
the proper paradigm to embed the analysis in. When dealing with redistributive issues,
there is one notion worth pointing out and that is the work centering around `Ricardian
Equivalence'. Ricardo (1817) considered tax finance and debt finance to be equivalent.
For a given level of expenditures, financing by debt or taxes was equivalent since indi-
vidual tax payers would recognize the future liabilities associated with debt and would
increase their savings appropriately. As a result their consumption pattern over time is
unchanged. However, Ricardo did not really believe this to hold in practice. In his view
people were myopic and issuing publíc debt would lead to profuse expenditure. In 1974
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Ricardian Equivalence was `rediscovered' by Barro. In a series of papers following Barro
(1974), the exact requirements for Ricardian Equivalence were disentangled. Among
others, they include, first, rational farsighted individuals should either live forever or
should through altruisticcally motivated bequests or gifts be linked to their immediate
descendents and, thus, behave as if they live forever. Second, capital markets operate
perfectly. Third, taxes are non-distortionary. Fourth, there are no differential borrowing
rates. Fifth, there is no uncertainty with respect to future taxes and income. The impli-
cations of these assumptions went further than just the equivalence between taxes and
debt. Also intergenerational redistribution via a PAYG pension scheme becomes useless.
Individuals offset the redistribution by changing their private savings appropriately. In
fact, how the government finances its expenditures becomes irrelevant. The Ricardian
Equivalence theorem has been subject to many critical studies (cf. Bernheim (1987,
1989b), Barro (1989), Bernheim and Bagwell (1988), Seater (1993)). Besides inconclus-
ive empirical evidence (cf. Seater (1993)), there is no dispute over the implausibility of
the strong assumptions underlying the Equivalence theorem. Taxes usually are distor-
tionary, capital markets do not operate perfectly and there is uncertainty with respect
to future developments. In this thesis it is assumed that individuals are non-altruistic.
Though altruism is present in reality as well (see e.g. Van der Heijden et al.(1995)) it is
not likely to exist in the specific form formulated by Barro (1974). In reality, there are
many intrafamily linkages (Bernheim and Bagwell (1988)) or impure forms of altruism
due to incomplete information, to utility derived from the `joy of giving' or to constraints
on intergenerational altruism (Abel and Bernheim (1991)). This leads to the conclusion
that the Ricardian view is at most an interesting intellectual bench-mark. For policy
analysis, however, it is clearly unsuitable. Therefore, in this thesis, Ricardian Equival-
ence does not hold.
The next question is, which model to use? When dealing with intergenerational redistri-
bution, it is not surprising that overlapping-generation (OLG) models form an important
tool for the analysis in the following chapters. In an OLG model, at each point in time,
a part of the current population dies and is replaced by new individuals or generations.
Since Ricardian Equivalence does not hold, generations are not linked by altruism as in
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Barro (1974)1. OLG models, in turn, can be subdivided into two subclasses. There is the
`classic' Samuelson-Diamond OLG model (Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1965)) and the
`modern' Blanchard-Yaari OLG model (Blanchard (1985), Yaari (1965), Weil (1989)). In
the Samuelson-Diamond OLG model time is discrete and each period a new generation
is `born' living for a finite number of periods, usually two or three, after which they `die'.
It is not difficult to see that at each point in time the number of different generations
alive is exactly equal to the number of periods each individual lives. Note also that, and
this is important for the sequel, at each point in time, members of different generations
have a different remaining lifetime. The second type of OLG model, the Blanchard-Yaari
model, differs from the `classic' OLG model by the fact that individuals do not have a
finite number of periods to live but face, at each point in time, a constant probability of
dying. The implication of this assumption is that at each point in time, each individual
alive, irrespective of its date of birth, has the same expected remaining lifetime. This
explains why this model is also known as a model of `perpetual youth'. Generations
differ in the amount of wealth they have accumulated over their lifetime.
An important driving force behind intergenerational conflicts is the fact that members
of different generations face a different remaining lifetime over which they plan their
consumption, savings etcetera. Since in the Blanchard-Yaari model, at each point in
time, each individual alive has the same expected remaining lifetime, the driving force
behind the conflicts studied in this thesis is absent in that model. Thus, the classic
Samuelson-Diamond OLG model, where at each point in time, members of different gen-
erations face a different remaining lifetime, is the most appropriate model for the object
of this study2. Generations will favour policies which are beneficial to them during their
lifetime without incurring (part of) the costs since these are shifted onto the shoulders
of other present or future generations.
In the upcoming chapters, a two-overlapping-generations structure is used. Individuals
1This kind of altruism would give a Ramsey type of model, because individuals would act as if they
live forever and Ricardian Equivalence would hold.
ZDifferences in remaining lifetime are certainly important when dealing with redistribution via public
debt or public investment. Though this does not hold for PAYG public pensions, modelling PAYG
public pension achemes is much simpeler in a Samuelson-Diamond OLG model without losing any of
the essential featutes.
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live for two periods after which they die. In the first period they work and earn labour
income or they receive an initial endowment. In the second period they are retired and
rely for their consumption on their own private savings or some form of pension transfer
from the government. This structure implies that at each point in time two generations
are present. They will be called `young' and `elderly' respectively. Of course, the young
in one period are the elderly in the next period. Furthermore, they are assumed to be
non-altruistic. The individuals will be assumed to optimize some lifetime utility function
U which is taken to be additive separable over time. Hence, a member of the generation
born at time t optimizes
Ut - U(ci,ci~l) - u(ci) f Bv(ci~l), 0 G B G 1 (2.2.1)
where u and v are the direct utility functions in the first period, when young, and
the second period, when old, of their lives respectively. cy denotes consumption when
young, co denotes consumption when old. B is the factor at which individuals discount
their future consumption.
2.3 Games and dynamics
Conflicts between generations form an important aspect of this thesis. Situations of con-
flict can be analysed with the use of game theory which deals with situations in which
several persons or institutions (players) are involved with (possibly) conflicting interests.
In the present analysis, the players involved are the current and future generations and
the different governments since, in each period, a new government is formed by the rep-
resentatives of the generations then alive. This implies that, each period, two games
are played. One between the private sector, consisting of the generations present, and
the government. The other between current and future governments because current
governments may have to take future policy choices into account when choosing their
own policies since these future policy choices may affect the utility of current generations.
This dependence of present policy choices on future policy choices and, besides, the fact
that current policy options depend on past policy choices, makes this game intrinsically
dynamics. More precisely, the present state, i.e. the resulting situation due to the cur-
SThough not a real `dynamic game' as will be seen below.
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rently chosen actions by the players, depends on past states (which, of course, are the
result of past actions). E.g. the size of the current PAYG pension system may depend
crucially on the past savings of the current elderly. The inherited level of public debt,
due to past policy choices, affects current policy options. Besides, the creation of public
debt affects future policy options since this debt has to be redeemed some day in the
future and a part of this future debt redemption may fall onto the shoulders of some
current generations.
When applying game theory, an important assumption which has to be made concerns
the behavioural attitude towards the actions of the other playerss. There are two possi-
bilities. First, when choosing his own action, each player takes the actions of the other
players as given. This is a case of Nash behaviour. Second, there is Stackelberg behav-
iour in which players act in a hierarchical order and announce their actions one after
the other. Players lower in the decision-hierarchy know the actions of the players higher
up in the decision-hierarchy and take the actions into account when deciding on their
own actions. Players higher up in the decision-hierarchy take the reactions of players
lower in the decision-hierarchy on their actions into account. A player higher up in the
decision-hierarchy is a Stackelberg leader with respect to the player lower in the decision-
hierarchy, who is a Stackelberg follower with respect to the leader.
When players act in different periods, Stackelberg behaviour seems the most natural
assumption. The players acting in earlier periods are Stackelberg leaders with respect
to players acting in later periods who are the Stackelberg followers. This is the case
for the government in the analysis in Chapters 3 and 4. I. e. the current government
is Stackelberg leader with respect to the government in the next period. However, in
Chapter 5 Nash behaviour towards future governments had to be assumed to keep the
sA second important asaumption which has to be made when dealing with real dynamic games is on
the available information. Two possible assumptiona can, roughly, be discerned. Either, there is open
loop information or there is feedback information. In the firat case, there is only information on the
initial atate of the game. While playing the game, no information on current states becomes available. In
the second case, while playing the game, each period information concerning the atate at the beginning
of that period becomes available. See e.g. De Zeeuw and Van der Ploeg (1991). But, as argued, the
games analysed here are not true dynamic games. Hence, this kind of assumptions is not relevant here.
An exception is when the government optimizes social welfare, i.e, the utilities of all current and future
generationa.
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analysis somewhat tractable. Besides, Stackelberg behaviour can also be appropriate if
one of the players is `big' compared to the other player. This is the case for the game
played each period between the government and the private sector. The government is
one `big' organization while the private sector consists of a large number of individuals,
each acting atomistically, i.e. they consider the effect of their private actions on the
actions of others negligible and, thus, take the actions of others as given. Hence, the
government is Stackelberg leader with respect to the private sector.
Thus, games as well as dynamics play an important role in the analysis of the following
chapters. However, though closely related, the combination of the two, the theory of
dynamic games, cannot be applied. For a game to be dynamic requires, besides the
dependence of the present state on past states, repeated interaction of the players. How-
ever, in the present context, players interact only once since each period the government
is formed by a new set of politicians. Moreover, old generations die and new generations
are born each period. On the other hand, however, past states do matter for current
states. E.g. the inherited level of public debt is relevant for current policy choices and,
thus, for the current level of debt. Past savings of the current elderly do matter for the
level of the pension benefit they will receive. This implies that solutions to the games
analysed here are derived in a similar way as solutions to dynamic games. However, the
standard techniques, as used in dynamic game theory, cannot be applied.
2.4 Modelling political conflict
Using the materials given in Sections 2 and 3 the model of a government in a represen-
tative democracy, as used in the upcoming chapters, can be constructed. When solving
this model, the difference between Nash and Stackelberg behaviour with respect to future
policy choices is indicated. Also some issues in relation to social welfare maximizers and
command solutions are treated. But, first, a short overview is given of other literature
dealing with the politics of intergenerational redistribution.
Related literature How have others dealt with the politics of intergenerational re-
distribution? Most of this literature has recently been reviewed in Breyer (1994) and
has also been discussed in Chapter 1. But in the previous chapter, the focus was on the
political conflict itself, here, limited to dynamic models, the focus is on the modelling of
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the political conflict.
Most contributions are in the field of public pensions. As argued, Stackelberg lead-
ership of current governments with respect to future governments is a natural assump-
tion. However, Stackelberg games are often difficult to solve analytically. The existing
literature has dealt with the effects of future policies on current policies in a variety of
ways. Verbon and Verhoeven (1992), in a paper on PAYG pensions, assume that cur-
rent policymakers take future decisions as given. Thus, Nash behaviour is assumed. In
another paper on pensions, Veall (1986) makes the (inconsistent) assumption of present
generations displaying Stackelberg behaviour towards future generations, while future
generations display Nash behaviour towards their succeeding generations. The incon-
sistency arises because the generations of the next period are assumed to behave in the
same way, i.e. display Stackelberg behaviour towards their successors and assume future
generations to display Nash behaviour. In Browning (1975) and Boadway and Wildasin
(1989), current generations decide on a pension policy based on the assumption that this
policy is not changed in the future. In Browning (1975), this turns out to be correct,
since future generations make the same assumption. In Boadway and Wildasin (1989)
this leads to an initial overshooting of the steady-state values of the pension transfers
after which, depending on the parameters, they gradually converge to the steady state
by a pattern of alternative over- and undershooting, or they do not converge but cycle
around the steady state. Hansson and Stuart (1989) assume that the chosen pension
policy is laid down in the constitution. Since amendments to the chosen policy are only
possible by unanimous consent, the policy is never changed.
In the case of public debt, taking future policy as given, i.e. Nash behaviour towards
future governments, it is not difl'icult to see that, in the presence of non-altruistic indi-
viduals, debt policy would be completely determined by the maximum sustainable level
of debt which is determined, among others, by the tax base. Thus, in this case Stack-
elberg behaviour towards future governments is important. Stackelberg behaviour has
been introduced before in the models with public debt. Persson and Svensson (1989),
where public debt is used strategically to tie a future government to a certain policy, and
Tabellini and Alesina (1990), who analyse voting on the budget deficit, use Stackelberg
behaviour in a two-period model. Alesina and Tabellini (1990), which is very similar
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to Persson and Svensson (1989) confine themselves to steady-state analysis. Tabellini
(1991) develops a two period model where voters in the first period decide on a level of
debt, taking the tax policy of the second period into account. In this model, altruism
plays an important role as well. Altruism is also important in Cukierman and Meltzer
(1989), where public debt is used to transfer resources from the future to the present
because (some) children are wealthier than their parents. These studies are reviewed in
more detail in the introduction to Chapter 3.
The government in a representative democracy. As mentioned on several oc-
casions before in this thesis, the government is assumed to operate in a representative
democracy setting since this is the dominant political system in most countries. The
government is formed by politicians who represent the interests of various groups present
in society, like workers, pensioners, employers, etcetera. Each of these groups' interests,
which can be described by the utility of a reperesentative member of the group, receives
a weight, called the political power, in the objective function maximized by the govern-
ment. This political weight is the result of, e.g., competition among the different interest
groups for political influence, lobbying and similar activities by these interest groups or
competition among politicians for the votes of these interest groups. Concentrating on
the intergenerational conflict, it is convenient to distinguish two groups, namely young
and elderly. Thus, it is assumed that the government maximizes a weighed combination
of the utility of the elderly and young. In general, this polítical weight will be a function
of the size of the generation. In the sequel this function is assumed to be linear. In that
case the objective function of the government in period t can be represented by~:
Ut-1 f~(1 f n)Ui - Bv(ci) f ~(1 -1-n) [u(c~) f Bv(cifl)~ (2.4.1)
where ~ is the political importance of a current young individual relative to a current
old individual. n is the population growth rate. Hence, the relative political power of
the young generation equals a(1 f n). The expression after the equality sign follows
from using eq. (2.2.1) where the current elderly are only included with their old-age
utility. The government maximizes eq. (2.4.1) using the available instruments, It and is
~Bernheim (1989a) calls a decision function as eq. (2.4.1) `witóin an overlapping generatíons frame-
work, ....the most natural class of welfare functíons for a representative government' (Bernheim (1989a),
p. 124.)
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subjected to a budget constraint. The approach to government behaviour followed here
is closely related to the interest function approach as developed by Van Winden (1983)
or the model of competition among pressure groups as developed by Becker (1983). For a
behavioural underpinning the reader is referred to Coughlin et al. (1990) which is based
on probabilistic voting models of vote-maximizing politicians. The political weights can
also be thought of as being the result of different interest groups engaging in lobbying
activities in order to obtain influence on political decisions (Potters and Van Winden
(1993)). An alternative interpretation of eq. (2.4.1) is that of a generation of young who
decide on which policy to implement and who are altruistic towards the elderly. ~~a then
measures the degree of altruism.
As a result of the actions of the private and public sector, the state the economy is
in evolves over time. In the notation of this chapter, this can be denoted by
Se - Bc(le, Se; Se-i; . . .) (2.4.2)
St denotes the state variable at the end of period t(and thus, at the beginning of period
t-f 1)s. The state variable can be the level of public debt, the level of capital, etcetera.
The `...' stands, as before, for other relevant variables (interest rates, etcetera) which
are, for convenience, taken as given in this section. These state variables are subjected
to terminal conditions, SN - S9.
If the government in period t is a Stackelberg leader with respect to future governments,
it takes the behavioural response of these future governments on the current policy choice
into account. Denote the optimal policy choice of the next period government by Ii~l.
Ii~l is a function of the state variable at the beginning of period t f 1, St. Of course,
in this policy choice, the policy choices in period t f 2 etcetera, are taken into account.
By using the budget constraint of the government, eq. (2.4.2), li~l can be written as a
function of I~ and St-1. Then, the first-order condition for the government in period t is
given by:'o
sNot to be confused with private savings at.
9In general, the terminal condition can, of course, take any value. It can also be an interval.
loTo avoid unnecessarily complex notation, it is assumed here that the government has only one policy
instrument. Thus, the set It contains only one element.
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9dvt .~c~ f~(1 -~
n)dut dci }~(1 } n)edvi~l dcifi dlétl - 0dc~ d7: dci dlt dc:~, dli~, dIi
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(2.4.3)
The inclusion of the derivative of private savings with respect to the instrument of the
government reflects the fact that the government is Stackelberg leader with respect to the
private sector. The term did in the first-order condition of the government, eq. (2.4.3),
reflects the Stackelberg behaviour with respect to future governments. If Nash behaviour
is assumed, this term disappears. The solution to this model is found by starting in the
final period N, where the optimal policy is determined by the terminal condition on the
state variable, SN. By recursively working backward, the complete solution to the model
can, in principle, be derived.
The model sofar is intended to be positive, i.e. describing actual developments chosen by
a representative government. Then two, interesting, comparisons can be made. One is
comparing this outcome to a government that not only cares about current generations
but also about future generations. I, e., to a government maximizing social welfare. Com-
paring this model to the representative democracy gives the effects of myopia, i.e. the
disregarding of future generations, on the policy choices. Alternatively, one might be
interested in comparing the policy choices of a representative government to the policy
choice of a dictator who has the same objective function but who is able to directly
set consumption and capital levels. This comparison shows whether the representative
government has sufficient instruments to attain the same allocation as the dictator. At-
tention is given to both these alternatives.
Social welfare versus representative democracy. For a government optimizing
a social welfare function where the utilities of all current and future generations are
included, the objective function is given byll
N N
~~P(1 f n)~~Ui-1 - ~~P(1 f n)~t~ev(co) } P(I f n)u(cv)~ (2.4.4)
t-o ;-o
i1This is a Benthamite social welfare function. If each generation is not weighed with its relative size,
(1 f n)', a Millian social welfare function would result.
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where p is the social discount factor12. If N-~ oo, for the sum to be finite it has to hold
that [p(1 f n)]' G 1. The solution to this problem is found by solving the equations of
Bellman's principle of dynamic programming recursively13:
V(St-1) - max{9v(ci) f P(1 f n)u(ctv) f V~r(Ss)} t- 1,...,N (2.4.5)
VN}1(SN) - maX{e71(CN) ~ p(1 -~ 7L)u(CN)} (2.4.Ó)
Vi is called the value function and gives the maximum value of the objective function
over the remainder of the planning period, in this example period t until period N, as a
function of the state at the beginning of the current period. The first-order conditions
are given by:
dvt dci dut dcty dV ~r ( St )-eact . ált ~p(I~n)~ci .~It fp(1.f.n) dlt -0 t- 1,...,N (2.4.7)
dvN dCN duN dCN -
B d~o . dIN f p(1 f n) d~v . dIN - 0
N N
(2.4.8)
For more details on this, the reader is referred to the many textbooks available on the
topic of dynamic programming (e.g. Sargent (1987)).
Both problems, the representative democracy and the social welfare optimization, are
solved in a similar manner. Starting in the final period, where the policy choice is com-
pletely determined by the terminal condition on the state variables, the complete solution
is found by working recursively backward. Note the difference between the government
operating in a representative democracy and the social welfare maximizer. In the former
case, there is no value function. The current government is not interested in maximizing
the utilities of future generations, it only is interested in future policy choices insofar
1zIn the term on the right-hand-side, the young-age utility of the first generation and the old-age
utility of the last generation are left out. In the former case, this utility is enjoyed before the world
atarted, in the latter, after the world terminated.
13Implicitely it is asaumed that the government hae information on the current atate. Which ia a trivial
aseumption. Hence, in the terminology of dynamic games, this is the feedback information atructure.
See footnote 6 of thia chapter.
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they affect current generations. Hence, in the first-order condition, eq. (2.4.3), there is
an expression containing the derivative of the utility of the present young when old with
respect to the policy instrument li. Note that the effect of It on vt~l works through the
Stackelberg term, i.e. the effect of the present policy It on the optimal policy choice of
the future government (It}1). There is a priori no reason that both approaches lead to
similar policy choices and, in general, this is not the case. On the contrary, one would
expect that they would lead to different outcomes because, e.g., if p-.~, a social welfare
maximizer gives much more weight to future developments than a sequence of represen-
tative governments because it takes the utilities of all future generations into account.
However, in some cases, for specific choices of the values of the exogeneous parameters,
the two approaches can give identical policy choices. For the parameter choices giving
this result in Chapters 3 and 4, it holds that a is larger than p. This higher weight for the
current young generation in a representative democracy compensates for the disregarding
of future generations, which are taken into account by a social welfare maximizer.
Central planning versus representative democracy. The market solution for a
representative democracy can also be compared to a command solution. However, when
defining a command solution complications arise. Usually, a command solution is defined
for a social welfare maximizer, choosing the consumption and capital levels maximizing
the utilities of all present and future generations once-and-for-all. But, dealing with a
representative democracy, this is not the appropriate thing to do because it implies not
only compasing whether some set of instruments suffices to attain the command outcome
but also comparing myopia to social welfase. Therefore, one should define a command
solution for a myopic dictator caring about present generations only. But then, what to
do with ci}1? Since the scope for such a myopic dictator is confined to one period only
(in this case period t), citl is chosen by the myopic dictator in the following period (as
ci is chosen by the present myopic dictator). But, ci~l gives utility to the current young
generation, a generation the present myopic dictator cares about. Hence, behavioural
assumptions with respect to ci~l are necessary. As seen above, this can either be Nash or
Stackelberg. Solving this problem is similar to solving the problem of the decentralized
representative democracy. The difference is the set of intruments, which, in case of a
command solution, contains consumption and capital levels. The first-order condition
resembles eq. (2.4.3). Of course, behavioural assumptions with respect to the private
sector are no longer relevant.
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2.5 Final remarks
The previous section treated the basic model as it will be used in the upcoming chapters
in general terms. In this final section, the differences between these chapters are given.
It, the policy instruments of the government, differs in each of the following chapters. In
Chapter 3, dealing with public debt, the policy instrument available to the government
will be debt, obviously, and a uniform consumption tax levied on both generations. The
choice of a consumption tax instead of an income tax or lump-sum taxes is driven by the
fact that a consumption tax is analytically more tractable and, therefore allows to focus
on the effects of the intergenerational conflict. Moreover, in most countries, pension
savings are deductable from the income tax. Assuming this in Chapter 3 implies that
an income tax is effectively a consumption tax. Similar reasons are behind the choice
for lump-sum taxes in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, where a PAYG pension scheme
is analysed, a lump-sum tax is levied on the current young generations. The revenues of
this tax are used to make a lump-sum pension transfer to the elderly. In this chapter,
there is no public debt. Thus, each period, the revenues of the lump-sum tax are exactly
equal to the transfer payments to the elderly. In Chapter 5, dealing with public invest-
ment, three sets of policy instruments are discussed. First, a uniform lump-sum tax
levied on both generations. Second, a time- and age-dependent lump-sum tax. Finally,
lump-sum taxes and public debt. The revenues of the taxes and, if possible, of public
debt issuance, are used to finance public investment and, if necessary, debt repayments.
Investment in public capital raises the interest rate in the next period which is beneficial
to the current young. The return on their savings increases. The current elderly have
nothing to gain from public investment. There is also a spillover to future generations
because their wage increases.
Chapters 3 and 4 are similar in many respects. In both chapters the government is
assumed to be a Stackelberg leader with respect to future governments. Besides, the
policy choices of a representative government are compared to the policy choices of a
social welfare maximizer. With this comparison, the effects of disregarding the utility
of future generations is analysed. The decentralized solution and the command solution
for a social welfare maximizer are identical. In this case the government has sufficient
instruments to replicate the command solution through the market. The main empha-
sis in these chapters is on the evolution of government policy. In Chapter 3 this is a
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debt policy whereas in Chapter 4, a Pay-As-You-Go public pension policy is the object
of study. To prevent the solution from being dominated by `end-of-time' effects14, an
infinite horizon model is analysed in these chapters. Finally, both chapters deal with
small open economies. Chapter 5, dealing with investment in public capital, is somewhat
different. The economy is assumed to be closed. Public capital affects wages and the
interest rate with a lag of one period. Thus, increases in the level of public capital is
beneficial to the younger generations only because the return on their savings increases.
A small open economy would imply a fixed world interest rate rendering an uninteresting
problem. In that case, public investment only affects wages. Since investments in public
capital become productive with a lag of one period and none of the present generations
work in the following period, present generations are not interested in public invest-
ment. Closing the economy, however, considerably complicates the analysis. Therefore,
the assumption of Stackelberg behaviour towards future governments is replaced by the
assumption of Nash behaviour to keep the analysis somewhat tractable. However, in
contrast to Chapter 3, this implies no loss of any of the essential features in this chapter.
Furthermore, the analysis has to be confined to a steady-state analysis. As a benchmark
case, the command solution for a representative democracy is used. Thus, the focus is
on whether the government in the decentralized economy has sufficient instruments to
obtain the command outcome.
14Imagine a two-period model. Then, if public debt has to be redeemed the aecond period, policy
in this final period is to a large extent determined beforehand. Besides, in a two-period-model, each
individuals horizon is equivalent and there is no inherent tendency to ahift taxes to future periods as
these future taxea have to be paid by the individuals themselves.
Chapter 3
The dynamics of public debt
3.1 Introduction
In many western countries a similar evolution of public debt after World War II occurred.
First, debt ratios declined, until, somewhere in the mid seventies, they started to rise.
Recently, the EC countries have proclaimed by way of the Maastricht Treaty that stabi-
lization of debt ratios (at a relatively low value) is the policy goal to be targeted. These
phenomena raise the question as to the determining factors of the evolution of debt. The
age structure of the population may constitute an important factor. As already sketched
in Chapter 1, older generations of tax payers may favor a debt-financed tax cut since it
enables them to avoid tax payments by shifting these taxes to future periods when they
are no longer alive. Younger generations, not expecting to avoid these tax payments,
may favor policies which smooths these tax payments over their lifecycle. Trivially, the
effect of the age structure depends to a large extent on the ruling tax regime. In the
overlapping-generations model, to be developed in Section 3.2, all consumers, both young
and old, pay a consumption tax at the same rate. For the elderly, tax shifting by debt
creation would then be advantageous. For the young, however, tax shifting implies that
they are confronted with a higher future tax burden. Though the model used in this
chapter has an infinite horizon, continuously passing on debt by issuing new debt with-
out repaying at least part of the principal or the interest burden is not possible. The
domestic and foreign lenders (an open economy is assumed) will prevent the government
from issuing more debt than it is ever able to repay, including the interest payments.
Since it is never able to repay more than it ever can collect in taxes, this constitutes an
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upper limit for the level of debt which equals the present value of all future tax payments
minus the present value of any future government expenditures. Besides, the government
is assumed to operate in a representative democracy setting and as such optimizes the
utilities of current generations only. Hence, the desire of the young to smooth taxes over
their lifecycle will prevent the government from accumulating debt as fast as possible.
In such a model, ageing, i. e. an increase in the number of elderly relative to the number
of young, has two effects. The political influence of the elderly, who prefer tax shifting,
increases due to an increase in their relative number. On the other hand, a decrease in
population growth leads to a decrease of the tax base. This implies that the possibilities
for tax shifting decrease in the long run. As a consequence, the current young may
be confronted with a higher future tax burden if taxes are shifted to the future now.
Therefore, they will be more strongly opposed to tax shifting.
From this perspective, this chapter analyses the choice of the debt policy of a rational
government. It is assumed that the government only takes the utility of current gen-
erations into account. So, it may be interpreted as a representative government which
consists of subsequent generations of politicians with a finite time horizon. There is no
way a present politician is able to bind his successors to a planned policy. This does not
imply that future policy is exogenously given to a present politician: public debt is the
instrument through which he is able to influence future decisions. Therefore, rational
expectations of future decisions have to be formed. In particular, generations of poli-
ticians are assumed to be able to calculate all possible paths of future taxes (and, hence,
debt levels) as a function of the present tax rate and to pick the path that maximizes
their welfare, i.e. they are assumed to be Stackelberg leaders towards future generations
of politicians.
The assumption of Stackelberg leadership has been introduced before in this context.
Persson and Svensson (1989) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990) use Stackelberg behaviour
in a two-period model. In Persson and Svensson (1989), a government with a relatively
low preference for public consumption, which is sure to be replaced the next period by a
government with a relatively high preference for public consumption, will issue debt in
order to constrain the next-period government in its policy choice. It has to redeem the
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debt and, therefore, has less possibilities for public consumption expenditures. Tabellini
and Alesina (1990) construct a model where heterogeneous individuals have to vote on
the budget deficit. The heterogeneity stems from different preferences with respect to
the composition of public expenditures. Since the median voter in both periods may
differ, the median voter in the first period takes the effect of its choice on the choice of
the next period median voter into account. Alesina and Tabellini (1990), which is closely
related to Persson and Svensson (1989), do consider an infinite-horizon model but confine
themselves to a steady-state analysis. The difference with Persson and Svensson (1989)
is that a current government is not sure to be replaced by another government but faces
a certain (exogenously) given probability to be replaced. Consumers are heterogeneous
in a similar way as in Tabellini and Alesina (1990). As in Persson and Svensson (1989)
there are different policymakers who have different preferences with respect to the size
and composition of public expenditures. Again public debt is used strategically to affect
future policy choices. Note that in these models each individuals horizon is equivalent to
the horizon of the government. As a result, there is no inherent tendency to shift taxes
to future periods as these future taxes have to be paid by the individuals themselves.
In this chapter, the difference in time horizon of different generations is at the heart
of the analysis. Like the literature cited above, repudiationr is abstracted from. Con-
trary to this work, successive generations of policymakers are assumed to have identical
preferences. Moreover, an infinite-time horizon is considered. This chapter also abstracts
from altruism. Assuming that the policy adopted reflects the interests of the different
groups present in that period, an explicit solution for the time path of public debt and
the tax rate is derived. It appears that, depending on the relation between the interest
rate, the population growth rate, the private díscount rate and the relative political im-
portance of the generations, public debt can decrease or increase in the course of time.
In the latter case, it asymptotically approaches a finite maximum sustainable value,
1Tabellini ( 1991) studies debt as an instrument of intergenerational redistribution in a two-period
model that allows for repudiation. Altruism is essential for his results. Without altruiam the government
budget ia always in balance because rational lenders will foresee future repudiation and, therefore, will
not lend to the government. If, however, they are altruistic towards future generations, they will
accept a partial repudiation since this is beneficial to futute genetationa. Other papere dealing with
intergenerational redistribution in a political-economic model with altruism include Cukierman and
Meltzer ( 1989) and Hansson and Stuart (1989).
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determined by the present value of the total future tax collections minus public expendi-
tures. Note that this result contradicts the claim made by Tabellini and Alesina (1990),
who state that `(i~n an overlapping generations model with no altruism,..., current voters
would be unanimously in favor of the largest possible óudget deficit,...'Z Tabellini and
Alesina (1990) forget that current young generations prefer tax smoothing to a certain
extent since they are present the next period and will otherwise be confronted with an
enormous increase in tax payments.
It can be shown that the time path chosen by representative governments may, but
need not, coincide with the one that results in the case of a social-welfare-maximizing
government, i. e. a government that takes the utilities of all current and future gener-
ations into account.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the
overlapping-generations model. Section 3.3 presents the solution to the model. The
ability to calculate time paths for debt also makes it possible to analyse how the course
of these paths will change due to exogenous changes in the parameters. This is done in
Section 3.4. Besides, a comparison is made with actual debt policy after World War II.
The final section concludes.
3.2 The Model
In the sequel, a small open economy will be assumed where debtors are able to borrow
from domestic lenders as well as foreign lenders, both against a fixed world interest rate.
In this case, the capacity of the domestic capital market does not impose any restrictions
on the borrowing behaviour of the government. This in contrast with a closed economy,
where government borrowing is restricted by the domestic supply of savings.
The Consumers
A standard overlapping-generations model is used where two non-altruistic generations,
old and young, are present at the same time. Each individual lives for two periods. In
the first period, he is endowed with one unit of income of which he saves an amount s.
ZTabellini and Alesina ( 1990), p. 38.
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He has to pay a tax rate r over the remaining part. The rest is used for consumption in
the first period of his life, civ, which therefore equals:
Ct - (1 - Tt)(1 - st). (3.2.1)
When he is old, the savings including the interest revenues net of taxes are consumed:
~ttl - (1 - Tt}1)(1 f r)st (3.2.2)
where ct}1 is old-age consumption at time t~- 1 and r is the given fixed world interest
rate. So, at a given time the young and the elderly pay the same tax rate which excludes
direct transfers from the current young to the current elderly. Note that the tax system
used is actually a consumption tax instead of an income tax. st are savings for future
consumption so that these can be considered as pension premiums which are tax de-
ductible in many countries. The value of savings, including accrued interest, then equals
the pension benefit which is taxable. The young optimize a lifetime-utility function
Ut - U(ci,cL~l) subject to eqs. (3.2.1) and (3.2.2). The instrument in the optimization
is the savings rate. Hence, the first-order condition reads:
ast --a~t (1-rt)-1-~Ut (l~r)(1-Teti)-0 (3.2.3)t t tt~
From this follows s~ - s~ (rt, Tt~l, r) as the optimal amount of savings.
The Government
Government outlays at time t consist of interest payments on the given amount of govern-
ment debt per consumer of generation t- 1, bt-1i and given expenditures per consumer
of generation t, gt. These expenditures give no utility to the consumers and can be seen
as an (exogenous) collection costs of taxes, independent of the amount of taxes. The
government generates revenues by levying taxes. Abstracting from the possibility of debt
repudiation, directly or indirectly through monetary finance, the government's budget
identity reads:
bt - ~ 1~- n J bt-~ -~ gt - Tt
( 3.2.4)
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where n is the growth rate of the population and Tt is total tax revenue per consumer
of generation t. From eqs. (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) it follows that total tax revenue equals:
r1-Frl
Ts - Ts[(1 - si)
f` 1 -~ nl s`-`~
(3.2.5)
Two natural conditions constrain the set of fiscal policies open to the government. First,
the government is forced by the foreign and domestic lenders to obey the well-known
No-Ponzi-Game condition which simply says that the principal and the service of the
debt cannot be financed completely by going into new debt. In other words, it requires




Aggregating forward eq. (3.2.4) from period t on to a final period T, the government's
intertemporal budget constraint results:
r1~ rl ~-T T 1} r e-i
b` - `1 -~ nl ~ ~ ~ `1 f n~ (Ti - 9i)
(3.2.7)
i-sf1
The NPG condition then implies that the intertemporal budget constraint for an infinite
horizon can be written as:
~ (1 f rl t-i
b` -~`1 f n I (Ti - 9i );-ct1
(3.2.8)
which is the well-known result that the present debt has to be met by future primary
surpluses. This condition is tightened by a second natural constraint. When raising
taxes, the government faces a maximum tax rate, Tmas, which, obviously, never exceeds
13. This implies that the total of future primary surpluses is finite (assuming that the
tax base grows at a rate smaller than 1~) and thus constitutes a threshold value, bmaz,
above which the (foreign) lenders will no longer be willing to buy government debt since
then they know for sure that it will not be repaid.
The threshold value bmal and the maximum tax rate Tn`a~ constrain the set of fiscal
3Because of a Laffer curve effect, rm"~ may be smaller than 1. However, here it is assumed that
rmar equals 1.
3.3 The evolution of debt 39
policies open to the government. Which policy will be chosen by the government from
this set depends on the decision making process. Assuming a representative democracy
setting, the government at time t represents currently living generations only and is suc-
ceeded by another government every next period. It is assumed to maximize a decision
function consisting of the utilities of the current generations only:
Wi - Ui-i -~ ~(1 f n)Ui (3.2.9)
where ~ E[0, oo) denotes the relative political influence of a young individual. Every t,
this decision function is maximized again by a new generation of politicians. In choosing
its policy the government explicitly takes account of sL, the optimal amount of savings
chosen by the consumers. This makes it act as a Stackelberg leader towards the private
sector.
Given the fact that current generations are not altruistic towards future generations,
the current government does not take the utility of future generations into account.
Therefore, the scope for fiscal policy for an incumbent government is confined to the
present period. The chosen policy has, however, implications for the actions to be taken
by future governments. It is assumed that the current government takes these actions
into account in choosing a policy. This means that it also acts as a Stackelberg leader
towards all future governments.
3.3 The evolution of debt
This section focuses on the decision making process when Wi in eq. (3.2.9) is maximized
again each period. Only the current young and old generation count in the decision
making process. The fiscal policy preferred may depend on an agents planning horizon.
Even when their preferences can be characterized by the same utility function, conflicts
of interest between agents may arise if they have different planning horizons. In par-
ticular, while the elderly would prefer complete tax shifting, the young may, due to the
age-independent tax structure, be interested in policies that smooth taxes over their life-
time. The tax rate set by the government follows from the maximization of eq. (3.2.9).
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Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition reads:
8Wt 8Ut-,
C7Tt - (,~o
~-(1 ~ r)st-1~ }
J ~
.~(1 f n) 1 - 8ct (1




~ll - Tt}1)(1 ~
r)C7Tt -( 1 ~ r)s2 aV L1J I-
0
where ré~l is the tax rate set by the next period government. Note that r~~l is a
function of rt reflecting the fact that an incumbent government acts as a Stackelberg
leader towards future governments4. The political preferences of the old and the young
generation then follow from eq. (3.3.1) by setting .~ equal to 0 or ~~ oo, respectively.
From ~ - 0, i.e. no political weight for the current young generation, assuming positive
savings and aá~~' 1 0 it follows that á C 0, implying that there is no internal solution.
This clearly indicates the preference for low taxes by the present elderly. Since they
will have passed away the next period and do not bother about the utility of the present
young generation or any other future generation, they will prefer tax rates to be set at the
lowest possible level which is determined by the maximum debt level, bmóz. The political
preferences of the young follow from .~ -~ oo in eq. ( 3.3.1). In this case substituting eq.
(3.2.3) in eq. ( 3.3.1) and rewriting gives:
8Tt}1 - (1 - Tttl)(1 - St)- (3.3.2)
art (1 - rt)ei
The left-hand-side of eq. (3.3.2) is associated with the marginal costs of a one-dollar
tax decrease. The right-hand-side gives the willingness to substitute present taxes for
future taxes. According to eq. (3.3.2), the tax policy preferred by the young is the
one where marginal cost equals marginal willingness5. Note that since neither negative
4Since the next government is asaumed to be a Stackelberg leadet to ita aucceasora, rt}1 implicitly
takea rt}2,...,r~ into account.
bAn alternative interpretation of eq. ( 3.3.2) is as followa: A young individual has two ways of
influencing hia second-period conaumption posaibilities; either directly by changing his savinga a or
indirectly by chooaing a higher ( lower) current tax rate in return for a lower ( higher) tax rate in the
next period. The latter can be aeen as `saving through the government'. Now, eq. (3.3.2) can be
interpreted as an arbitrage condition which denotea when the young conaumer is indifferent between
'.! ~
theae two forms of saving. This can be seen by rewriting eq. (3.3.2) as: -~11}rl,l - 1-r'}'(1 f r)t-~~ - 1-r~
where the right-hand-aide is the rate of return of private savings and the left-hand-aide denotes the rate
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savings rates nor tax rates or savings rates larger than 1 are allowed, for any t it will hold
that aá~ C 0. The consequence of this is that if the political power of the young is non-
negligible, the government trades off current and future tax rates, given the Stackelberg
assumption that it takes account of the relation between the current and all future tax
rates. A lower current tax rate will lead to a higher debt inherited by the next generation
which, as a result, might have to opt for a higher tax rates. For old individuals the trade-
off between current and future taxes is of no relevance. As noted before, if the elderly
are solely decisive for the tax rate, then the tax rate will be set at its lowest possible
value given the viability of the implied policy. The tax rate actually chosen in the politi-
cal process will result from weighing the preferences of the old and the young generations.
Assume the utility function to be of a logarithmic type and separable, i.e., Ut -
In(ci) f Bln(ci~l), where B is the private discount factor. Furthermore, it is assumed
that government expenditures g are constant and smaller than 1~ and that rmas equals 1.
Given these assumptions, it immediately follows from eq. (3.2.3) that the young choose
st - lfe for all t. Inserting all this in eq. ( 3.3.1) results in the following first-order
condition for the government at time t:
- B~(1 TiTt) -~(1 -}- n) j~(1 TtTt ) f ~i1 1 - 0, for a 1 0 (3.3.3)
for t- 1, ..., oo. Notice in eq. (3.3.3) that, as expected, the relation between the current
and future tax rate is of importance only if a young individual has some political power,
i.e., a 1 0. The term between brackets reflects eq. (3.3.2), the marginal trade-off made
by the young. However, the government also takes the preferences of the elderly, which
are reflected in the first term, into account. Hence, it follows that the tax rate chosen
by the government will be lower than (or at most equal to) the tax rate preferred by the
young. In the extreme case where .~ - 0, eq. (3.3.3) cannot hold with equality implying
that there is no internal solution. As noted before, given bmaz, the lowest possible tax
of return of `saving through the government'.
6This is, however, not necessary. The tax rise may be postponed until period t f 2 or later, leaving
ri~l unaffected. In that case, the interests of the young and elderly coincide.
Tg c 1 implies that the level of government expenditures per consumer is lower than the initial
endowment each consumer receives in the economy.
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rate resultss.
At any time t, the government, as a Stackelberg leader towards future governments
knows that future governments use eq. (3.3.3) to solve for the tax rate. Therefore, it
uses this equation to calculate the relation between its own and future government de-
cisions.
To derive a solution for the infinite horizon problem the following procedure is used:
first the finite horizon problem is solved and then a solution for the infinite horizon
problem is derived as the limit of the finite horizon problem9. Assume the time horizon
to be finite, T. Obedience of the No-Ponzi-Game condition for a finite T implies that
all public debt has to be repaid, i. e.lo:
bT - 0 (3.3.4)
The calculation executed by the forward-looking government at time t goes backward
starting in the final period T. In that period, the government has no choice but to obey
the terminal condition 6T - 0. The tax rate in the final period, then, follows immediately
from the government's budget constraint, eq. (3.2.4):
TT - 1 f(I f T)g ~(I
f r)b~r-1 -~ 9~ (3.3.5)
where r" - i~n, r" denotes the effective interest rate, and, hence, 1 f r" - 1~. In period
T- 1, the incumbent government explicitly takes account of eq. (3.3.5). Inserting it in
its own budget constraint and taking the derivative with respect to T7-1 gives
8rT - -(1 .}- r') (3.3.6)aT7-,
BGiven 6t-1 - 0, this tax rate can easily be calculated to be ri --}, in~ .
9Note that etandard dynamic programming techniques are not applicable in this case because of the
form of the target function.
loStrictly speaking, the No-Ponzi-Game condition for a finite horizon teada limt~7 (1~)'6i - 0. But
since (1~)' 1 0 for every finite t this impliea 67 - 0.
3.3 The evolution of debt 43
Inserting eqs. (3.3.5) and (3.3.6) into eq. (3.3.3) and solving for TT-1 learns that an
interior solution will be obtained if debt (~ - C bmax --1} 1}T h}(i}rle][(i}.1}i] If` 2 - T (ltr)~ g ~ (1}Bl(1}f12
b7-2 - b7ax the tax rate will be equal to Tmax. Moreover, bT-2 1 óTax is simply not
possible. The (foreign) lenders will prevent this level of debt from being issued since it
can never be repaid. Therefore, an interior solution is always obtained. Given rT-1 thus
obtained, the solution for the tax rate rT-2, rT-3 and so on can be obtained in the same
way.
The solution for the infinite-horizon analogue of the model follows by taking the limit
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where rtnt is the interior solution for the tax rate at time t. Q is defined as ~a~i} ~B and
describes the political compromise between the preferences of the present generations.
It reflects the political weight in the decision making process attached to present utility
(of the old and young generation) relative to future utility (of the present young). Of
course, bmax is independent of the political influence of both generations as measured
by a. Rewriting bmax as 1}A -F '-~, it becomes clear that, given the assumption g G 1,
public debt can exceed savings which, in that case, implies that the country is a debtor
11That the limit of the solution of the finite-horizon problem is indeed a solution for the infinite-
horizon problem is easily seen by writing down the first-order conditions of the infinite-horizon model
and checking the candidate solution and, furthermore, noting that the finite-horizon solution behaves
as a turnpike (see e.g. Blanchard and Fischer, 1989), hence there are no transversality problems.
b - bmaxt-1
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in the world capital market12.
The evolution of debt can be traced by substituting solution (3.3.7) into the budget
restriction (3.2.4). This gives the following linear difference equation:
(bma~ - b~) - 1 -~ p(bmaz
- bt-1) (3.3.10)
(bmóz - bt-I) can be interpreted as the scope politicians in period t have for increasing
the inherited debt. According to eq. (3.3.10) this scope for policy-making changes from
one period to another by the factor 1á. From this, it can be concluded that debt (and
thus the tax rate) increases if r" G p, decreases if r" 1 p13 or remains unchanged if r" - Q.
An intuition for this result can be given by noticing that eq. (3.3.3) implies equality
between the marginal political willingness to substitute taxes and the marginal cost of
tax substitution. The willingness in the political process to substitute present for future
taxes is given by the first two terms in eq. (3.3.3):
MRST~ T~~1 - é~ eW, -
1- Ttt~ Q ( 3.3.11)
T .e.~t~ - Tt
From the definition of ,Q it can be seen immediately that this willingness depends on both
the private discount factor B and the political power balance ,~(1 f n). Lower values for B
imply more impatience on the side of the individual (young) consumers. They are more
interested in present than in future consumption. This, obviously, lowers the political
willingness to give up present consumption (and thus present utility) through higher
12If, instead of an open economy, a closed economy with a linear production technology is assumed
(i.e. f(k) - rk f w where w is normalized: w- 1) the capital market imposes an additional constraint
6 G s- 1}e. In that case, 6n`"r - min{ 1~ f 1~, 1~}, which implies that the constraint imposed
by the tax base ia redundant if g G 1. This implies a lower upper limit for public debt than in the open
economy case, thus altering the aet of feasible policiea. However, in case of g 1 1(but amaller than
1~ r" 1~, national income), the resulta fot the closed economy coincide with those of the amall open
economy.
13Here, an unetable proceas occuts where the debt and the tax rate tend to minua infinity. In principle,
negative debt also poses a problem of viability: in the case of foteign borrowera, the rest of the world
muat be willing to serve it. It is posaible to avoid such a procesa by imposing e.g. a non-negativity
restriction on the tax rate. Then the debt will converge to a finite minimum level. Calculationa for thia
case have appeared in an earliet version of this chapter and are available upon requeat. Since they do
not provide additional insighta they aze left out here for expositional reasons.
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taxes now in exchange for future consumption. A similar argument holds for a lower
,~(1 fn), i.e. more political weight for the present elderly. Then again, the willingness to
give up present consumption in exchange for future consumption is lower. On the other
hand, the marginal cost of tax shifting is given by
MRTT~ Tt}1 - -
aTt ;l - (1 ~ r) a (3.3.12)
8T~ 1 f Q
Note that this marginal cost is lower than the marginal cost of a debt increase when
debt has to be redeemed completely in the next period. In that case, the marginal cost
of a one-dollar debt increase (or, equivalently, a one-dollar tax decrease) would be 1~ r"
(see eq. (3.3.6)). The reason for this is that, when debt is not completely redeemed in
the next period, it is possible to shift the burden of the one-dollar debt increase partly
over to future generations. This decreases the marginal costs. The degree to which this
possíbility is used depends on the private weight attached to future consumption (B)
and the political power balance (,~(1 -~ n)) as can be seen from Q. In the optimum the
marginal costs of tax shifting have to equal the marginal benefits. From equalizing these
two it follows that the tax rate (and, hence, debt) increases if r" G~, decreases if r" ) p
or remains unchanged if T-,Q.
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 3.1 If bo G bmax, J~ ) 0 and B 1 0, for every finite t, it holds that:
(a) If r" G Q then
bt-, G bt
Tt-1 G Tt
(b) !f r" ~ Q then
bt-1 1 bt
T~ 1 ~ Tt
(c) If r - Q then
bt-i - be
Tt-1 - Tt
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Insert Figure 3.1
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the debt ( eq. (3.3.10)). Case ( a) is the case r" G Q
and the system converges towards the steady state bm"x through a sequence of increasing
levels of debt. Case (b) for which r" 1 Q results in an ever decreasing debt. The 45o-line
corresponds with regime (c) in the proposition where b~ - 60 - 6 for all t. The adjoining
tax rate is then given by r- 1}~ }Tla[Tb ~- g].
It is interesting to compare the evolution of the debt described in Proposition 1 with the
evolution that would result from the maximization of a social welfare function. It can
easily be shown14 that, if the government maximizes a Benthamite social welfare function
with a social discount factor p, a proposition analogous to Proposition 1 with p replaced
by P- 1 can be derived. P - 1 is the social rate of time preference. So, any evolution of
debt and taxes that can result from decision making by a representative government can
also be found by maximizing a social welfare function that explicitly takes account of
the utility of future generations. So, a representative democracy, where decision making
is based on the utility of the currently living generations only, may act as if it takes the
welfare of all future generations into account. However, it will do this only to a limited
extent: since ~3 ~ 1 the implicit social rate of time preference can never be below 1. This
result provides a justification for the common practice to mimic a positive government
by a normative social welfare maximizing government with a high social rate of time
preference compared to the individual rate of time preference ( see e.g. Van der Ploeg
and Van de Klundert (1991)).
3.4 The efiects of parameter changes
The analysis in the previous section led to a description of the evolution of the debt
as a function of the exogenous parameters a, r, 9, g and n. This section analyses how
this evolution is affected by a change in these parameters15. Two cases have to be dis-
laSee Meijdam, van de Ven and Verbon (1994).
1sNotice the difference with a comparative statics analyais where changes in the atationary state are
analysed. Here, changes in the whole time path of debt due to changes in the exogenous parametera are
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tinguished: one where the change in the parameters is unanticipated, the other where it
is anticipated. In case of an unanticipated change in the parameters these effects remain
unknown until the time of the change, t- t'. If, however, the change is anticipated, the
effects are taken into account from period 1 onwards as the news of the change in the
parameters arrives1ó. From eq. (3.3.10) it follows that, given bt-1, a change in a, n,
B, r or g in period t has two effects: one running through b"`ax, changing the scope for
policy making, the other running through l~p, affecting the factor at which the scope for
policy making is changing from one period to another. The following table summarizes
the effects on bn`as and 1tÁ:
8a óB 8r óg ón
8bmax
a~1tR
In the sequel changes in the exogenous variables at some time t' will be investigated. The
reference situation is r" G Q, i.e. increasing debt levels and tax rates.
Effect of an increase in political power of an old individual. This is reflected
by a decrease in a at time t'. Since bmas is independent of political elements, this does
not affect the maximum level of debt. However, this maximum sustainable level is ap-
proached faster. Because the main concern of the elderly is a low tax rate, each period
a larger part of the scope for policy-making is consumed. The implications of this are
represented in Figure 3.217. In the case of an unanticipated decrease in a, debt jumps to
a higher level at the time of the change, t. Due to this jump, the old generation present
at that time enjoys large gains from its increased political power. Subsequent generations
analyaed.
1sNote that, if the debt level at the time the news of the change arrivea (either at t- 1 or at f- t,
the time of the change) is larger than the new ómar a situation occurs where debt can never be repaid
and the government is in fact bankrupt.
17In thia figure and the figures to come, the dotted linea refer to the situation where there is no change
in the reapective exogenous parameter. The dashed line denotea the debt path tollowed in this case.
The shift of the axia ia due to a change in óma~ changing the scope for policy-making. Illustrated is the
case where t- 2. Hence, in the initial period 0, bma~ - 6o is given by point a. If there was no change,
the next period, ómar - 61 would be given by point b. However, due to the change in a, it is given by
point b'. Etcetera.
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Insert Figure 3.2
of elderly can profit from their increased political power to a much lower degree, because
they are left with a debt level much closer to the maximum level bmax. Moreover, each
generation reinforces this effect for their successors by consuming a larger part of their
scope for policy-making.
In case of an anticipated change in the political power of the elderly, the generations
at t- 1 will immediately exploit the possibility to jump to a higher debt level which
arises due to the change in political power at tls. Note that, because of this jump to
a higher debt level and the chosen debt policy, all generations of elderly with increased
political power, including the elderly of generation t, are confronted with a smaller scope
for policy-making. Hence, the gains from their increased political power are relatively
low.
Eífect of an increase in the private discount factor. If the private discount factor
B increases, two opposing forces are at work as can be seen from the table above. First,
due to higher savings, the tax base enlarges making lower taxes and larger debt levels
possible (i.e. ómal increases, widening, ceteris paribus, the scope for policy-making).
Second, the relative political weight of present utility decreases (i.e. Q decreases) ím-
plying, ceteris paribus, a preference for higher taxes now relative to future taxes. As a
result, less debt is passed on to the future thus increasing the scope for policy-making for
future generations of politicians. Figure 3.3 provides an illustration of an unanticipated
Insert Figure 3.3
and an anticipated change. In case of an unanticipated increase in B, the two opposing
effects are at work at the same time t'. Therefore, the total effect is ambiguous and de-
1sThe generations between t- 1 and t- t then pursue debt policies that would be unsuatainable
if they were continued after t. This can easily be seen from Figure 3.2 by extending the solid line of
policies between 0 and t- 1. It will not pass through the origin. However, because of the change in
political power at t, a switch ia made towards a sustainable policy.
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pends on the magnitude of the increase19. For small alterations in B the tax-base effect
dominates, for larger alterations in 9 the political weight effect dominates which even
might lead to a regime switch from increasing debt levels to decreasing debt levels. The
upper part of Figure 3.3 illustrates a jump to a lower level bi. Savings increase, making
more debt creation possible. However, politicians are not inclined to do so, due to the
higher political weight attached to future utility. If there is an anticipated change, the
generations before time t can and will take advantage of the enlargement of bmaT due to
the increase in B at time t. Hence, at t- 1 there is jump to a higher level of debt. At
time t, only the increased political weight of the future is left, implying a slower growth
of the debt. Note that the generations at t- 1 only experience the enlargement of
the tax base and not the change in political weights. Therefore, they partly exploit the
increase in the tax base. Due to this anticipation effect, the generations at t profit only
partly from the widening of the tax base.
Effect of an increase in the interest rate. An increase in the interest rate has two
effects. First, it enlarges the interest burden of existing debt and makes debt creation
in the future more costly. Second, the interest revenues on savings rise which leads to
a widening of the tax base. Clearly, these two effects are opposing. The increase in
the interest burden necessitates, ceteris paribus, lower debt growth. The effect on the
tax base makes, (again) ceteris paribus, larger debt levels possible. These effects can be
derived from eq. (3.3.10). The increased interest burden of existing debt necessitates an
increase of the factor, i}R, by which the scope for policy-making changes. The higher
costs of future debt issuance and the growth of the tax base are both contained in the
effect on bn`ax From rewriting bma~ as 1}e f 1~ it immediately follows that aárt C 0
since g C 1. So, the positive tax-base effect of an increase in r is dominated by the
negative interest-burden effect. An increase in r leads to a jump to a lower level of debt,
Insert Figure 3.4
either at t- t (unanticipated, the upper part of Figure 3.4) or at t- 1(anticipated, the
19Note that, if r~ Q, the political weight effect always dominates and a jump at time t to a lower
level of public debt can be observed.
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lower part of Figure 3.4)~0. After t the erosion of the scope for policy-making is slowed
down because of the increased interest burden of inherited debt, implying less debt to
be passed on to future generations.
Effect of an increase in government expenditures. The effect of a change in the
government expenditures on bmax is clearly negative. An increase in g means that a
larger share of tax revenues has to be used for financing these expenditures, leaving less
room for debt repayments. This naturally implies that less debt can be accumulated,
i.e. bmax is lower. The growth rate of debt is unaffected since the political weights and
the interest rate remain unchanged. Hence, an increase in g leads to a negative jump in
debt. When this jump is observed depends on whether it is anticípated or unanticipated.
An anticipated change in g at time t leads to a jump at t- 1, an unanticipated change
leads to a jump at t- t'. (Figure 3.5).
Insert Figure 3.5
EfFect of a decrease in population growth. The effect of a decrease in population
growth, í. e. ón G 0, comprises two effects: an increase in the political power of the
old generation (8,1(1 f n) G 0), because of the increase of their relative number, and
an increase in the effective interest rate ( 8r" ~ 0). The world interest rate r, of course,
remains fixed, just as the political influence of a young individual, .~. Rewriting eq.
(3.3.10) gives bmax - bi -,~ 1 }r .r(6"`a~ - bs-1). Therefore, a decrease in n implies~(itn)t á
that the scope for policy-making is diminished less quickly from one period to another
by successive governments. Apparently, the effect of an increase in the political power
of the elderly is dominated by the effect of the increase in the effective interest rate.
Hence, ceteris paribus, a smaller part of the scope for policy-making is used by the
present generation of politicians. Assuming g G 1, this effect is reinforced because a
ZoA jump to a lower debt level at t- 1 in anticipation of a future increase of the interest rate may
seem odd, eince consumera do not exhibit altruistic behaviour towards future generations. So why
ahould they bother? The reason for this is, of course, that, since they are Stackelberg leaders towazds
future generations, they know the behaviour of generation t in reaponse to the change in the interest
rate. This causes a reaction of generation t- 1 to the displayed behaviour of generation t which in turn
causes a reaction of generation t- 2, etcetera.
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decrease in n leads, through the increase in the effective interest rate, to a decrease in
bmnx, implying a contraction of the scope for policy-making. Lower population growth
lowers the tax base and by this bma2 decreases. Figure 3.6 gives an illustration of an
Insert Figure 3.6
unanticipated (upper part) and an anticipated (lower part) decrease in the population
growth rate. The decrease in bmax necessitates a jump to a lower level of debt, either at
period 1(anticipated) or at period t' (unanticipated).
Parameter changes and actual debt policy
Returning to the actual evolution of debt after World War II described in the Intro-
duction, it is interesting to check whether this evolution can be explained by the model
through parameter changes. However, before continuing, some qualifications should be
made. In this model, there is no growth while, in reality, economics have grown. Also,
with all parameters constant, b either converges to bmóz or declines without bounds.
Hence, the following analysis should be read keepíng this in mind.
With respect to the initially declining debt levels, according to Proposition 1, this can
be the case if Q is lower than r". Although the effective interest rate was quite low in that
period, the discount factor may have been so high that ,Q was even lower. Indications of
this may be found in the fact that savings by consumers were relatively high given the low
interest rate. Moreover, in this same period many funded pension plans were initiated,
also indicating the relatively high importance the generations of that time attached to
the future. Starting in the sixties, the post-war baby-boom generation started to enter
the labor market. In terms of this model this implies a(small) increase in n. It might be
hypothesized that this generation was more consumption minded than the previous one
witnessed by the fact that savings did not increase in spite of the increase in the interest
rate starting in the early seventies. So, a larger generation with a lower discount factor
entered the labor market. According to the model, this might have caused the shift
from decreasing to increasing debt levels as observed in practice. This growth of debt
continued during the eighties leading to rather high levels of debt. Recently, in several
countries policy measures were enacted to mitigate the growth rate of debt. Moreover,
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as expressed by the EMU-norm regarding the required debt ratio for the member states
of the EC, maximum levels for the debt ratio were fixed. These phenomena can be
interpreted in the framework of the model. In particular, many EC-countries expect
an ageing of their population. As noted before, such a decrease in population growth
should lead to a lower maximum level of debt. Moreover, this maximum level should be
approached at a slower pace. Figure 3.7 illustrates this effect of an anticipated decrease
in population growth21. In this figure, the generation of politicians at time t- 2 expect
Insert Figure 3.7
an ageing of the population to occur at time t- 3. Moreover, the generation that is
young at t- 2 is relatively large. In the simulation n- 0.3 was taken in the first two
periods to indicate an increasing population, followed by a period where the dependency
ratio increases (n --0.1 for t - 3) after which the population stabilizes (n - 0). If
the length of one period were equal to 25 years, and period 1 would correspond with the
first 25 years after World War II, this stylized demographic development would roughly
correspond with the current EC-situation. The population is expected to stabilize at
a lower level than the current one in the second or third decade of the next century,
after a once-only increase of the dependency ratio due to the retirement of the post-war
baby boom22. It appears that, in anticipation of the decrease in population growth, debt
jumps to a lower level at time t- 2. After this, debt gradually approaches the new
maximum level. Notice from Figure 3.7 that if the population would stabilize after t- 2
instead after t- 3, the debt ratio would be slightly higher in these periods. So, the
baby boom, í.e. the increase in the dependency ratio at t- 3(n --0.1), hardly has
any effect on the evolution of debt. But the baby bust, i. e. the permanent decrease in
population growth (n - 0) affects the evolution of debt to a large degree.
Z1In the simulation the following parameter values are used: a- 0.55, g- 0.5, B- 0.5, r- 2.1,
60 - 0.
Z~Notice from Figure 3.7 that an increasing debt ratio has been assumed for the whole poat-war
period. In this simulation the factors that contributed to a declining debt ratio during this period are
not taken into account.
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3.5 Summary and concluding remarks
In the literature surveyed in the introduction dealing with the strategic use of public debt,
the driving force behind these models were the differences in preferences with respect to
the size and composition of public expenditures between successive governments. In the
present model, the effect of public debt on future decisions is also taken into account but
for a different reason. Current young generations are still alive in the following period
and future policy choices are relevant to them. Current old generations clearly prefer
full tax shifting since they are no longer alive in future periods. Thus, the driving force
behind the current model is the difference in time horizon of the different generations
present.
An overlapping-generations model is used. Consumers, both young and old, pay a con-
sumption tax at the same rate. Given logarithmic utility functions, explicit solutions
for the development of the tax rate and the level of debt are derived. A sequence of
representative governments will gradually increase or decrease debt. In the former case,
debt converges to a level determined by the maximum taxing capacity. In the case of
decreasing debt, it may converge to a level determined by some lower bound on the tax
rate. Under a social planner, debt may take the same route as under a representative
government. However, even though differences in preferences are abstracted, this is by
no means necessary. Representative governments may choose another time path of debt
than a social planner because of the inherent tendency of consumers to shift taxes to
future generations.
In this model the time path of debt can be calculated completely. Therefore, it is
possible to derive how this path will change due to some foreseen or unforeseen change
in the parameters. Such a change leads to a jump in the level of debt and, thus, forcing
it to follow another path. This new path may converge towards a different maximum
level, or may even decrease instead of increase. The following comparative-dynamics
results are worth pointing out here. First, if savings increase due to a lower rate of time
preference, this can be concomitant with a desired decrease in the level of public debt.
An increase in savings, giving a higher potential to finance public debt, is at the same
time an expression of the increased weight that the current young generation places on
its future consumption. By the same reasoning, an increase in the rate of time preference
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leads to an increase in the level of public debt. Second, in this model anticipated ageing
of the population leads to an immediate curtailing of debt. Basically, ageing limits the
possibility to shift the tax burden to the future by debt creation as it increases the ef-
fective interest rate.
Some qualifications are in place. First, when using the model to analyse actual debt
policy, one should keep in mind that in the present model growth is absent. In reality,
of course, economies did grow, at different points in time at different rates, after World
War II. Assuming constant growth over time would not change the results dramatically.
It would increase the tax base, and thus bm's. Besides, the current young would have
a higher initial endowment to start with. Given the unchanged political weights, the
conjecture is that in this case the government would redistribute from the current young
to the current elderly and, therefore, debt would increase faster. Second, debt either
tends to its maximum level, determined by the maximum tax capacity, or to a minimum
level (not explicitly considered here). Hence, there is no internal solution determined by
the political weights.
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Chapter 4
The evolution of public pensions
4.1 Introduction
In most countries public pensions are financed by a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. Pri-
vate pensions, on the other hand, are generally financed by a capital reserve ( CR) system.
In a PAYG system, the pension transfers to the current old generation are financed by
tax payments of the current young generation. A CR system implies that generations
save for their own old age.
Several explanations are given why PAYG systems exist. Most authors model the level
of taxes and transfers as the outcome of some voting process within an overlapping gen-
erations framework. Several groups of agents, having different preferences about the
level of government transfers, decide on this level by some form of voting. Browning
(1975) and Boadway and Wildasin (1989) use a median voter framework to analyse the
determination of taxes and transfers in a PAYG system. In Browning (1975), this results
in a social insurance budget which is "too lazge" in a steady state. The reason for this
result is that the optimal level of social insurance, i.e. the level that maximizes lifetime
utility, is the level preferred by the youngest voter. The median voter, however, prefers
a higher level. However, Browning (1975) neglects the existence of private savings which
might offset the overexpansion of the social insurance budget. The existence of private
savings is taken into account by Boadway and Wildasin (1989). In their model, agents
face borrowing constraints on the capital mazket. The tax-transfer scheme initially over-
shoots the steady-state value of the system because expectations are adaptive. Then,
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depending on the parameters of the system, the tax-transfer scheme gradually converges
towards the steady state by a pattern of alternative over- and undershooting, or the
scheme does not converge but cycles around the steady state.
Both Browning (1975) and Boadway and Wildasin (1989) abstract from the notion of
altruism between generations. Altruism is an important motivation for the existence of
a PAYG system in Hansson and Stuart (1989) and in Veall (1986). In Hansson and Stu-
art (1989), current generations choose some path of taxes and transfers to which future
generations are committed by law. Each period the present generations may amend the
law but they will choose not to do so. The reason is that each present old generation
will be opposed to every amendment to the present social security law and will block
this amendment since each present generation has veto power. Veall (1986) treats social
security as a trade between present and future generations in which present generations
take the decisions of future generations on social security into account. In the model
used by Veall (1986), the young are solely responsible for the level of taxes and trans-
fers. Because of their altruism towards the older generation, they are willing to make
a transfer. In a paper by Verbon and Verhoeven (1992), the decision on the level of
transfers is made in a representative democracy. I.e., the government is modelled as
a group of politicians representing the interests of the present living generations only.
The level of transfers that is chosen depends on the political influence of the elderly and
the young. This can also be interpreted as a case of altruism, where the young gener-
ation, as in Veall (1986), is solely responsible for the level of taxes and transfers, and
they are altruistic towards the current elderly. Also a social contract may explain the
existence of PAYG public pension systems. Current young generations give a transfer to
the current old because, if they do not give this transfer, the next-period young gener-
ation is not obliged to give a transfer to the current young when they are retired. It then
may be beneficial to comply with the social contract (Sjoblom (1985), Verhoeven (1993)).
The importance of future decisions for present tax and transfer levels is evident. Rational
present young generations form an expectation about their future pension transfers since
this influences their decision about how much to save now. The involvement of future
decisions greatly complicates matters. To be able to deal with these complications sim-
plifying assumptions are used. In Browning (1975) present generations decide on a tax-
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transfer policy based on the assumption that this policy is not changed in the future.
Since future generations make the same assumption this turns out to be correct. Hansson
and Stuart (1989) assume that the tax-transfer policy is laid down in the constitution
and each generation has veto power over the amendments. Others use behavioural as-
sumptions towards future decisions. In Verbon and Verhoeven (1992) present generations
display Nash behaviour towards future generations, i. e. present generations take future
decisions on taxes and transfers as given. Veall (1986) makes the (inconsistent) assump-
tion of present generations displaying Stackelberg behaviour towards future generations,
i.e. taking the behavioural responses of future generations on present decisions as given,
while future generations display Nash behaviour towards their succeeding generationsl.
An important aspect of this chapter is that all generations, i.e. present and future,
display Stackelberg behaviour towards their succeeding generations. Because of the
sequential order in which the decisions on the pension transfers are made, this is the
most natural assumption.
This chapter uses a framework of overlapping non-altruistic generations which is given
in Section 4.2. The young decide on how much to save, but, because they are rational,
this decision depends on the level of transfers both when they are young, since then they
have to finance these transfers, and when they are old, since then they are the recipients
of these transfers. The level of transfers is chosen by the government. As in Verbon and
Verhoeven (1992), the government is modelled in a representative democracy setting.
As noted before, and different from their assumption of Nash behaviour towards fu-
ture generations, Stackelberg behaviour of present and future generations towards their
succeeding generations is assumed. Additional differences are: First, Verbon and Ver-
hoeven (1992) exclude negative savings and transfers. Their solution is therefore given
by a constrained steady state with either zero savings or zero transfers. Second, their
economy can be dynamically efficient as well as inefficient. But, because of the con-
straints, this is not really important for their model. In Section 4.3, the differences
between Nash behaviour and Stackelberg behaviour are analysed. Besides, section 4.3
derives an analytical solution for the representative democracy and gives a description of
the evolution. Furthermore, the welfare consequences are analysed for the initial gener-
1The inconsistency then arises because the generations of the next period are assumed to behave the
same, í.e. play Stackelberg towards their successors and assume future generations to play Nash.
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ations if the government decides to introduce a PAYG pension system. Also the relation
between the solution under the assumption of Nash behaviour and the solution under
the assumption of Stackelberg behaviour is analysed. In addition, a comparison is made
between this solution and the policy chosen by a government optimizing a Benthamite
social welfare function. Section 4.4 analyses changes in the exogenous parameters of the
model. The chapter is concluded by Section 4.5 with a summary and some additional
remarks.
4.2 The Model
This section develops an overlapping-generations model of a small open economy with a
private sector and a government sector.
The private sector
The private sector consists of agents living for two periods. The population grows at a
constant rate n. The first period of their lifes the agents are endowed with one unit of
income of which an amount of I~ is paid as a lump-sum tax which is used to finance a
PAYG system. pt is the transfer per capita of the old generation. Of the remaining part
of their income they have to decide how much to save ( st) for the second period of their
life2. This gives for the first period consumption c2:
cr~-l-si-lfn (4.2.1)
The second period of their life besides the return on their savings they receive a govern-
ment transfer ptt~ financed by the PAYG system. Second-period consumption cf}1 then
is given by:
céti - (1 f r)si -F ptti (4.2.2)
ZNegative eavings are not ruled out. In principle an agent can borrow to achieve negative savinga.
Since this would imply borrowing againat future income it might give an enforcement problem. Es-
pecially, if this future income depends on future decisions. However, in this determinietic setting, the
level of future income is perfectly predictable. Thus, an enforcement problem is abaent.
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r is the fixed world interest rate. Utility is assumed to be logarithmic with a private
discount factor B, assumed to be between 0 and 1. The agents optimize:
lnc; ~ Blncitl (4.2.3)
subject to eqs. (4.2.1) and (4.2.2). The agents, when deciding on st, take the decisions
on pt and pt~l by the government as given. From optimization of eq. (4.2.3) with respect
to si follows the optimal level of savings si:
, 9 pe 1 Peft
s~-1~BC1-1-~n~-1-1-8 l~r
(4.2.4)
The amount saved sL is a fraction 1}e of the net income 1- 1~ minus the present
value of the government transfer pi~l to be received in the second period weighted by
the private discount factor. A higher value for B means that more weight is attached to
the future which implies that a higher fraction of the net income is saved and the future
transfer is less taken into account. More tax pi to be paid means less is available for
savings. A higher transfer pitl in the next period means less need for private savings.
The government
The decisions on the PAYG system are made in a representative democracy. The govern-
ment is managed by successive generations of policy makers. Each policy maker is seen
as a melting pot of different groups having different, possibly conflicting, interests. These
groups are competing among each other for influence on the decisions to be made. The
policy adopted reflects the interests of the different groups to the extent they succeed
in this. Applied to the present model this implies that every period the government
transfer pt is chosen according to a decision function which is the weighted average of
the utilities of the generations present in that period:
Wt - Blncf f.~(1 ~- n) (Incty -~ Blnci}1) (4.2.5)
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where ~ E[0, oo) is the relative political weight of a young individual. The idea of
successive policy makers introduces an additional feature. Not only is the present policy
maker playing a game with the private sector but it is also playing a game with future
policy makers. As the latter game is sequential by construction, Stackelberg behaviour
towards future policymakers is a natural assumption. Finally, it is assumed that the
economy is dynamically efficient, i.e. r~ n.
4.3 A PAYG system in a representative democracy
When the government is modelled in a representative democracy setting, i.e. it is man-
aged by successive generations of policymakers, every period t the policymaker of that
period optimizes eq. (4.2.5). Since it acts as a Stackelberg leader towards the private
sector, it takes the saving behaviour of the private sector, given by eq. (4.2.4), into
account. It also takes the transfers pit;, i- 1, ... chosen by future policy makers into
account. Given the chosen transfer scheme pi, the optimal level of savings follows from
eq. (4.2.4). The solution is given by two first-order linear difference equations3. First,
the private sector savings sf are given by:
, 1~-n .~(r-n)-1 .~
st - r- n ~(1 f n) ~ 1 ~~(1 f n) ~ 1(1
~ r)si-t
For the pension transfer pf the solution reads:
(4.3.1)
1 f n 1 f r ~(1 f B)(1 f n)
p~ - Br - n ~(1 ~ B)(1 f n) ~ 6- J~(1 ~- B)(1 f n) f e(1
~ r)s1-1 ( 4.3.2)
Thus, for any initial level of savings, so, the evolution of si and pt can be calculated4
The steady-state values for s~ and p~ are easily derived from eqs. ( 4.3.1) and (4.3.2)
by setting si-1 - si. They are given by s„ --~ and p„ - lfr 1}n Note thatr-n r-n
the steady-state values only depend on the population growth rate and the interest rate.
3The derivation of the solution is given in the appendix.
4Alternatively, as a referee of an eazlier veraion pointed out, one could write these difference equationa
in terms of p~ and calculate the evolution given an initial transfer level po. In that case, the development
of pi becomes independent of B. This changes some of the reaults in the sequel but not esaentially.
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They are independent of the preference parameters J~ and B. The steady-state savings
are determined by the maximum amount that can be borrowed, which is given by the
net present value of aggregate future incomess. Since it assumed that the economy is
dynamically efficient, i. e. r 1 n, the steady-state savings of the young are negative.
These negative savings are necessary to finance the pension transfer to the present eld-
erly. Negative saving implies borrowing against future resources, in this case the future
pension transfer of the present young. The development of the system of savings and
pensions can be traced down by rewriting eq. (4.3.1) as follows:
~(1 f r)
s„-s~ - ~(l~n)}1 ~s, (4.3.3)
If aifn~fl G 1, savings decrease monotonically and transfers increase monotonically over
time. (The opposite holds if a~ifnlfl ~ 1.) This condition can be rewritten as r G n~ á.
It resembles the Aaron condition ( Aaron ( 1966)). The Aaron condition shows when, for
a given level of transfers, the rate of return of the PAYG system is higher than the rate
of return of private savings. In an economy which only grows due to population growth,
this is equivalent to r G n. Thus, in this case, a PAYG system, with positive transfers,
can only emerge if the economy is dynamically inefficient. In this chapter, a PAYG
system (with a positive transfer from young to elderly) can exist even if the economy
is dynamically efficient. The reason is the weight attached to the utility of the current
elderly by the policymaker. If their political weight, relative to the young, is sufficiently
high, i.e. .~ is sufficiently low, it holds that r G n f~. Hence, there are transfers from
the current young to the current elderly despite the fact that the economy is dynamically
efficient. Moreover, unlike Aaron (1966), transfers are not constant over time. Hence,
the rate of return of the PAYG system is given by P` 'P~ } " . Thus, even if no weight is
attached to the current elderly, comparing the PAYG system to saving privately implies
comparing p` 'p~ }n to 1 f r.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the evolution of taxes and transfers if r 1 n f~ and if r C n~ á.
In the latter case, they converge to the steady-state values of s„ --~ and
lf" lfr The following proposition summarizes these results:p~a - r-n
SFuture income equals 1~ n, (1 -F n)Z, (1 .} n)3,.... for period t f 1, t-~ 2, t-~ 3,.... Aggregated and
discounted back to period t, this amounts to ~.




st - si, si 1 si-1, lim si -~ o0
e~oo
Pt - Pt , Ps C Pi-i ~ tly~ Ps ~-~
2. If r G n-}- ~ then
St - St ~ St ~ St-1i hm S~ - sasttioo
Pt - Pt ~ pt 1 Pt-i ~ tly~ Pt - Paa
It is possible to trace down the welfare consequences for the generations alive if a PAYG
system is introduced in some period t. The following proposition gives conditions deter-
mining the effects of such an introduction on utility of the current generations.
Proposition 4.2 If the government decides to introduce a PAYG system:
The current old generation gains in terms of utility iff r G n f á.
The current young generation gains in terms of utility iff
A I ~ ~ ~ 8(r - n)
r-n (lfn)2(1fB)
or
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B B(r - n)
C a G 1
(1 f n)2(1 f B) r- n
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For the proof, see the appendix. For the current elderly, the effect depends on whether
the pension transfers are increasing or decreasing over time. If r C n f á, the pension
transfer is increasing over time. Given that before period t there was no pension transfer,
the pension transfer the elderly receive is positive. Thus, they gain in terms of utility
with the introduction of a PAYG system. For r~ n~ á the opposite holds. The fact
that the savings were fixed for the current elderly at the time the PAYG-scheme was
introduced, made it easy to determine the effects of the introduction, it only depended on
the pension transfer they received. For the current young, however, the effect depends
on the pension transfer when they are old, as well as on the pension transfer for the
current old since it is paid by the current youngs. Moreover, savings are not fixed but
depend also on the current and future pension transfer. Consider case A. The first
inequality with respect to J~ implies that the current elderly have to pay a transfer to
the current young. This positively affects utility of the current young. This positive
effect is not offset by the transfer they have to pay themselves when they are old, if the
future transfer is sufHciently low, which is guarenteed by the second inequality. Hence,
the current young gain in terms of utility by the introduction of a PAYG system. If
,~ violates the second inequality, the old-age transfer overcompensates the welfare gain
due to the transfer from the current elderly, implying, on total, a loss in terms of utility
for the current young. In case .1 violates the first inequality, implying a transfer from
the current young to the current elderly, which is a utility loss for the current young,
this utility loss is not sufficienly compensated by the future transfer the current young
receive when they are old. On total, they have a utility loss. A similar story can be told
for case B.
Stackelberg versus Nash
As noted in the introduction, behavioural assumptions with respect to future decisions
are important because future decisions on pension levels are important for the willingness
to participate in a PAYG pension scheme now. In this chapter, Stackelberg behaviour
is assumed, thus, the effects current policy choices have on future policy choices are
6Moreover, becauae of the assumption of Stackelberg behaviour, all future pension transfers are
relevant.
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explicitely taken into account. The alternative would be to assume Nash behaviour,
i.e. taking future policy choices as given as done in Verbon and Verhoeven (1992)7. A
natural question to ask is what difference this assumption makes with respect to the
solutions. In case of Nash behaviour, the solution for the savings and the transfers is
given by the following two first-order linear difference equations8
sN - r } n[~(I f r) - 1] f~(1 f r)sN 1 (4.3.4)
p~, - B1 } n (1 ~- r)[1 -~(1 f n)] - a(1 ~- n)(I f B) 1 f r sN ( 4.3.5)
- r-n ~(1-~n)-~B .~(lfn)fB ( ) s-i
where the superscript `N' refers to the Nash assumption. These solutions clearly differ
from the solutions under Stackelberg behaviour given in the previous section. This
difference stems from the effect the current pension transfer has on the future pension
transfer which in turn affect current savings. This effect is not taken into account when
the government takes future policy as given, i.e. where Nash behaviour is assumed.
It is, however, taken into account in case of Stackelberg behaviour. Straightforward
comparison gives the following proposition
Proposition 4.3 Given any initial level of savings so, it holds for all t that
N . Nsi 1 st, Pt G Pt
What is the intuition behind this result? As noted before, the current pension transfer
affects the future pension transfer which in turn affects current savings. From inserting
eq. (4.2.4) into eq. (4.3.2), it can be shown that the effect the current transfer has on the
future transfer is positive. This, in turn, negatively affects current savings. Therefore,
~This is not the only diffetence with Verbon and Verhoeven (1992) though. Other differences are:
First, Verbon and Verhoeven (1992) exclude negative savings and transfers. Their solution is therefore
given by a constrained steady-state with either zero savings or zero transfers. Second, their economy
can be dynamically efficient as well as inefficient. But, because of the conatraints, this is not really
important for their model. The aolution to the unconatrained version, however, as analyaed here,
depends on whether the economy is dynamically efficient or inefficient. In case it is inefficient, the
solution is independent of the political parameters. Moreover, consumption becomes zero immediately,
i.e. directly after the initial period, for both generationa.
aThe derivation is given in the appendix
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in case of Nash behaviour, where the positive effect of the current transfer on the future
transfer is neglected, this leads to savings which are higher and pension transfers which
are lower than under Stackelberg behaviour, where the positive effect of current on future
transfers is taken into account.
A social welfare maximizing PAYG system
The solution obtained can be compared to a social welfare maximizing PAYG system
which follows from optimization of a Benthamite social welfare function:
~
Wto` -~~P(1 f n)]' [Inc~ } Blnco~i,
~-o
(4.3.6)
where p is the social discount factor. p - p(1 f n) then, denotes the social rate of time
preference. This will be used is the rest of this chapter since it simplifies notation. The
solution is given by the following two first-order difference equations9. For the private
sector savings in period t, si''o`, it reads:
s.,~o~ - 1 f n r- P~ 1 f r s.,~o~
c r-n l~p l~P c-i
The solution for the period t pension transfer, pi''o`, is given by:
(4.3.7)





By equating the solution of the social welfare maximizer and the solution of the rep-
resentative democracy, the following result can be derived:
Proposition 4.4 Given any ánitial level of savíngs so, the táme paths for taxes and
pensíon transfers chosen by a social welfare maxámizer coáncide with time paths chosen
by a representatáve democracy if p- n~ á.
Thus, for every value for ~ and n, there is a p such that the policy chosen by a represen-
tative democracy coincides with the policy choice of a social-welfare maximizer and vice
9The derivation is given in the appendix.
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versa. Both cases take the future into account, but, each of them, in a different way. In
the representative democracy, the current government takes the policy choices of future
governments into account. If the government is modelled as optimizing a Benthamite
social welfare function, the utilities of future generations are taken into account. R.emark
that in Chapter 3, a similar result was derived. There, however, any policy chosen in a
representative democracy can be chosen by a social welfare optimizer but not vice versa.
The difference between public debt and public pensions is that the former redistributes
between generations, over periods while the latter redistributes between generations,
within periods. Thus, in the former case, the government in the representative democ-
racy has the possibility to shift the burden of taxation over to future, yet unrepresented
generations. And, indeed, this will be the case. Hence, policies chosen by a social wel-
fare optimizer that attaches high weight to future generations will never be chosen in a
representative democracy.
The following proposition denotes, for a given level of savings st-1i when generations
in period t are better off in a representative democracy than with a social welfare maxi-
mizer and vice versa.
Proposition 4.5 Given st-1i it holds for:
The current old generationlo
1
Ut-1 G Utoi tiff p' G n f.~
The current young generation
A U~G U~o`iff nf~GpGn-~.~(1-~n)21~8
B UtGUto~t~n}~~1~n~zléBGpGn}~
Proof: see the appendix. For the current elderly, the result is straightforward. If p is
smaller than n~- á, the pension transfer in the representative democracy is smaller than
the pension transfer of a social welfare optimizer. Hence, given their level of savings,
their utility is lower in the representative democracy. For the current young results
are more complicated. The effect on their utility depends on the current as well as on
loThe auperacript `soc' refers to social welfare optimization.
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all future pension transfers. Moreover, unlike the current elderly, their savings are not
fixed but also vary with the present and future pension transfer. Consider case A. If
n~ á C p, the pension transfer with the social welfare optimizer is smaller than the
transfer in the representative democracy. This implies a gain for the current young in
terms of utility with the social welfare optimízer when they are young, but a loss when
they are old. This loss is, however, not sufficient to compensate for the gain incurred
when they were young. Therefore, on total they gain in terms of utility with the social
welfare optimizer relative to the representative democracy. If p C n -~ á, the utility loss
incurred when young due to the higher transfer paid under the social welfare optimizer
relative to the representative democracy is not sufíiciently compensated in terms of
utility by the higher transfer received when they are old. Hence, utility is higher in the
representative democracy. A similar story can be told if p 1 n~- ~(1 ~- n)2 é. In that
case, the utility gain due to the higher transfer received in their old-age by the current
young from the social welfare optimizer is not sufficient to compensate for the utility
loss due to the higher transfer paid to the current elderly. Hence, utility is lower with
the social welfare optimizer than in the representative democracy. A similar story can
be told for case B. Furthermore, note that if both generations get higher utility in the
representative democracy than with the social welfare optimizer, this must imply that
some future generations get lower utility in the representative democracy. Otherwise,
the social welfare optimizer could improve in terms of utility by choosing the same policy
as in the representative democracy.
4.4 The effects of parameter changes
In reality, the exogenous parameters in this model are not constant over time. Popu-
lation growth rates, interest rates and political and private preference parameters (~
and 8 respectively) change over time. This section analyses the effects of changes in
the exogenous parameters. The focus will be on unanticipated changes. Note that,
the length of one period corresponds to one generation, í. e., about 30 years. Hence,
people anticipating on changes in the political balance, the private discount factor or
the interest rate taking place in the next stage of their life is rather unrealistic. Changes
in the population growth rate are, more or less, forseeable over such a period of time.
Therefore anticipated as well as unanticipated shocks are analysed in this case.
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The reference situation in the sequel will be ~~~}n~}1 C 1, i.e. decreasing saving rates
and increasing transfers, and a positive so. Period t' denotes the period the parameter
change occurs. A subscript `1' denotes the value of a parameter before the change, a
subscript `2' denotes its value after the change. The mathematical derivations of the
results are given in the appendix.
The effect of an increase in political power of an old individual An increase
in the political power of an old individual is reflected by a decrease in a. If the change is
unanticipated, the young of period t- 1 expect the pension policy not to change. Their
savings decision is based on this expectation. When they are confronted with their
increased political weight the following period, they will use it to raise their pension
benefit. However, since they did not foresee this possibility the period before, their
savings are `too high'. This partly offsets the increase in pensions. In other words,
though their increased political power gives the elderly the possibility to force a higher
pension benefit, their lower `need' for it partly offsets the increase. The total effect is
positive. Note that the steady-state levels of savings and pensions are unaffected. If
the change in ~ is large enough, a regime switch may occur from decreasing savings
and increasing transfers to increasing savings and decreasing transfers. The following
proposition summarizes:
Proposition 4.6 In case of an unanticipated increase in ~ in some period t, the initial
e,~ects are
pí(with change~ ~ pi(no change~
si(with change) G si(no change)
Steady-state levels are unaffected.
The effect of an increase in the private discount factor An increase in the private
discount factor at some date t' implies a higher weight for old-age utility of the generation
t'. Ceteris paribus, this implies that they will increase their savings. However, savings
also depend on current and future pension benefits. The government, confronted with
a generation of elderly with a relatively low private discount factor and a generation
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of young with a higher private discount factor, will decrease the pension benefit for
the current elderly. This lower pension benefit for the current elderly positively affects
the savings of the current young, ceteris paribus. However, savings also depend on the
pension benefit the current young expect to receive themselves. Ceteris paribus, a higher
weight for old-age consumption implies a higher pension benefit. Since this negatively
affects savings whereas the lower pension benefit for the current elderly positively affects
savings, the total effect is ambiguous and depends on the relation between .~, n, r and the
change in 8. From the condition given in Proposition 4.7, the following can be inferred.
If a or r is relatively high, the initial effect on savings ís more likely to be positive. In
the first case, a relatively high .~ implies relatively more political power for the young.
Therefore, current young know that for their old age they cannot rely too much on their
pension benefit. Hence, they better save more for themselves. In the second case, a
relatively high r, saving privately is relatively more attractive than the PAYG system.
The effect of n on the initial jump of savings is ambiguous because n has two, opposing,
effects. On the one hand a relatively high n implies relatively more weight for the young.
On the other hand, it implies that the PAYG system is relatively more attractive than
saving privately. The savings of generation t' f 1 and subsequent generations are only
affected by the effect on the savings of generation tll. Since the level of s~ is ambiguous,
the level of s~-1 and so forth, is ambiguous as we1112. The effect on the pension level
of period t-}- 1 and subsequent periods, depends in a similar way on st. This follows
immediately from eq. (4.3.2). Finally, note that the steady-state levels of pensions and
savings are unaffected. The following proposition summarizes:
Proposition 4.7 In case of an unanticipated increase in B in some period t, the initial
effects are
p{(with change) C p~(no change)
si(with change) 1 (G) sf(no change) iff ~(r - n) f 1 ~r ~1 n n) 1(C)1 ~182
Steady-state levels are unaffected.
11This follows from eq. (4.3.1), which does not depend on B.
12In principle, it is possible to calculate a similaz condition as done for st. However, since it requires
calculation back until period t-1, the last period before the change, these conditions become increasingly
complex without providing further insight. Therefore, they are omitted.
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The effect of an increase in the interest rate An increase in the interest rate makes
private saving more attractive relative to the PAYG system. Therefore, the initial effect
on private savings is positive and the effect on pensions is negative. The effects on the
steady-state levels are similar. The new steady-state level of pensions is lower, the new
steady-state level of savings is higher. Furthermore, since a~l~n~}1 ~s increasing in r,
the change in r may cause a regime switch, i.e. from decreasing savings and increasing
pension benefits to increasing savings and decreasing pension benefits. The following
proposition summarizes:
Proposition 4.8 In case of an unanticipated increase in r in some period t', the initial
effects are
pi(with change) G p{(no change)
sL(with change) 1 si(no change)
Steady-state levels change
new old new old
psa C paa Saa 1 saa
The effect of a decrease in the growth rate of the population From a policy
perspective, a change in the population growth rate is most interesting one. In this case,
anticipated as well as unanticipated changes are analysed. In either case, a decrease in
the population growth rate makes the PAYG system less attractive compared to private
savings. This can be inferred from the decrease of the steady-state pension benefit and
the increase in the steady-state savings level. The decrease in population growth has
two, opposing, effects on the pension transfer. On the one hand, there is a political
effect. The extra number of elderly, relative to the number of young, creates an upward
pressure on the pension level. On the other hand, relatively more elderly increases the
cost for the current young if the pension transfer would remain the same (the cost effect).
This creates a downward pressure on the pension transfer.
If there is an unanticipated decrease of the population growth rate, the initial effect
depends on the savings level of the current elderly, sL-1. If this is relatively low, the
pension level decreases. Otherwise, it increases. What is the intuition? A relatively low
sL-1 implies that the current pension transfer is relatively high. Maintaining the current
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pension transfer is, therefore, relatively costly. Hence, the cost effect will dominate the
political effect and a decrease in the pension transfer and an increase in the savings level
can be observed. If si-1 is relatively high, the opposite holds. Note from Proposition
4.9 that there are levels of si-1 for which both pi as well as s~ decrease. A decrease in
pL positively affects s{, as can be deduced from eq. (4.2.4). However, if this decrease is
sufficiently small, this decrease is offset by the decrease in n since it is the ratio of pi over
I~- n which matters (see eq. (4.2.4)). Furthermore, note that this implies that if private
savings are relatively high, if initially no PAYG system exists, it may come about even
if the growth rate of the population decreases13
In case of an anticipated change, the initial effect of a decrease in the population growth
rate on the pension level is negative, i. e. at the time the change in n becomes known,
there is a downward jump in the pension level and an upward jump of savings. The
reason is that, in this case, the cost effect is taken into account directly whereas the
political effect is only indirectly taken into account via pi~1. The direct political effect is
absent until the time of the change implying still a relatively high weight for the current
young. Hence, savings increase and the pension benefit to the elderly in period decreases.
The following proposition summarizes:
Proposition 4.9 In case of an unanticápated decrease in n in som,e period t', the initial
effects are
p{(with change) ~ (G) pi(no change)
.ff e t ()
1 f ni ( .~(1 f B)(1 } nl)2
eI
t s-- ~ G- r - n 1`I - ~(1 f B)(r - n)
si(with change) G (1) si(no change)
1 ~- ni ~ .~(1 -~ nl)~ 11
iff si-1 J(C) - 1- J
r-n .~(r-n )
In case of an anticipated decrease in n in some period t, the
when the future shock becomes known, are
initial effects in peráod t- ,
pi-~(with change) c pi-~(no change)
19A similar result ie derived in Meijdam and Verbon ( 1995).
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s{-~(with change) ~ si-~(no change)
Steady-state levels change
new old new old
Paa C paa saa J Saa
4.5 Summary and concluding remarks
The intention of this chapter is to provide additional insights into the evolution of PAYG
public pension systems or, more general, social security systems. From a normative point
of view, social security programs might be installed because they lead to a Pareto su-
perior allocation of endowments. This, however, can only be the case if r G n, i. e. the
economy is dynamically inefficient. In positive models, social security systems can arise
if the economy is dynamically efficient. The existing literature up to date concerning
positive explanations is mainly based on median voter models or assumptions of altruism.
This chapter does not use a median voter framework nor does it rely on the assumption
of altruism. Instead, the pension level is chosen in a representative democracy.
An important feature of this chapter is the notion of Stackelberg behaviour. Not only
is the government assumed to be a Stackelberg leader towards the private sector, taking
account of the behavioural responses of the private sector, but it also acts as a Stackel-
berg leader towards future governments. Because of this assumption, the present young
anticipate on the behavioural responses of future generations which implies that they
are able to use their savings strategically in a similar way as in Veall (1986).
The following results were derived: First, even without the assumption of altruism a
PAYG pension system might arise. The reason is that agents rationally anticipate fu-
ture decisions and, besides that, both generations have political influence on the decisions
taken. In addition to the latter point, one might say that the political influence of the
elder generation replaces the assumption of altruism. Whether a PAYG system with
positive transfers from young to elderly indeed comes into existence depends on the par-
ameters of the model. Conditions were derived that determine whether a PAYG pension
system will emerge or the old generation will be forced to make transfers to the young.
These conditions were a function of the population growth rate, the interest rate and
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the political weight of a young individual relative to an elderly. Also, the welfare conse-
quences for the current generations were analysed if the government decides to introduce
a PAYG system.
Next, the difference between the assumption of Nash behaviour and of Stackelberg be-
haviour was analysed. Compared to the solution with the assumption of Nash behaviour,
the level of savings was lower if the effect of current pension transfers on future trans-
fers was taken into account. The current transfer postively affected the future transfer,
which, in turn, negatively affects current savings. This, however, was neglected in case
of Nash behaviour. Savings are therefore higher with Nash behaviour than with Stack-
elberg behaviour. For the level of pension transfers the opposite held.
Furthermore, the PAYG system chosen in a representative democracy was compared
to the policy choice of social welfare maximizer. It appeared that every policy chosen
by a social welfare maximizer is feasible in a representative democracy as well and vice
versa. The reason was that both cases took the future into account, but, each of them,
in a different way. In the representative democracy, the current government took the
policy choices of future governments into account. If the government is modelled as
optimizing a Benthamite social welfare function, the utilities of future generations were
taken into account. In addition, a welfare comparison was made between these two cases.
Finally, the effects of changes in the exogenous parameters were analysed. An increase
in the political power of an old individual led initially to an upward jump in the pension
benefit, and a downward jump in the private savings level. The steady-state levels were
unaffected because they were only determined by parameters related to total discounted
income. In case individual consumers became less impatient and attached more weight
to old-age consumption, reflected by a higher private discount factor, the initial effect
depended on the other exogenous parameters. The steady-state levels were, again, un-
affected. An increase in the interest rate made saving privately more attractive than
the PAYG system as a means to transfer wealth to the next period of life. Hence, pen-
sions jumped downward initially while savings jumped upward. The steady-state levels
changed in the same direction. From a policy perspective, in the face of the ageing
population in many western countries, the change in the population growth rate was
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the most interesting one. In case of an unforeseen decrease in the population growth
rate, the initial effects depended on the level of savings of the elderly when the change
occurred. If these were relatively high, the pension level would jump upward, while pri-
vate savings would jump downward. A decrease in the population growth rate had two,
opposing effects. On the one hand, there was a political effect because of the increase
in the number of elderly relative to the number of young. On the other hand, there
was a cost effect because keeping the pension at its current level became more costly for
the current young. In case of a relatively low savings level, the latter effect dominated,
causing a decline in the pension level and an increase in the savings level. If savings were
relatively high, the opposite held. In case a future decrease in the growth rate of the
population was anticipated, the pension level jumped downward whereas private savings
jumped upward when the future change became known.
A Appendix
A.1 The derivation of the PAYG-scheme in a representative
democracy
The solution to the infinite horizon model is obtained by first solving the finite horizon
model and, then, taking the limit to obtain the solution to the infinite horizon model'a
Assume that there is some final period T. Then, sT - pr~l - 0. The government in
period T then optimizes:
max Bln 1 f r sT-1 -~ ~PT [( ) Pr] f a(1 -~ n)In[1 - 1 f n]
Straightforward optimization shows that
1 -~ n a(1 -}- n)
~-e~(l~n)f9}~(lfn)fe(lfr)sz-i
Next, the government in period T- 1 optimizes




11Note that atandard dynamic programming techniques are not applicable in this case because of the
form of the objective function.
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-}- ,~(1 ~ n) { ln[1 - sT-1 - ~ n] ~- Bln[(1 f r)sT-I ~ pT]~ (A-3)
Since the government is Stackelberg leader with respect to the private sector, it takes eq.
(4.2.4), the savings behaviour of the private sector, into account. Using this equation in
eq. (A-3), it can rewritten as:
maxBln[(1 f r)sT-2 f pT-1] f~(1 -b n)(1 f B)ln[1 -~-' f~] (A-4)rT-~ 1 f n 1 f r
Each government is also Stackelberg leader with respect to future governments. Hence,
using eq. (4.2.4), pT can be rewritten as a function of pT-1. Inserting this in eq. (A-4)
and optimizing gives:
PT-i - B
I f n (1 } r) -F (1 f n) -~(1 ~ 6)(1 f n) (1 -~ r)sT-s (A-5)
- 1-}- r~(1 -~ B)(1 f n) f B ,1(1 f 6)(1 -~ n) ~- B
Doing this repeatedly gives
1-F n 1 f r (1 ~}. n~T-k}1
Pk-er-n a(1fB)(lfn)f9[1-ll~-r ,-
a(1 f B)(1 i- n) f 9(1
- ~ r)sk-i (A-6)
for k- 0, ..., T- 1. Eq. (4.3.2) then follows from T-~ oo. Eq. (4.3.1) follows from
inserting eq. (4.3.2) into eq. (4.2.4).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Given the logarithmic utility function, it is sufficient to compare ci for the current elderly
and c~v(ci~l)B for the current young.
From eq. (4.2.4) follows that if there was no PAYG pension system savings st-1 are
equal to 1}e. Hence, in that case ci -(1 ~ r) l~e. If the government introduces a PAYG
pension system, ci becomes
o B(1 ~- r)(1 f n) B(1 f r) B
ct -[.~(1 f B)(1 ~ n) {- B](r - n) }[~(1 -~ 6)(1 -}- n) t e] 1} e
Direct comparison shows that consumption of the current elderly is higher (lower) by
the introduction of the PAYG pension system iff
~(1 f B)(1 -~ n)
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.~(r - n) G (~) 1
Using eqs. (4.2.1), ( 4.2.2) gives for ci ( citl)B in case there is no PAYG pension system
1 ite BC 1 ~ BI [B(1 -h r)]
Using eqs. (4.2.1), (4.2.2) and eqs. (4.3.1), (4.3.2) gives for ci(citl)B in case there is a
PAYG pension system
a(1 f r)[(1 f- n) -f- (r - n)ite]
lfe
L(r - n)[~(1 ~- n) f 1][~(1 f 9)(1 f n) f B]]
[B(1 f r)]B
Direct comparison shows that utility is higher (lower) with the PAYG pension system iff
[~(r - n) - 1][.~(1 f n)2(1 f B) - B(r - n)] G(1)0
Q.E.D.
A.3 Nash
The optimal level of private savings is given by eq. ( 4.2.4):
B p~ l 1 pifl
s`-1tB~l-lfnJ-1fB 1~-r
The first-order condition for the government is given by
B a
ó - vct ct
Hence, the optimal transfer level is given by
B(1 - st) - ~(1 f r)st-1
pt - B
~ } 1}n









- B(1 } r) - (B } 1}n) I
M- N-
(I } B)B(1 ~ r)2 (1 ~ r) [(1 ~ e)a } ~tn] -(i -~ r)
The following two eigenvalues of M can be calculated
Iri - ~(1 f r) hs -
lfr
' 1 ~- n
Since the economy is assumed to be dynamically efficient, i.e. r 1 n, it holds that p2 ~ 1.
For the dynamical system to be saddlepoint stable, it must hold that .~(1 f r) C lls
Then, applying the result of Blanchard and Kahn ( 1980), eqs. (4.3.4) and ( 4.3.5) are
derived.
A.4 The derivation of the social welfare maximizing PAYG sys-
tem
The solution to the infinite horizon model is obtained by first solving the finite horizon
model and, then, taking the limit to obtain the solution to the infinite horizon modells
Assume that there is some final period T. Then, sT - pT}r - 0. In the final period, the
following optimization problem results:
! T-r T
max I I } n~ Bln[(1 ~ r)sT-1 -h pT] ~ ~1
f nl ln[1 -~] (A-10)pT `1-~p 1-~pJ l~n
Here the social rate of time preference p instead of the social discount factor p has been
used since it simplifies notation. Note that p- 1}p. Straightforward optimization shows
that:
B(1 f P)(1 f n) - (1 f n) I
~- B(1 -}- p) ~- (1 ~ n) B(1 f p) f(1 f n) ( } r)sT-r
Next, the optimization problem in period T- 1 is given by:
(A-11)
lsIf a(1 } r) ~ I, an unstable system would result.
1sNote that standard dynamic programming techniques are not applicable in this case because of the
form of the objective function.





I` 6ln [(1 f r)sT-z ~ j~T-1]}
1 ~- p
rl ~n1T-1
~- I` 1 } ..il {!n[1 - sT-1 - ~~] -}- Bln[(1 f r)sT-i f pT]} ~- (A-12)
P
(1-I-n1TlJ PT~ 1{ P ln[1 - 1} n]
Since the social welfare maximizer is Stackelberg leader with respect to the private sector,
it takes the behaviour of the private sector, as given by eq. (4.2.4), into account. Then,
using eqs. (4.2.4) and (A-11), eq. (A-12) can be rewritten as:
maxBln[(1 f r)sT-z f pT-i] f
1~- P rl } B} 1 f Pl ln[1 ~ 1-f- n- PT-i ](A-13)
nT-~ 1~-"1` lf`J lfr lfn
Again, straightforward optimization shows:
(1 ~ P)2(1 t n) rl ~ 1}
n~PT-i - B(1 ~. P)(1 f n) f(1 ~- n)Z ~ B[(1 f P)(1 f n) f(1 } P)2] l 1 f r
- (1 f n)[(1 f B)(1 } P) ~ (1 } n)] (1 } r)sT-z
(1 ~ P)(1 t n) -f- (1 ~ n)a ~ e[(1 ~ n)(1-~ n) ~ (1 ~ P)a]
Doing this repeatedly gives:
(A-14)
1 r I n T-k}1~ [1 - ~1~) (1 f P)
Pk-e -
Óln [(1 } B)(1 ~ P) - [(1 f B)(1 } P) - (P - n )] (1~)T -k] ~- ltn
~[(1 f B)(1 f P) -[(1 f 8)(1 ~ P) -(P - n )](~)T-k~
- sk-, (A-15)
óln (1 f B)(1 f P) -[(1 f B)(1 } P) -(P - n)](~)T -k] } tfn
for k- 0, . .., T- 1. Eq. (4.3.8) then follows from T--~ oo. Eq. (4.3.7) follows from
inserting eq. (4.3.8) into eq. (4.2.4).
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.5
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Given the logarithmic utility function, it is sufficient to compare ci for the current elderly
and civ(citl )B for the current young.
Using eq. ( 4.2.2) and eqs. (4.3.2) and (4.3.8) to obtain ci and ci''o` respectively:
o B(1 -~ r)(1 f n) B(1 -~ r)
~t -[~(1 ~- B)(1 f n) f e](r - n) } [~(1 ~ e)(1 f n) ~. B~st-1
o,o~ 6(p - n)(1 - {- r)(1 -{- n) B(p - n)(1 f r)
~ -[(1 f n) ~ B(1 ~ P)~(r - n) }[(1 f n) f B(1 f P)~se-1
Direct comparison shows that
Ci,aoc ~ (~)Cé ~P~ (~)n~ ~
Using eqs. (4.2.1), (4.2.2) and eqs. (4.3.1), (4.3.2) and eqs. (4.3.7), (4.3.8) to obtain
ctv(ci~l)B and ctv''o`(ct~i`)a respectively:
~(1 ~ r)[(1 f n) ~(r - n)st-1] lte
ci (citl)B - [(r - n)[J~(1 f n) f 1][~(1 ~- B)(1 ~- n) f B],
[B(1 f r)~B
~y,ao~(cific)B -
f(1 f r)(P - n)[(1 -~ n) ~- (r - n)si-1~
lfe[B(1 } r)]B
- L (1 f P)(r - n)[(1 f n) ~ B(1 ~- P)] J




a (P - [n ~- ~~)(P - [n f a(1-f- n)21 é B) ~ (G) 0
A.6 Parameter changes
Q.E.D.
In the sequel, a subscript `1' denotes the value of a parameter before the change occurs,
i. e. in the periods 1, ..., t. The subscript `2' denotes the value of a parameter after the
change, i. e. periods t, ....
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The effect of an increase in political power of an old individual
The optimization problem in period t is given by
maxBln[(1 f r)s{-1 ~ pi]~
P~
~~z(1 -} n) { In[1 - si - 1~ n] -~
Bln[(I -} r)si f Pi~i]} (A-16)
subject to
el ~ n I~ r -.1z(1 -F B)(I f n)
(1 f r)si (A-17)Pifi - r- n .~z(1 f B)(I f n) ~ B ~z(1 -F B)(1 f n) ~ B
B r Pi l 1 Pifl
s`-lf9`I-I~nI-lf6 1tT
(A-18)
Straightforward optimization shows that
el f n 1~ r - .~2(1 ~ B)(1 ~- n)
(1 ~ r)si-i (A-19)Pi - r- n az(i ~ e)(1 f n) -~ e az(I ~ e)(I ~ n) ~ e
In period t- 1, policy is chosen assuming that ~ is equal to .11 in period t. Hence, the
optimization problem is given by:
max Bln[(1 ~- r)si-z } Pi-i]}
pi-i
~- al(1 f n) j ln[1 - s2-1 - ~} n] ~ Bln[(1 f r)si-i f Pi]}
subject to
(A-20)
B 1 ~- n 1 f r - ~z(1 -}- B)(1 f n) (1 -F r)si-1 (A-21)p` - r- n ,~z(1 ~ B)(1 -}. n) ~ B az(1 -f- B)(1 } n) f B
B Pi-i l 1 Pi
s`-1 - 1~B CI- 1~nI - I f6 1-}-r
( A-22)
Straightforward optimization shows that
A Appendix gg
1-I-n 1-~r ~1(1~B)(lfn)
Pc-i - Br - n al(I f B)(1 ~ n) f B-~1(1 f B)(1 ~ n) ~ e(
I -F r)si-2 (A-23)
The initial jump in the pension benefit follows from comparison of eq. (A-19) with
the level of pi if there was no change in ~. Straightforward computation shows that
pi(no change) C pi(with change). In a similar way it follows that si(no change) ~
si(with change).
The effect of an increase in the private discount factor
The optimization problem in period t is given by
max Blln[(1 f r)si-1 ~ p{]f
Pi




I f n, 1~- r - ~(1 ~- BZ)(1 f n)
1 f r si A-25r-n a(i~e2)(i~n)}e a(i}eZ)(l~n)}B2( ) ( )
B2 PF l 1 Pifi
st- 1-~82
(I-
lfnl - 1-~B2 l~r
(A-26)
Straightforward optimization shows that
Pe - 611
~ n I~ r - ~(1 f B2)(1 f n) 1~- r si-1 A-27r-n ~(Ite~)(1-~n)tel a(I}B2)(i-~n).~Bl( ) ( )
In period t- 1, policy is chosen assuming that B remains equal to Bl in period t. Hence,
the optimization problem is given by:
maxBlln[(1 f r)si-s f Pi-i]~
Pé ~
~~I 1 ~ n ln 1- s-- pt-1 B!n I f r s-- ~ A-28( ){ [ e i-1}n]f i[( ) t i Pè] ( )
subject to
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1 f n 1 ~- r a(1 -~ Bl)(1 ~ n)
Pi - Bl r- n .~Z(1 f Bi)(1 t n) ~- Bl -~(1 f ei)(I -i- n) f Bl
(I f r)si-i (A-29)
Bi 1- Pi-i l 1 Pi
1fB1 C l~nl-1fB1 lfr
(A-30)
Straightforward optimization shows that
Pe-i - gl
l f n 1-}- r - a(1 ~ el)(1 f n)
1~- r st-2 A-31r- n al(I ~ e,)(i t n) ~ e, a(I ~ el)(I ~ n) } B, ( ) ( )
The initial jump in the pension benefit follows from comparison of eq. (A-27) with
the level of pí if there was no change in B. Straightforward computation shows that
p{(no change) ~ pi(with change). In a similar way it follows that s{(no change) G(~
) si(with change) iff ~(r - n) ~ 1}r ln~~(G) lté .
The effect of an increase in the interest rate
The optimization problem in period t is given by
maxBln[(1 ~ ra)si-1 f pt]~
Pi
subject to
f a(1 -~ n) j ln[1 - si - I} n] -~ Bln[(1 ~ rs)si f Pifi]} (A-32)
e 1 f n 1 t r2 - ~(1 f B)(1 -~ n) ( 1 f r2)si (A-33)pi}' - r2 - n .~(1 -}- B)(1 -~ n) f B ~(1 -~ B)(1 d- n) -~ B
e Pi l I Pi}i
st-1-}~BCI-1-FnI-1-FB 1~r2
(A-34)
Straightforward optimization shows that
B 1 f n 1 f rZ - ~(1 f 9)(I f n) (1 f r2)si-1 (A-35)
pt - rz - n ,1(1 f 6)(1 f n) -}. 8 ~(1 ~- B)(1 ~- n) -}. 6
In period t' - 1, policy is chosen assuming that r is equal to rl in period t. Hence, the
optimization problem is given by:
A Appendix
maxBln[(1 f rl)s~-~ -~pf-1]f
P~-~




B 1~ n 1 f rl - .1(1 -}- 9)(1 f n)
(1 f rl)si-I (A-37)
p` - rl - n ,12(1 f B)(1 f n) f B ,~(1 ~ 9)(1 f n) ~- B
e Pi-i l 1 Pi
st-1-1-1-BCl-1fnl-1fB lfrl
Straightforward optimization shows that
lfn 1-~rl ~(1~}-B)(1-Fn)
Pi-i - Br1 - n ~(1 f 9)(1 f n) ~ 9-.~(1 f 9)(1 f n) f B(1 f ri)si-s
(A-38)
(A-39)
The initial jump in the pension benefit follows from comparison of eq. (A-35) with
the level of pi if there was no change in r. Straightforward computation shows that
pí(no change) ~ pi(with change). In a similar way it follows that si(no change) G
st(with change).
The effect of a decrease in the growth rate of the population
Unanticipated
The optimization problem in period t' is given by
max Bln[(1 f r)si-i f Pi]fPi
~ a(1 ~- nz) { ln[1 - s{ - pt ]-}. Bln[(1 f r)si f pitl]}




1 f n 1 f r -.~(1 ~ B)(1 f n2) 1~ r si A-41
r-nZ .~(1-~9)(lfn2)f6 .~(1~-9)(1-~n2)f9( ) ( )
92 The evolution of public pensions
e Pi l I Pi}i
si- 1{-B Cl- 1~nI -1 fB 1-}-r
(A-42)
Straightforward optimization shows that
el ~ nl 1~ r - ~(1 f B)(1 ~- n2) 1 f r s A-43Pt - r- nz .~(1 f B)(1 ~ nz) f 9 a(1 f 8)(1 f n2) f B( ) i-i ( )
In period t' - 1, policy is chosen assuming that n is equal to n1 in period t'. Hence, the
optimization problem is given by:
max Bln[(1 ~- r)si-2 f Pi-i]f
pi-i
f a(1 ~- nl) j ln[1 - si-1 - Pi-i
l 1 f n~
~ Bln[(1 ~ r)si-1 f pi]} (A-44)
subject to
el f nl 1~- r -~(1 -}- B)(1 f nl) 1 f r s A-45Pt - r- nl .~(1 f B)(1 -F nl) f 6 ~(1 -}- B)(1 ~ nl) ~ B( ) i-i ( )
B Pi-i I Pi
st-1-1f9CI-1-1-n1~-1fB 1-}-r
(A-46)
Straightforward optimization shows that
1 f nl 1-~ r a(1 ~- 6)(1 f ni)
Pi-i - Br - nl ~(1 ~- 9)(1 f nl) f B- a(1 f B)(1 f nl) ~ g(1
~ r)si-z (A-47)
The initial jump in the pension benefit follows from comparison of eq. (A-43) with
the level of pi if there was no change in n. 5traightforward computation shows that
pi(no change) G(1) pt(with change) iff si-1 ~(G) -~(1 -~a(i}e) rnny}B~. In
a similar way it follows that si(no change) ~(G) si(with change) iff si-1 )(G
) - 1}ni I - a 1}ni }1
r-n~ a(r-ny)
Anticipated
In case of an anticipated change in the population growth rate, the optimal pension
benefit in period t' is identical to eq. (A-43). The optimization problem in period t- 1
is, because of the anticipation, given by:
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max Bln[(1 ~ r)s~-2 } pi-1]-}-
pi-i
f~(1 ~ nl) ln[1 - s-- Pi-1 ] Bln 1-~ r s-- f] (A-48)e i- 1-{- nl { [( ) s i Pi }
subject to
B1 f nl 1 f r -,~(1 f B)(1 f n2) 1 f r s A-49Pe - r - n2 ~(1 f B)(1 f n2) f B a(1 f B)(1 -}- n2) f B( ) i-' ( )
B ( pi-i l 1 pi
st-I- 1-~9 `1- 1fn1I - lf9 lfr
(A-50)
Straightforward optimization shows that
r-n2~-1~-n1 1~-r
pi-i-e r-n~ a(lfe)(1fn1)fe-
.~(1 -{- B)(1 f nl) ( )
- a(1 ~ B)(1 ~ nl ) } B(1-~ r)s2-2 A-51
Doing this repeatedly gives for anticipation j periods before:
Pi-
- B 1 } nl 1 ~- r -~ ,,~ [ 1 - (11~)i-lj
(nl - nZ) -
r- n2 ~(1 f B)(1 t nl) fJ8
- J~(1 f B)(1 f nl) (1 ~ r)s
.~(1 f 6)(1 ~- nl) ~ B t-i-1
(A-52)
The initial jump of the pension benefit at the period the future change in n becomes
known follows from comparison of eq. (A-52) with the level of pi-i if there was no
change. Straightforward computation shows that p~-i(no change) ) pi-i(with change).









Figure 4.1: The evolution of taxes and transfers
Chapter 5
Public investment policy as an
intergenerational conflict
5.1 Introduction
Until the mid eighties public investment and public capital received little attention by
economists. Then, two developments put investment in public capital again at the fore-
front of economic analysis. First, a number of empirical studies appeared, dealing with
the question whether the decline in US productivity could be attributed to a shortage in
public capital (cf. Gramlich (1994) for a critical overview of these studies). Second, in
theoretical research, public investment regained interest by the literature on endogenous
growth. Investment in public capital, be it infrastructure or education, could raise the
productivity of private capital and, hence, raise output, consumption etcetera. It might
even affect growth rates permanently (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)). Both these
developments led to a boost in empirical and theoretical research on the role of public
capital. Besides, policymakers are becoming increasingly aware of the role public capital
can play in the competiveness of an economy. Especially in Europe where the increased
economic integration leads to more and more harmoni2ation of fiscal policies. This makes
this traditional instrument of competition between countries, e.g. by offering favourable
tax treatments to foreign investors, less useful. Competition between countries shifts to
the provision of the best environment for firms to operate. Infrastructure is an important
aspect of this.
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If public capital is important for productivity, growth and competition, the question
what determines the level of investment in public capital becomes important as well.
Yet, this question is hardly addressed. In most of the existing literature dealing with
public capital, either the utility of a representative agent or a social welfare function
consisting of utilities of all present and future generations is optimized. There are a few
exceptions which deal with some form of political decision making on public investment.
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) develop a model where infinitely-lived individuals differ with
respect to their relative share of the capital stock. The government uses a tax on capi-
tal to finance investment in public capital which enters the private production function
(similar to Barro (1990)). The level of public capital is decided upon by majority voting.
Thus, the level of public capital is the result of a political conflict between individuals
who differ in their share of the capital stock. The level chosen is suboptimal in the sense
that it falls below the level that maximizes growth. The growth maximizing level would
be preferred by a`pure' capitalist, i.e. an individual that only has capital income and
no labour income. If the median voter has more labour income, he prefers a higher tax
on capital. Furthermore, the more unequal the distribution of income and wealth, the
lower the rate of growth. In Van der Ploeg and Van de Klundert (1991), short-sighted
politicians, who have a higher rate of time preference than the private sector, increase
public consumption at the expense of public investment. This gives lower economic
growth. Another study dealing with investment in public capital in a politico-economic
framework is Konrad (1993). He models the political process as a gerontocracy, i.e. only
the current elderly have political power. They decide on a social security tax and on
investment in public capital. There is investment in public capital because it is produc-
tive immediately and therefore raises the tax base of the social security tax. Another
explanatory factor for investment in public capital may be altruism. E.g. in Glomm
and Ravikumar (1992) current generations leave a bequest to their offspring because of
altruistic feelings. The bequest is the quality of (public or private) schools. This could
also be applied to public capital. In Jappelli and Ripa-di-Meana (1994), the level of
public capital is determined in a representative democracy by a government that only
cares about the current generations. Public capital, which is productive immediately,
only benefits the current young generation. Besides public capital, there is also public
consumption which benefits both generations. Both these public expenditures are fi-
nanced by public debt and a lump-sum tax levied on the current young generation only.
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Their conclusion is that the level of public capital declines if more weight is attached to
the utility of the current elderly'.
What determines the level of investment in public capital is also the focus of this chapter.
Besides, whether there will be under- or overinvestment relative to a bench-mark level
is analysed as well. In this chapter the level of investment is determined in a conflict
between young and old generations. The government operates in a representative democ-
racy setting where only the present livíng generations are involved in the decision making
on public investment. Since for most public investment projects it takes considerable
time before they are ready for use, older generations do benefit only partly or maybe
even not al all from public capital and therefore will be opposed to investment in public
capital. Due to investment in public capital, the interest revenues on old-age savings
of the current young generations may increase. Besides, there may be spillovers to fu-
ture generations in the form of higher wages. This increases the future tax base making
possible, e.g. higher pensions. This may also be beneficial for the current young. The
opposition of the elderly and the non-representation of future generations, who may ben-
efit from public investment as well because of an increase in wages, may, therefore, lead
to underinvestment. However, this result is closely connected to the way in which these
investments are financed. If the budget has to be balanced and only current generations
pay taxes, underinvestment is likely to be the case. If, however, the government can use
public debt to finance public investment, this may lead to overinvestment since, in this
case, the costs can be shifted onto the shoulders of future, yet unrepresented, generations.
1The study of Jappelli and Ripa-di-Meana (1994) contains some serious flaws. First, in theit com-
mand solution they optimize welfare of a representative generation. The solution then is determined by
the golden rule condition. In their market solution, however, they consider a welfare function of the two
living generations, i.e. the current young and old generation. In this set-up there are two sourcea for
differences between both solutions. On the one hand, there is the difference in the objective function.
In the command solution, the current elderly are neglected. But in the market solution they are taken
into account. On the other hand, thete is the difference between instruments (command versus market).
However, because the elderly do not pay taxes in their model, the government has sufficient instruments
to attain the command solution through the market if they neglect the elderly completely. Hence, their
paper compares two governments with different objectives. The difference between command and mar-
ket solution is superfluous. Second, they solve their model implicitly reatricting themaelves to a set of
solutions where the policy is constant over time. This solution need not to coincide with the steady
state of the unrestricted model as they erroneously suggest.
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The resulting level of public capital due to the conflict between the generations present
is analyzed in Section 5.4. Three cases are distinguished. One where the government has
to balance its budget and can use time-dependent taxes only to finance public capital.
In the second case, the government still has to balance its budget but has the ability to
tax both generations differently. This implies that the government can affect the welfare
distribution between the two generations not only by public capital but also by taxing
both generations at a different level. The final case is where the government is allowed to
use debt to finance public capital. Before that, in Section 5.2, an overlapping generations
model of a closed economy is developed. The private sector consists of two overlapping
generations of which only the young generation works. The production side of the econ-
omy consists of an infinite number of price-taking firms. Public capital enters the private
production function. The government is modeled in a representative democracy setting
and maximizes utility of present generations only. Section 5.3 discusses the problems
of defining a command solution and presents a command optimum for this representa-
tive government which is used as a bench-mark in the following sections. Section 5.5
concludes this chapter.
5.2 The economy
5.2.1 The private sector
The private sector consists of overlapping generations of homogeneous agents. Each
agent lives for two periods, the first period, when young, labeled `y', the second period,
when old, labeled `o'. There is no population growth and the size of each generation
is normalized and equal to one. Each agent optimizes an additive separable lifetime
utility function of consumption in both periods. First-period consumption (ci ) of an
individual born at time t equals wages (wt) earned minus a lump-sum tax (Tt ) and
minus savings (st). Second-period consumption (ci}1) equals the first-period savings
plus interest revenues minus a lump-sum tax (TL~I). Agents choose a level of savings
that optimizes lifetime utility. This gives the following optimization problem:
max Ut - us(ct ) f Bvt(citl) (5.2.1)
s.t. ci~ - wi - r~ - st (5.2.2)
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~t}1 - (I ~ rt}1)st - Tt}1
(5.2.3)
where Ut denotes the lifetime utility function of a generation born at time t. ut and
vt are the instantaneous utility functions of the first and second period of their lifes
respectively. B is the private discount factor and rt}1 is the interest rate in period t~ 1.
Straightforward optimization shows that optimal savings s" are determined by:
auv - B(1 f rt}1) aót (5.2.4)a~ a~t},
Thus, given the interest rate and the discount factor, consumers equalize the present
values of marginal utilities. In the sequel, the utility function is assumed to be logarithmic
in consumption in both periods, i.e ut - lnci and vt - lnci}l. This implies that savings
are given by:
ro B
st -(l f e)(l f rt}1) ~ l f 8(wt
- Ti) (5.2.5)
Immediately it follows that savings decrease if the interest rate or the tax paid when
young, ry, rise. Savings increase if wages or old-age taxes rise. In this model, savings
can be interpreted as pension contributions into a capital reserve system. When old, the
individuals receive a pension which equals the contribution plus the interest revenues.
5.2.2 Firms
The production side of the economy is assumed to consist of a large number of price-
taking firms, each optimizing profits. There are three inputs for production, labour (1),
private capital (k) and public capital (g). Capital (private and public) is assumed to
depreciate fully within one period. Thus, the flow of investments in period t equals the
stock of capital in period t f 1. This gives:
max yt - rikt - wilt - kt
s.t. yt - f (jt, ~t, 9t)
(5.2.6)
(5.2.7)
where f(.) is a constant returns to scale production function. f(.) satisfies the standard
Inada conditions2 and has declining marginal productivity in both types of capital. Each
ZÍ~~) - 0, limr~o Í~~~~ oo, lim:~oo Í~~ï) - 0.
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type of capital raises the marginal productivity of the other type, i.e. aká9 is positive.
The firms take the level of public capital as given. Assuming perfect competition in the
factor markets implies that capital is paid according to its marginal productivity. Thus:
1 ~- ri - ~kt (5.2.8)
e
Because of the externality in the form of public capital, firms make profits. The zero
profit condition implies that these profits are included in the wages, i.e. given to the
current young3. Thus:
wt - li aye ~ 9t aye (5.2.9)
ále a9e
The second term on the right-hand-side of eq. (5.2.9) are the profits due to the free
availability of public capital. The production function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas
and given by:
yt - Ali k~ gR (5.2.10)
where ry 1 0 is the elasticity of labour, a 1 0 and Q~ 0 are the elasticities of private
and public capital respectively and A is a scale parameter. Since y~ a f Q- 1 it holds
that ~~~ G 1 implying that growth is not endogenous. Furthermore, the supply of
labour is assumed to be inelastic. Hence, labour can be normalized to one. Eq. ( 5.2.10)
implies that
1 -{- re - kis (5.2.11)
The profit due to the externality is equal to Qy. Since this is included in the wages,
wages equal
wt - 7ys -f- (jye - (1 - a)y~ (5.2.12)
Note that g is not a pure public good. Each firm gets its private share of public capital.
If it were a pure public good, each firm could increase its profit by splitting up in smaller
3If ptofita are positive or negative, fitms would either ptoduce at an infinite scale, attaining infinite
profits, or contract its scale to 0 (cf. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), p.68). Since labour supply is
exogenous, including these profits into the wages creates no additional distortionary effects.
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production units. By assuming g to be a rival good, this is avoided.
5.2.3 Government
The level of public capital is chosen by the government. The government is modelled in
a representative democracy setting. It optimizes:
Ut-1(ci-i, cé) ~ aU~(ci, cifi) (5.2.13)
i.e. the government takes account of present generations only. ~ denotes the relative
political weight of the young generation4. In this set-up, each period, a new government
optimizes utility of the then living generations. Since future policy choices affect the uti-
lity of the current young, behavioural assumptions with respect to future policy choices
are necessary. It will be assumed that current governments conjecture that future policy
instruments, i.e. future tax or debt levels are not affected by current policy instruments.
Hence, Nash behaviour is assumed. However, all other effects are taken into account.
With respect to the private sector and the capital market, the government acts as a
Stackelberg leader. It thus takes the behaviour of the private sector as reflected by eqs.
(5.2.4) and (5.2.8) into account.
The government faces a budget identity, which in its most general form is given by:
9tti f( 1 -F~ rr)bc-i - Tt ~- rt -f- bt (5.2.14)
where bi is the stock of government debt at the end of period t. Eq. (5.2.14) encompasses
the various sets of policy instruments discussed in the sequel. From this budget constraint
follows that it is assumed that public capital becomes productive with a lag of one period.
5.2.4 Closing the model
Finally, equilibrium on the capital market requires:
st - keti f bt (5.2.15)
4In previous chaptera, a denoted the relative political weight of a young individual. However, since
population growth is absent in this chapter, this equals the relative political weight of the young
generation.
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Hence, private capital, just like public capital, becomes productive with a lag of one
period.
5.2.5 The effects of public capital
Before continuing with a bench-mark situation and the market solutions, a closer look
at the effects of public capital in this model is in order. In a Neoclassical model like this,
investment in public capital has several opposing effects. These effects can be divided
into financial effects and real effects5. The financial effects relate to the way in which
the investment expenditures are financed, by debt or taxation. From the budget con-
straint of the government, eq. (5.2.14), follows that, in this model, an increase in g can
be financed either by an increase ín taxation of the young (r~), an increase in taxation
of the elderly (To) or an increase in public debt (b). Focusing on each of these instru-
ments in isolation, then, first, an increase in g, financed completely by an increase in r~
leads, ceteris paribus, to a decrease in private savings. This follows immediately from eq.
(5.2.5). From the equilibrium condition on the capital market, eq. (5.2.15), follows that
this leads to an decrease in the supply of private capital. This decrease in k has, ceteris
paribus, two effects. On the one hand, it increases the interest rate, since the marginal
product of capital is declining in k. This gives a decline in savings. On the other hand,
a lower k decreases wages w(see eq. (5.2.12)) because labour supply is inelastic. Hence,
a decline in wages decreases savings as well (all ceteris paribus). Figure 5.1 summarizes.
The overall effect on private savings is negative. Moreover, savings again affects private
r~j-as j-tikj--~rj'-~s j
~wj-~sj
Figure 5.1: The effects of g financed by Tv.
capital. As a result, multiplier effects may occur. Financing the extra amount of public
capital completely by an increase in public debt b gives similar effects because an increase
in the level of public debt leads, ceteris paribus, to a decrease of private capital since the
capital market is in equilibrium. Using ro to finance the extra amount of g gives exactly
opposite effects. From eq. (5.2.5) follows that an increase in ro leads, ceteris paribus,
SThis labelling is taken from Aachauer ( 1988), dealing with a more general discussion of the effects
of fiacal policy in a Neoclassical model.
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to an increase in private savings. The rest immediately follows from figure 5.1, with the
opposite signs. In general, it is more likely that governments use a combination of these
instruments. This implies that the different effects have to be weighed against each other.
So far, only the financial effects have been discussed. There may also be real effects.
More public capital increases wages and interest rates, which has an ambiguous effect
on savings by the consumers. Besides, there are crowding-in and crowding-out effects on
the firm level. On the one hand, depending on the degree of complementarity between
private and public capital in production, public capital may raise the productivity of pri-
vate capital. E.g. better roads raise the productivity of trucks using them. Thus, more
public capital leads to a crowding-in of private capital. On the other hand, depending
on the degree of substitutability between private and public capital, an increase in the
level of public capital may raise the overall level of capital above its desired level by the
firms who, ceteris paribus, will respond with a decrease of private capital. Thus, public
capital crowds-out private capital.
Thus, the effect of public capital on the economy is ambiguous due to the several, finan-
cial and real, effects. When analysing investment in public capital, these effects have to
be weighed against each other. Besides, the effect on wages is an externality since this
benefits future generations for which current governments do not care. Finally note that
the analysis is confined to steady states. This implies that effects like the spillover to
future generations have to be taken into account when analysing steady states.
5.3 A command solution
An important and often heard question is whether there is over- or underinvestment in
public capital. In order to compare the different sets of policy instruments used in the
following section and to analyse which set gives solutions closest an `optimal' solution,
a bench-mark case has to be defined. This is a so-called command solution, where the
government, as a social dictator, can directly choose consumption and capitál levels.
The `a' in the title of this section has been chosen deliberately. This is not a command
solution in the usual sense. Usually, a command solution in an overlapping generations
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model implies an infinitely long living social dictator optimizing a social welfare function
including utilities of all present and future generations where the dictator simultaneously
chooses all present and future consumption levels. The steady-state values in that case
follow from the modified golden rule condition. However, in the present context of a
representative democracy, there is a sequence of governments, each living for one period
and optimizing a decision function containing only the utilities of the generations living
in that period and not the utilities of future generations. Besides, in a social welfare func-
tion, utilities of future generations are discounted by a social discount factor, whereas in
the representative democracy, the current young are weighed with their relative political
power and future generations are not involved and have therefore no weight at all. The
social discount factor is usually restricted to be between 0 and 1, the political weight can,
in principle, take any (positive) value. Thus, comparing the outcome of a traditional
command solution to the market solution implies not only analysing whether a given set
of policy instruments suffices to replicate the command solution through the market but,
also, comparing two different objective functions. To avoid differences caused by different
objective functions, one should derive a command solution that follows from maximizing
eq. (5.2.13). That is, one should maintain the assumption that the government is not
interested in the utility of future generations and, at the same, assume that it is able to
choose current consumption levels. However, then complications arise because what to
do with ci~,? Since the scope for such a myopic dictator in period t is confined to period
t only, ct~l is chosen by the myopic dictator in the following period (as ci is chosen by
the present myopic dictator). But, c~~l gives utility to the current young generation,
a generation the present myopic dictator cares about. Hence, behavioural assumptions
with respect to ci}1 have to be made. As seen in Chapter 2, this can either be Nash,
taking cL}1 as given, or Stackelberg, taking the behavioural response of the following
myopic dictator into account. Both assumptions and its implications for steady-state
values will be analysed. But, first, the steady state for a dictator optimizing an infinite
horizon social welfare function is given. This is the more standard command solution
and it will be compared to the solution chosen by the myopic dictator.
Social welfare. When a dictator optimizes social welfare, it maximizes
max ~ Pt~ev(ci ) f Pu(ci )~ (5.3.1)
e-o
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where O C p G 1 is the social discount factor. Each period the social dictator has to
obey the resource constraint, yi - cÉ f cty -}. ktfl f gt~,. This resource constraint can
be used to substitute out ci. Then, optimization with respect to ci, ki~l, gc~l gives the
following first-order conditions:
dvt-1 du~ dvi óye}i dvs ayst1
B dco - Pdcy - Pedco 8k - Pedco ~ a
t - 1, ..., oo (5.3.2)
s t tti ttl efi 9~fi
The first equality denotes the optimal intergenerational distribution of welfare between
current elderly and young. The second equality denotes the optimal intertemporal al-
location of welfare of an individual. The last equality implies an efficiency condition:
The levels of private and public capital~ are chosen such that their marginal products
are equal. For logarithmic utility and a Cobb-Douglas production technology the steady




co - vte ~l - P(cx -~ Q)~y
cv - vté ~1 - p(a ~- Q))y (5.3.3)
This steady state follows from the modified golden rule condition, i.e. ~-~-'- Theak a9-v.
efficiency condition implies that the ratio of k over g equals p~a.
Nash. A sequence of myopic dictators operating in a representative democracy setting,
optimizes
max Bv(ys - ci - ktti - 9efi) f.~[u(ci )~ Bv(citi))
~i ~k~fi~9~}i
(5.3.4)
Nash behaviour implies taking ci~l as given. As a result, there is no investment. Capital
becomes productive only the following period. But since ci}I is taken as given, this
implies that there is no investment in capital. Moreover, the myopic dictator of the
7Note that the labels `private' or `public' are, of course, not relevant here. For the social dictator it
are just two types of capital, both necessary for production.
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previous period neither chooses a positive amount of capital, there is no production and,
thus, no consumption. Hence, there is no internal steady state in this cases.
Stackelberg. In case of Stackelberg behaviour, the reaction of the next period myopic
dictator on current choices is fully taken into account. By using the resource constraint,
the optimal choice of ci}1 by the next myopic dictator can be written as a function of
ytfl: co[ytfl]. Hence, the current myopic dictator optimizes
max Bv(yt - ci - kstl - gifi) } ~[u(ci) -~ Bv(c [yt}i])] (5.3.5)
~Y.ke}i.9efi~
The first-order conditions are given by
dvt-1 du~ dvt dci~l óyttl
g dceo -~ dcé -~B dciti dyeti akiti
dvt dci~, óytfl
- ~edciti dyefi a9sfr
(5.3.6)
Note that the efficiency condition holds here as well. Compared to the social welfare
maximizing dictator, the relation between the marginal utility of consumption of the
current elderly (aá~) and the marginal utility of first-period consumption of the cur-~
rent young (~) is identical if ~- p. The difference is in the optimal intertemporal
allocation of utility of an individual. Because of the resource constraint, for a social wel-
fare maximizing dictator it holds that ci}1 - yt}1- cifl - ktf2 - gcfs. Since for the social
welfare optimizing dictator, ci~l, kt}2 and gt}2 are instruments as well for optimizing eq.
(5.3.1), it holds that d~~ - 1. This implies that a social welfare maximizing dictator
acts as if an extra unit of production is completely given to the next-period elderly, á. e.
the current young when old. However, now, ct~l, kt f~ and gt}2 are instruments of the
next-period myopic dictator. It is by no means sure that an extra unit of production is
completely given to the elderly of that period. Hence, investment generates an externa-
lity in the form of a spillover to future generations because they benefit from the extra
0
production as well. Thus, dv~ does not have to be equal to one.
For logarithmic utility and a Cobb-Douglas production technology, the steady state is
determined by:
aThie result is driven by the fact that with a Cobb-Douglas production technology, g is a necessary
input.
5.3 A command solution 107
(a) cv - é~ , (b) k - Rg
dco 1 k dco 1 g
(c) dy - ~cx y ( dy - ~,0 y )
Eq. (a) follows from the first equality of eq. (5.3.6), eq. (b) from the third and eq. (c)
from the second. The term á~ is problematic, since its exact specification is unknown.
By using the method of undetermined coefficients it is possible to solve for the steady




y - [A(aaó)tr(~Qó)A~ ~-á-n
co - afe[1 - ~ó(~ f Q)]y
cv - afe [1 - ~ó(a f Q)]y (5.3.7)
ó follows from áy - a}B[1-.~Á(~-FQ)] - ó and it is given by ó- a}e}á la~p~. Note that
ó C 1. This implies that an extra unit of production is only partially given to the next-
period elderly, i.e. the current young when old. The rest is divided over consumption of
the next-period young and private and public capital. Note that the efficiency condition
requires that k- E. From the steady-state values, eqs. (5.3.3) and (5.3.7), follows that
if p- .~, the level of g, k and y is smaller than with a social welfare maximizer. Since
the production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale with respect to k and g,
cy and co will be lower as well. If ~ó - p, the steady-state levels for g, k and y are
the same. However, cb will be higher and co will be lower with Stackelberg behaviour.
Though total consumption (cv f co) with Stackelberg behaviour equals total consump-
tion with the social welfare maximizer, the division over the generations differs. With
Stackelberg behaviour it is divided according to ~-;, - á, with a social welfare maximizer
according to ~~ - P which equals áá in this case. In order to obtain the same capital
and production levels as with a social welfare maximizing dictator, the myopic dictator
has to give a much larger weight to the current young. This larger weight `compensates'
for the disregarding of future generations and implies a higher cv relative to co.
What does this imply for the bench-mark case to be used in the sequel of this chap-
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ter? As noted in the introduction, Jappelli and Ripa di Meana (1994) choose for their
command solution the optimization of utilities of a representative generation, resulting in
steady-state levels determined by the golden rule condition. However, a justification for
this choice is absent. Besides, the fact that the current elderly are fully neglected makes
this solution unsatisfactory as a bench-mark case. What then? Which bench-mark case
is to be used should, of course, be closely connected to the choice of the behavioural
assumptions used with respect to future policy choices. In this chapter it is assumed
that current governments take future policy choices as given, i.e. Nash behaviour. Thus,
the effects of current policy choices on future policy choices is not taken into account.
However, as seen above, the command solution in a representative democracy with Nash
behaviour with respect to future policies is not defined. Therefore, as a bench-mark for
the sequel of this chapter the Stackelberg case will be taken. Though this implies that
differences between the command and market solutions can also stem from the difference
in behavioural assumptions (Stackelberg in the command solution and Nash in the mar-
ket solution), it is the closest related. The objective functions for this command solution
and the market solution are identical. Besides, the effect of current policy choices on
future consumption of the present young is taken into account in both cases. Table 5.1
provides values for the baseline case9. The efficiency condition implies k- 1 for the
g k y 9~,~ U cy co
1.043 1.043 10.170 1.000 2.231 5.215 2.869
Table 5.1: Baseline in case of Stackelberg behaviour.
baseline case. Table 5.2 provides the effects of changes in ,~ for the baseline case. Thus,
an increase in a leads to more public and private capital. Because of the increased politi-
cal weight of the current young, the future, i.e. the old-age utility of the current young
becomes more important. This explains the increase in private and public capital. The
efficiency condition is independent of .1 and is therefore unaffected.
9This and future baseline cases are determined by a- Q- 0.2, B- 0.55 and a- 1. The lattet value
implies equal weight for both generations. Estimates of the productivity of private capital a are around
0.2. Estimates of the productivity of public capital vary between 0 and 0.4. More recent estimates
suggest that 0.2 is more plausible (cf. Gramlich (1994)). A B of 0.55 for a generation (i.e. about 30
years) implies an annual discount factor of about 0.98.
5.4 The decentralized optimum 109
g k y 9~k U cy co
0.685 0.685 8.596 1.000 2.048 4.282 2.944
1.043 1.043 10.170 1.000 2.231 5.215 2.869
1.428 1.428 11.531 1.000 2.335 5.949 2.727
Table 5.2: The effects of variations in .~.
5.4 The decentralized optimum
In reality, a government cannot directly set consumption and capital levels. Instead,
it is restricted by the available policy instruments. Then, what are the implications of
different sets of policy instruments for the level of public capital? Will there be over-
or underinvestment in public capital, both in level and with respect the efficiency con-
dition? Three sets of policy instruments are discussed in the sequel. First, a balanced
budget policy with a lump-sum tax which varies over periods but not within periods
between generations, i.e. it is time-dependent only. Second, a balanced budget policy
with a time- and age-dependent lump-sum tax is considered. Finally, debt-financing of
public capital is discussed.
But first, it is interesting to look at the values for debt and taxes that replicate the
command solution as given in table 5.1. Taking into account the budget constraint of
the government, eq. (5.2.14), the behaviour of the consumers and the firms, eqs. (5.2.5),
(5.2.11), (5.2.12), and the equilibrium condition for the capital market, the following
values for the tax and debt levels in the baseline case can be computed:
T~ - 1.509 ra --0.119 6- 0.367
Thus, in order to obtain the bench-mark solution, public investment is financed by the
current young and, because debt is used, by the future young. The elderly receive a
(pension) transfer from the young. The (pension) transfer to the elderly occurs because
the profits due to public capital are included in the wages which makes these relatively
high. This prevents an inefficiently high level of savings. Besides, the current elderly do
not benefit from investment in public capital.
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However, in a representative democracy setting, allowing a government to use public
debt may lead to extremely large levels of debt if the future burden of debt is not taken
into account by the current government. Therefore, in the section where debt finance of
public investment is allowed, the government is restricted in its use of public debt. Such
a regime is the case in many western countries.
5.4.1 A balanced-budget policy with time-dependent taxes
Assume that the government has to balance its budget each period and cannot dis-
criminate between the different generations, i. e. rv - ro - r. Thus, the government
optimizes eq. (5.2.13) subject to
9ifi - 2TS (5.4.1)
Hence, present generations pay half of the costs of the investment each. Thus, investment
in public capital redistributes from the current elderly to the current young because, of
these two generations, only the young benefit from public investment. Using the budget
constraint to eliminate rt, optimization with respect to gtfl gives the following first-order
condition:
eávtor ~-l,Z~ }~óu~ ~-1,2~ } ~e 8~vt s d(1 f refi) - 0
8ct 8ci 8ctt1 ~ t d9sti -
(5.4.2)
The first two terms denote the marginal costs in terms of utility of an extra unit of public
capital. Since the old and the young generation pay half of the costs of the investment
each, these marginal costs are split up between these two generations. The first term
denotes the marginal costs in terms of utility for the current elderly, the second term
for the current young. The third term denotes the marginal benefit in terms of utility
of an extra unit of public capital. Of the current generations only the young benefit
from public investment by a(positive) income effectl'. This income effect is caused by a
change in the next-period interest rate which is denoted d d9}~' . Using that eq. (5.2.4)
gives savings st as a function of the interest rate (1 ~ rt~l) and the tax rate ri, and using
the equilibrium condition for the capital market (st - ktt,), gives:
11Public investment also gives a substitution effect between current and future consumption (~ .
' ~ -~.ec~ ~~; ~ a9,t, } B á~;~, 8a,~ ~ dg~t, ) This effect on utility, however, disappears because of the optimality
of private savings (this immediately followa from the firat-order condition of the private sector).
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a'v~f~ ~ a.-y~~. . ~ . ~
d(I t rs.Fl) - akefia9~t3 ak~ti aT~ a9iti
sigefl 1-a'~, 8a8kt}1 ó(ltr~ti)
(5.4.3)
Public capital affects the interest rate which in turn affects private savings. Since private
savings again affect the interest rate, a multiplier effect appears which is given in the
denominator. In case of logarithmic preferences, 1 f r negatively affects savings (see eq.
(5.2.5)) because substitution effect and income effect cancel each other out and, hence, a
negative effect on lifetime income remains12. Because of this negative effect on savings,
the denominator is smaller than 1, giving a positive multiplier effect. The numerator
contains the direct effect of public capital on the marginal product of private capital
and the indirect effect on the marginal product of private capital because of the effect
of taxes on savings. Since it was assumed that public capital raises the productivity of
private capital, the direct effect is positive. The indirect effect is positive as well since
an increase in public capital and, thus, in current taxes, leads to a decline in savings,
ceteris paribus. This, in turn, positively affects the interest rate. Hence, the total effect
of public capital on the interest rate is positive.
When discussing the effects of investment in public capital, many opposing effects are
present, including multiplier effects. Even for logaritmic utility functions and a Cobb-
Douglas production function, no analytical solutions can be derived. The equations
determining the steady-state are given in the appendix. For further analysis simulations
have to be used13. Table 5.3 presents the resulting levels of g, k and y as well as the
g~k-ratio, the level of utility derived by a generation (U) and the consumption levels
obtained (cy and co, respectively) for the baseline case. The results obtained for the
baseline case hold for other parameter values as well. Comparing the simulation results
obtained with the bench-mark level of public capital, clearly indicates underinvestment
in public capital, both in level and relative to the level of private capital. The latter im-
plies that the efficiency condition is not fulfilled. What are the reasons for these results?
First, note that, when choosing a level of public investment, the government cannot
1~Secause lifetime income, ws - rs - 1tr~t, , decreases.
13In these and upcoming simulations, various parametere settinga are used. The elasticities of output
with respect to the two types of capital are chosen between 0.1 and 0.4. The political discount factor
was chosen between 0.4 and 1.2. The private discount factor was chosen between 0.4 and 0.7. Taking
one period equal to about 30 years this comes down to an annual discount factor between .96 and .99.
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g k y 9~k U cy co
0.722 3.675 12.156 0.197 2.139 5.688 2.070
(Benchmark: 1.043 1.043 10.170 1.000 2.231 5.215 2.869 )
Table 5.3: Baseline if g- 2r.
exempt the current elderly from taxation though they do not benefit from it, since the
government is forced to tax both generations at the same level. Therefore, compared to
the mix of instruments given at the beginnning of this section, leading to the bench-mark
allocation, ro is too high, and Ty is too low. This increases savings. Second, the pri-
vate sector chooses savings such that the intertemporal allocation of consumption obeys
~-,`, - B(1 f r), which follows from the first-order condition, eq. (5.2.4). However, the
disregarding of the negative effect on the private interest rate by the private sector leads
to `too much' saving. The high level of savings and the impossibility of exempting the
current elderly from paying for public investment, leads to underinvestment in public
capital, both ín level and relative to the level of private capital. The latter implies that
the g~k-ratio is too low and, thus, inefficient.
What are the effects of changes in the political and private preferences on the level
of public capital? The effects on the steady-state levels of an increase in the relative
political weight of the present young (~) are reported in table 5.4 for the baseline case.
Table 5.5 presents the results where a whole range of values for the exogenous parameters
is considered. Since the changes in table 5.4 have the same sign as in table 5.5, it can be
concluded that the results are robust for the range of parameter values used. With an
g k y 9~k c~ co 1 f r w
0.569 3.416 11.422 0.167 5.437 2.000 0.669 9.138
0.722 3.673 12.154 0.197 5.688 2.070 0.661 9.723
0.873 3.902 12.778 0.224 5.883 2.119 0.655 10.222
Table 5.4: The effects of variations in ~ around the baseline case.
increase in ,~, the interests of the present young generation get a higher weight. Com-
paring steady states, this implies redistribution from the current elderly to the current
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9 k y 9~k cy
f f ~- -~ ~- f - f
Table 5.5: The effects of an increase in .~ ( general).
co 1}r w
young. Hence, the level of public capital increases. Though the associated taxes affect
both generations, the current young get more public capital in return. In the long run
(note that steady states are compared) wages increase due to an increase in g. This
causes savings to increase as well. But, since this is a second order effect in response
to g, savings and, thus, k rises less than g. Hence, the 9~k-ratio increases. The increase
in production leads to higher levels of consumption cv and co but cy increases relatively
more than co. Note that this implies that for the steady state increasing the political
weight of the current young generation is beneficial for the current elderly as well.
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 report the effects of an increase in the private discount factor. Table 5.6
provides values for g, k, y and the g~k-ratio around the baseline case. Table 5.7 provides
more general results, where other values for the other exogenous parameters are taken
into account as well. Again, comparing the two tables, it follows that the results are
robust. An increase in 9 implies in the first place a stronger preference of the private sec-




0.587 2.673 10.941 0.219 5.787 1.895 0.819 7.842
0.722 3.673 12.154 0.197 5.688 2.070 0.661 9.723
0.821 4.537 13.008 0.181 5.459 2.191 0.573 10.406
Table 5.6: The effects of variations in B around the baseline case.
g k y 9~k cy co 1-~ r w
B f f f - - f - -~
Table 5.7: The effects of an increase in B(general).
tor for old-age consumption. Therefore, the present young will, ceteris paribus, increase
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their savings. The increase of savings and, thus, of private capital, negatively affects the
interest rate and positively affects the wage. The government, by increasing the level
of public capital, positively affects the interest rate which benefits old-age consumption.
However, when doing so it has to take into account that half of the extra investment
is paid by the present elderly. This implies that the increase in g is smaller than the
increase in k implying less ef~iciency. Of course, old-age consumption increases whereas
young-age consumption decreases.
It can be concluded that, obliged to balance its budget each period and restricted to
use time-dependent taxes only, the government will choose public capital levels which
are below the bench-mark level, both in level and in relation to the level of private capi-
tal. The latter implies that the efficiency condition is not satisfied. The reason for these
results is the impossibility of exempting the current elderly from paying one half of the
investment. Their political weight negatively affects public investment. The high level
of savings and, thus, of private capital can be explained from the relatively high wages
and impossibility of giving a PAYG transfer to the current elderly. An increase in the
relative political weight of the current young leads to more investment in public capital,
also relative to the level of private capital, implying an efficiency gain with respect to
the g~k-ratio. Besides, the consumption of the current elderly increases. If generations
attach more weight to their old-age consumption, this implies, first of all, an increase
of private savings. The level of public capital also increases, but less than the level of
private capital because the government has to balance the positive effect of more public
capital on old-age consumption of the present young against the negative effect of a
higher ro for the current old. The result is a loss in efficiency of g relative to k.
5.4.2 A balanced-budget policy with time- and age-dependent
taxes
Can the government improve upon the allocation of the previous section when it has
the possibility to use time- and age-dependent taxes? In a world where the government
maximizes social welfare, i. e. it takes the utilities of all present and future generations
into account, the spillover to future generations is internalized and a system of time-
and age-dependent taxes will suffice to obtain the command solution of a social welfare
maximizer (see Calvo and Obstfeld (1988)). In the representative democracy setting this
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does not hold, however. The extra instrument gives the government the possibility to
spread the burden of public capital more fairly over the two generations, i.e. taxing
the young relatively more since they benefit from public capital. But the spillover is
still not internalized. However, the undesired spillover to future generations can now be
reduced by taxing generations differently and to invest less in public capital. But, this
has negative consequences for the steady state.
In this case, the budget constraint, eq. (5.2.14), becomes
gtfl- Ti } Tt (5.4.4)
Note that a PAYG pension system might result since taxes are allowed to be negative.
Using the budget constraint to eliminate Tt , gives an optimization problem for the go-
vernment in period t where it maximizes eq. (5.2.13) with respect to T~ and gt~t. Then,
the first-order condition with respect to Tt reads:
e8vtót ~ ~áu~ ~-1~ } ~B 8~vt ~std(1 f ytti)1 - 0
8ct 8ct óct~l drt J
where
a~ , , ad
d(1 f rttl) a~~ ~
v - a' ~ , aa~drt 1 - ak~- ~ alit,~t~)
(5.4.5)
(5.4.6)
Taxing the young gives a positive effect on the wealth of the current elderly since higher
taxes for the current young imply, ceteris paribus, lower taxes for the current elderly.
This is given by the first term in eq. (5.4.5). The second term is the direct effect on the
utility of the current young because taxation changes lifetime income. This is clearly
negative. Finallyi', there is an income effect due to the change in the next period interest
rate, which is given by eq. (5.4.6). The numerator denotes the effect which taxation of
the young has on the marginal productivity of private capital and, thus, on the interest
rate. For logarithmic preferences, rt has a negative effect on savings (which follows im-
mediately from eq. (5.2.5)). Since marginal productivity of private capital declines with
increasing k, less savings imply a higher marginal productivity. Hence, the numerator is
19Again, the aubstitution effect disappeara.
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positive. The denominator contains the multiplier effect of taxation. In case of logarith-
mic preferences, 1 f r negatively affects savings. Thus, for logarithmic preferences and a
Cobb-Douglas production technology, the denominator is positive and smaller than one,
indicating a positive multiplier effect. Hence, d 'dT` ' is positive.~
The first-order condition with respect to gt~l is given by:
Bavt-1 1 f.~B avs S d(1
~ rtti) 0o [- ] o t -8ct óce}1 d9tf1
where
a'v~t~d(1 .{- rttl) ak~t,as~t,
dgtfr - 1- a~ ~ ~, a~~ak, f, a~itr~t~)
(5.4.7)
(5.4.8)
The first term denotes the negative effect of public capital on the utility of the current
elderly. The second term is the positive income effect for the current youngls. The
change in the interest rate causes this effect. Eq. (5.4.8) gives the effect of public capital
on the interest rate. The numerator contains the direct effect of public capital on the
marginal productivity of private capital. This is positive. The denominator contains the
multiplier effect which is positive as well.
Again no analytical solutions can be derived. The equations determining the steady-
state are given in the appendix. For further analysis simulations have to be used. For
the baseline case, the results are given in table 5.8. Comparing these results to the
g k y 9,k T~ To U Cy ~o
0.231 1.226 7.771 0.189 1.270 -1.039 1.838 3.720 2.593
(Benchmark: 1.043 1.043 10.170 1.000 2.231 5.215 2.869 )
Table 5.8: Baseline case if g - ry -f To.
bench-mark case and the results of the previous section, the following can be observed.
The levels of private and public capital are lower. Production is therefore lower as well.
1sSee footnote 14
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The g~k-ratio is still below its efficiency level and slightly lower than in the previous
section. Consumption of the young is lower than in the bench-mark case and than in the
previous section. Consumption of the elderly is also lower than in the bench-mark case
but it is higher than in the previous section. How can these results be explained? Since
the government optimizes eq. (5.2.13), a weighted function of both living generations, it
may want to affect the intergenerational distribution of welfare between current gener-
ations. In the previous section it could only do this in a rather inefficient way. It had to
tax both generations equally and had to use public capital to affect the intergenerational
distribution of welfare. But, public capital has several effects which have to be taken
into account, including a spillover to future generations. Here, compared to the previ-
ous section, the government has an extra instrument available: it can tax both present
generations at a different level using a time- and age-dependent lump-sum tax. And,
moreover, these instruments are non-distortionary. Therefore, it can redistribute more
eflïciently by taxing both generations differently and use less public capital for redistri-
bution. As a result, public capital is lower than in the previous section. As can be seen
in table 5.8, the tax system used operates as a PAYG pension system. The taxes paid by
the young generation are mainly used to make a transfer to the elderly. This gives lower
savings and, thus, a lower level of private capital. Note that utility is lower as well, not
only compared to the bench-mark case but also compared to the previous section. This
can be explained as follows. The effect of the lower level of public capital on future wage
income is, of course, disregarded by the present government. However, this affects the
steady-state levels. Thus, the lower levels of private and public capital lead, compared
to the previous section, to a serious decline in the wage. As a result (and, of course,
due to the disregarding of this effect), the steady-state utility level is lower. Compared
to the bench-mark, the level of public capital is too low because the government is not
allowed to use public debt in this section.
Just as in the previous section, changes in the steady-state levels due to changes in
the exogenous parameters can be analyzed. The effects of an increase in a are reported
in table 5.9, which gives the variations around the baseline case, and in table 5.10 where
other values of the other exogenous parameters are taken into account. Except for ry, all
results are robust. Moreover the results are very similar to the results obtained in the
previous section. With an exception, of course, for the taxes. More political weight for
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Tv To Cv Co 1 ~- r w
0.140 0.846 6.528 0.166 1.380 -1.240 2.997 2.545 1.540 5.222
0.231 1.226 7.771 0.189 1.270 -1.039 3.720 2.593 1.286 6.217
0.349 1.655 8.962 0.211 1.154 -0.805 4.360 2.597 1.083 7.170
Table 5.9: The effects of variations in ~ around the baseline case.
g k y 9~~ T~ To cv co 1-}- r w
f ~- -t- f f f ~- ~- - f
Table 5.10: The effects of an increase in .1 (general).
the present young implies an increase in taxes for the elderly. The government can give
these extra tax revenues to the current young in two ways. First, by decreasing taxes for
the current young generation. Second, by increasing public capital. In case production
is rather inelastic with respect to public capital (i.e. Q is low), a decrease in Tv can be
observed. If, however, public capital is more productive, more emphasis is given to public
capital. As a result, rv can be seen to increase as well. Note that, as in the previous sec-
tion, the current elderly benefit from an increase in political weight for the current young.
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 report the effects of changes in the private discount factor. From
table 5.12 it follows that the results for the basline case hold for other values of the
other exogenous parameters as well. The results are almost completely opposite to the




To cv ca 1 f r w
0.274 1.318 8.159 0.208 0.817 -0.543 4.392 2.174 1.238 6.527
0.231 1.226 7.771 0.189 1.270 -1.039 3.720 2.593 1.268 6.217
0.209 1.163 7.533 0.179 1.632 -1.424 3.231 2.930 1.295 6.026
Table 5.11: The effects of variations in B around the baseline case.
results obtained in the previous paragraph. An increase in the private discount factor
implies a stronger preference for old-age consumption. As before, this implies first-of-all
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g k y 9,k Tv ro ca co 1~ r w
B - f - - f -t-
Table 5.12: The effects of an increase in B(general).
an increase of savings and, thus, of private capital. Hence, there are two external effects.
First, the effect on the interest rate. Second, the spillover to future generations. How-
ever, contrary to the previous paragraph, the present government can positively affect
old-age consumption by raising ra and decreasing To without all the external effects. But,
then, the disregarding of the effect on future wages has strong negative consequences in
the long run. Since public capital declines, future wages decline. This leads to a decline
in savings. Therefore, in the long run, the level of private capital decreases.
Summarizing: Though the government has an extra instrument at its disposal, the allo-
cation does not improve. On the contrary, the allocation worsens. The reason is that the
government can now more efficiently affect the intergenerational distribution of welfare
by taxing the generations differently. The government, thus, reduces the spillovers to
future generations. However, this has serious consequences for the steady-state levels
because the effect on future wages is much smaller. Compared to the previous section,
consumption when young decreases while old-age consumption increases. Compared to
the bench-mark case, consumption for both ages is lower. As in the previous section, the
level of public capital increases if the current young generation becomes politically more
important. Thus, efficiency with respect to the g~k-ratio improves. Contrary to the
previous section, an increase in the private discount factor leads to lower public capital
levels. As in the previous section, efficiency with respect to the g~k-ratío declines.
5.4.3 Debt
Not many countries balance their budget each period. On the contrary, public debt is
widely used. For several reasons, many countries have restricted themselves in the use
of public debt. E.g. in Germany the government is only allowed to borrow for public
capital expenditures, with a maximum of 75PIo of these expenditures. Until World War II
the Netherlands had a similar restriction on the use of public debt. Reestablishment of
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this norm has been discussed. The use of public debt gives the opportunity to spread the
burden of public capital more equally over the different generations. The future young,
who receive a higher wage income due to the investment in public capital, can now be
confronted with a part of the costs. Thus, the spillover to future generations due to
public investment can be `compensated' by a spillover due to public debt. Present gene-
rations will take advantage of the fact that future generations are not represented in the
current decision-making process. Therefore, the possibility of debt financing might lead
to overinvestment in public capital if the costs of public investment for future generations
exceed the benefits, which equal the spillover. Whether there will be overinvestment or
not is, thus, closely connected to the extent in which present generations are able to
avoid future debt repayments. It is assumed that the government is committed to repay
the debt (including the interest obligations) during the depreciation period of the capital
and that it is impossible for future governments to alter the repayment scheme or even
completely repudiate the debt. In the present model, with full depreciation within one
period, this leads to the following constraints for the government:
b: - 9tt1 (5.4.9)
T~i - (1 - ~)(1 f rs~i)6s ( 5.4.10)
Tifi - ~(1 ~ refi)be (5.4.11)
where ~ reflects the tax system and it denotes the part of taxes paid by the future elderly,
i.e. the current young when old. When dealing with uniform taxes, ~ was equal to 1~2.
In the case of time- and age-dependent taxes, ~ was determined endogenously. Now, ~ is
exogenous but allowed to vary between 0 and 1. It is assumed that ~ is smaller than 1.
1-~ can be interpreted as the extent in which current generations succeed in shifting
the costs of public investment onto the shoulders of future generations.
When deciding on a level of public investment, the current government takes the com-
mitment of the next government to repay the debt into account and, thus, takes the
effect of the current policy choice on the taxes to be paid by the present young when
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old into account. Then, the first-order condition determining the level of public capital
is given by:
d(1 } ro~i) d(1 ~ rttl
st - ~(1 f rsti) f ~ )gsti
d9tti d9ef i
where
t aketva9,t, } ak~ [aa~~(1 f reti) - 1 Jd(1 ~ re I)




The marginal revenues of an extra unit of public capital is given by the term on the left-
hand-side in eq. (5.4.12). This is an income effect only since, as before, the substitution
effect disappears. On the right-hand-side, the marginal costs consist of two parts. First,
the direct effect on the next period interest rate (the first term on the right-hand-side).
Second, public capital is financed with debt over which interest has to be paid. Since
public capital affects the interest rate, this affects wealth (this is given by the second
term). Note the difference with the previous sections. Because debt is used, the current
old generation becomes irrelevant for the decision-making on public capital. Instead,
future generations bear part of the burden of public capital. Since they are not repre-
sented in the current decision on public capital, this could lead to more public capital
than the bench-mark level would require because present young will take advantage of
the fact that future generations are not represented in the current decision-making pro-
cess. Overinvestment, however, not necessarily occurs, it depends on the level of ~.
Using the logaritmic specification of the utility function and a Cobb-Douglas production
function, after tedious manipulations steady-state values can be derived. They are given
in the appendix. However, for further results simulations have to be used. Tables 5.13
and 5.14 reports the effect of an increase in ~ on the steady-state levels. It follows from
table 5.14 that the results are robust. First-of-all, note that the level of public capital
may be above its bench-mark level. However, this depends not only on the value for ~
but also on the level of .1. For the model in this paragraph, the steady-state levels are
independent of a. But for the bench-mark case, they do depend on a but are indepen-
dent of ~. Thus, in principle, for each value of ~, there is a value of .~ for which the level
of public capital is identical. Comparing tables 5.2 and 5.13, it follows that utility levels





g k y g~k U c~ co 1 t r w
2.659 2.521 14.630 1.054 2.469 5.769 3.682 1.161 11.704
1.437 3.116 13.496 0.461 2.384 6.057 2.886 0.866 10.797
1.018 3.183 12.650 0.320 2.291 5.879 2.570 0.795 10.120
1.043 1.043 10.170 1.000 2.231 5.215 2.869 - -
Table 5.13: The effects of variations in ~ around the baseline case.
g k Y 9~k c~ co 1 -~- r w
Table 5.14: The effects of an increase in ~(general).
)
can be below as well as above those in the bench-mark case. This also is caused by the
independence of the decentralized solution of .~ and the independence of the command
solution of ~. Comparing public capital levels or utility levels is therefore meaningless.
It is more interesting to check whether there is over- or underinvestment with respect
to the efficiency condition since this condition is independent of a. Then it holds that,
depending on ~, there can be over- as well as underinvestment. In general, the g~k-ratio
increases if ~ decreases because public capital becomes relatively more attractive than
private capital and hence, a crowding-out of private capital results. For the bench-mark
case, the efFiciency condition is fulfilled if ~ ti 0.76. Old-age consumption increases
with a decline in ~ because, first, it implies that To decreases and, second, the return
on private savings increases since an increase in public capital and a decrease in private
capital both lead to an increase in the interest rate. c~ first increases if ~ declines because
wages increase due to the increase in production. However, a decline in ~ also implies
an increase of ry. If ~ declines further this starts to dominate and cv decreases. If ~ is
sufficiently low, there is no steady state at all. In that case, compared to the costs, the
benefits of public investment for the current young are so large that, eventually, public
capital crowds-out all private capital. The following proposition gives a lower bound on
the level of ~:
Proposition 5.1 The steady state exists if
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~ , [(1 - a - Q)(1 - Q f itB ) f 2a1 } 4Q~(1 - a - ~)(a ~ ~fé ) ~ al
(1fQf itá)2-4Rifé
Proof: See the appendix.
The effects of an increase in the private discount factor are reported in tables 5.15





9,k cv co 1 f r w
0.921 2.239 11.557 0.411 5.943 2.454 1.032 9.246
1.437 3.116 13.496 0.461 6.057 2.886 0.866 10.797
1.985 3.863 15.029 0.514 5.944 3.238 0.778 12.023
Table 5.15: The effects of variations in B around the baseline case (~ - 0.85).
g k y 9~k c~ co 1 f r w
B
Table 5.16: The effects of an increase in B(general).
savings are invested in private and public capital. Therefore, an increase in both can be
observed. The effect more private capital has on the interest rate, which is not taken
into account by the private sector, is treated in a similar way as in the case where the
government could only use time-dependent taxes. The government increases public ca-
pital in order to compensate for this effect. However, in increase in public capital implies
an increase in future taxes, also for the future young. This affects the steady state re-
sults since a higher Tv negatively affects private savings. Besides, an increase in private
savings does not imply an identical increase in private capital. A part of the savings is
invested public debt and, thus, in public capital. Hence, the g~k-ratio increases. If B is
still relatively low, cv increases as well because the increase in production. If B increases
further, cy decreases however.
Concluding, allowing the government to use debt, with b- g, what are the effects for
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the level of public capital? If the costs associated with the capital could be sufficiently
shifted onto the shoulders of future, yet unrepresented generations, i.e. ~ is small, over-
investment in public capital relative to the level of private capital can result. If the share
shifted onto the shoulders of future generations is too large, i. e. ~ is too small, there is no
steady state at all. Public capital then crowds out all private capital. Not surprisingly,
the level of public capital decreases with an increase in ~. An increase in the private
discount factor, implying a higher preference for old-age consumption, gives an increase
in savings and, hence, an increase in private and public capital. Furthermore, note that
changes in ~ have no effect on the level of public or private capital. Since the current
elderly are not relevant in the decision making on public capital, the relative political
power is irrelevant.
5.5 Summary and concluding remarks
In this chapter, public investment is modelled as a conflict between present living gene-
rations. Present older generations are opposed to investment in public capital since they
do not benefit from it. Younger generations have a higher rate of return on their old-age
savings due to the investment and, therefore, are in favour of public investment. This
conflict of interests is resolved in a representative democracy where the government is
formed by the representatives of the present living generations. Thus, the government,
when deciding on the level of public investment, only takes the utilities of current living
generations into account where each generation is weighed according to its relative pol-
itical influence.
Before analysing the resulting level of public investment, first, a bench-mark case is
defined. Because of the form of the objective function and the fact that, in a represen-
tative democracy setting, the scope for policy making is confined to one period, this
is not a trivial matter. It necessitated behavioural assumptions with respect to future
dictators. From the command solution an efficiency condition is derived for g versus k.
In the decentralized economy, the effects of investment in public capital on the utilities
of the generations also depend on the way in which these invesments are financed. The
command solution can be replicated in a market economy by using public debt and tax-
ation of the young. The elderly receive a transfer then. However, this solution cannot
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be attained. Since the government took future policy as given, unrestricted use of public
debt results in ever larger debt levels. Therefore, three different sets of policy instru-
ments are analysed. In case the government has to balance its budget each period and
has to tax both current generations at the same level, the chosen levels of public capital
are below the bench-mark level and, moreover, the efficiency condition is not fulfilled
because there is underinvestment in public capital relative to the level of private capital.
The reason for this is the spillover to future generations whose utility is not taken into
account by current government. Besides, the impossiblity of giving a transfer to the eld-
erly leads to a high level of private saving and, thus, of private capital. If the government
has the possibility to tax both generations differently but still has to balance its budget,
the level of public capital is even lower than in the case where the government has to
tax both generations identically. The reason for this result is that the government, hav-
ing the possibility to tax both generations differently with a non-distortionary tax, can
affect the intergenerational distribution of welfare more efTiciently without the spillover
to future generations. There is still investment in public capital, simply because it was
neccessary for production, but it is much lower than before. The tax system in this
case operates as a PAYG pension system giving a transfer to the elderly. As a result,
private savings and, thus, private capital are lower as well. When the government is
allowed to use debt, the resulting level of public capital depend on what share of the
debt repayments have to be paid by current generations. If current generations are able
to shift a large part onto future, currently unrepresented, generations, overinvestment in
public capital relative to the level of private capital can result.
In the two balanced budget cases analyzed, the level of public capital depends posi-
tively on the weight attached by the government to the current young generation. Since
they are the ones who benefit from investment in public capital, more political weight
gives higher levels of public capital. Also efficiency improved. This result is robust. Note
that in both balanced budget cases, the increased political weight is beneficial for the
present elderly as well. In case of debt financing of public investment this political weight
does not matter. Then, the extent to which future, yet unrepresented, generations can
be confronted with the cost of the investment becomes important. The higher the share
of these costs shifted on to the shoulders of these future generations, the higher the
level of public investment. However, if this share is too high, there is no steady-state
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solution because public capital crowds out all private capital so that eventually there is
no production at all.
The response of g to an increase in the private discount factor depends on the poli-
cy instruments available. An increase in the private discount factor implies a higher
preference for old-age consumption. When the government can only use time-dependent
taxes, this implies an increase in the level of public capital since this positively affects
the rate of return on old-age savings. It has, however, a negative effect on efficiency.
Because of the spillover to future generations, the increase in public capital was less
than the increase in private capital. But in the case of time- and age-dependent taxes,
the level of public capital decreases. An increase of taxes for the young and a decrease
of taxes for the elderly is a more efficient way of increasing old-age consumption and
decreasing young-age consumption because the government can avoid the spillover to fu-
ture generations. Again the level of public capital relative to the level of private capital
decreases, implying less efficiency. Finally when the government is allowed to use public
debt, the results are similar to the balanced budget case with time-dependent taxes.
With the exception that there is an increase in efficiency. The extra savings due to the
increased preference for old-age consumption are, in this case, not fully absorbed by an
increase in private capital but, partly, go to into an increase in public debt, and, thus,
in public capital.
An analysis where three different sets of policy instruments are compared to a bench
mark case begs the question which of these sets is to be preferred. This requires a com-
parison of the utility levels obtained. However, note that in the bench-mark case and
in the two balanced budget cases, the steady-state levels and, thus, the utility levels
depend on the value of ~ whereas in the debt case they are all independent of a. To
settle the case is therefore not easy. Comparing the two balanced budget cases, for the
steady state one can give a clear answer in favour of time-dependency of taxes only. The
disregarding of the positive spillover to future wages has serious negative consequences
for the steady-state levels in case the government can also discriminate according to age
when choosing taxes. The independence of the solution for the debt case of ~ and the
independence of the solution for the bench-mark case and the balanced budget cases of
~, implies that on the basis of utilities obtained the answer on the question which to pre-
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fer depends on values of both parameters (compare tables 5.2 and 5.13). Endogenizing
~ is therefore interesting but also complicated because there is an effect on the future
interest rate and therefore on future interest payments on public debt and future interest
revenues on private savings. A lower value of ~ implies more taxes to be paid by the
current young which negatively affects private savings. This affects private capital levels
and therefore the interest rate. Speculating somewhat, it is likely that ~ increases with
a, i.e. if the present young have more politícal weight, the share of debt repayments
paid by the present elderly is larger. Then an increase in J~ leads to an increase in ~
which, according to tables 5.13 and 5.14, leads to a decrease in steady-state utility levels.
Besides utility levels, the efficiency condition can be taken for a comparison. Both ba-
lanced budget cases give almost identical results with respect to the efficiency condition.
Efficiency may improve substantially if public debt is used. However, the level of public
capital can become too high compared to the level of private capital. If ~ decreases with
~, then, if .~ increases, efficiency improves if the budget is balanced, efficiency worsens
if debt is used. However, more general conclusions, like for what levels of ~ to use debt
or taxes, depend, of course, on the exact relation between a and ~. For more general
conclusions, further analysis is needed.
A Appendix
A.1 Steady state with time-dependent taxes
For logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas production the steady state in case of time
dependent taxes is determined by the following equations:
k - (1 -~2B) k } 1 -~ B~(1
- a)y - 1~s9) (5.A.1)
a , }c~i-av, 6 1
ak k9 k ite '
~s -,,2 (1 f~ay)
` k
1 -a1 zay ~ 2~9
k (1}B)(~)
(5.A.2)
where y is given by eq. (5.2.10). Eq. (5.A.1) follows from inserting eqs. (5.2.15),
(5.2.11), (5.2.12) and (5.4.1) into eq. (5.2.5), the optimal level of private savings. Eq.
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(5.A.2) follows from eq. (5.4.2), the first-order condition of the government, and using
eqs. (5.2.11), (5.4.1), (5.2.15) and (5.4.3).
A.2 Steady state with time- and age-dependent taxes
For the logarithmic utility function and the Cobb-Douglas production function the steady
state in case of time- and age-dependent taxes is determined by the following equations:
k-(~t B) k } 1 t 9~(1
- a)y - Ty] (5.A.3)
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where y is given by eq. (5.2.10). Eq. (5.A.3) follows from inserting eqs. (5.2.11), (5.2.12),
(5.2.15) and (5.4.4) in eq. (5.2.5). Eq. (5.A.4) follows from using eqs. (5.2.11), (5.2.15),
(5.4.4) and (5.4.6) in eq. (5.4.5). Eq. (5.A.5) follows from eq. (5.4.7) and using eqs.
(5.2.11), (5.2.15), (5.4.4) and (5.4.8).
A.3 Steady state with debt
Using the logaritmic specification of the utility function and the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, after tedious manipulations the following steady-state values for g and
k can be derived:
lte~(1-a)-cx(1-~)k]Akp '-~g
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g - -[(1-a)(1- tié)fQ(1-~)-~~
k - 2(1 - ~)(1 - }é)(1 - a) -
[(1 - a)(1 - ité) } Q(1 - ~) - ~~2 - 4,Q(1 - a)(1 - té)(1 - ~)- (5.A.8)2(1 - ~)(1 - }é)(1 - a)
The steady-state value for y can be found by substituting the expressions for g and k
into the production function eq. (5.2.10). As noted in Proposition 5.1, these steady-state
values are only defined if ~ is sufficiently high.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Define ~i - k. Then the first-order condition of the government, eq. (5.4.12) can be
written as:
Q}[Q-~Q-~f(1-a)(1-
Solving this for ~i gives:
l~g)]~f(1-~)(1-a)(1 -
lf9)~2-0
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(5.A.9)
From the second-order condition for the government's problem, which is given by
2(1 - ~)(1 - a)(1 - 1 t B)~ dg -F [(1 - a)(1 - 1 f 9) ~ (1
- ~)~ - ~1 g~
where d9 - k-~( tlé- 1) 1 0 since, by assumption, ~ G 1, it follows that
~ G - [(1 - a)(1 - té) f (1 - ~)Q - ~~
2(1 - ~)(1 - a)(1 - }é)
(5.A.10)
Combining eqs. (5.A.9) and (5.A.10) gives:
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Furthermore, it must hold that ~i ) 0 and the square root in eq. (5.A.11) must be
positive.
From the second-order condition follows
~`-[(1-a)(1- }é)~-(1-~)Q-~(
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Hence, since
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Thus, since 4Q(1 - a)(1 - 1}A)(1 -~) 1 0, it holds that z,i 1 0.
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The roots are given by
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Since (1 f ,0 -~ ité )2 - 4Q ité - (1 f Q)2 - (1 - ,0)2 -~ [1 - Q -}- lfé~2 ~ 0, eq. (5.A.13)
has a minimum, and, hence, the right-hand-side of eq. (5.A.12) is smaller than
[(1 - cx - Q)(1 - Q~ itá) } 2Qlf 4Q[(1 - a- Q)(a } itá) } Q1
(1fQf itB)2-4Qitá






In this thesis, conflicts between present generations over redistributive public policies
are analysed. These conflicts arise because the generations involved have different pref-
erences over these policies. The decisions on these policies are made by the government.
Thus, when analyzing redistributive policies from a more positive point of view, the pol-
itical decision-making has to be taken into account. Most of the public choice literature
assumes direct democracies. But since direct democracies are unusual in reality, the
value of this literature for describing actual government policy is limited. Most countries
are representative democracies where the government is formed by politicians who are
elected to represent the interests of their voters. While in office, the politicians are under
constant pressure from interest groups to enact those policies favoured by these interest
groups. The extent to which these groups get their preferred policies enacted depends on
their political importance. Policies chosen therefore are a political compromise between
the preferences of these groups. There are, however, relatively few studies analysing the
effects on the economy of political decision-making in a representative democracy.
In this thesis, redistribution between generations is modelled as the outcome of a politi-
cal conflict in a representative democracy. The politicians are assumed to represent the
interests of the current, non-altruistic generations only. These generations are supposed
to live for two periods, during which they are labelled `young' and `old' respectively.
Hence, a period in the model corresponds to a time span of approximately thirty years.
By assuming individuals (and politicians) to be non-altruistic, future generations' utility
is disregarded in policy decisions. The analysis is restricted to three types of policies
because these are considered typical for most redistributive public policies. These types
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are: public debt, public pensions and public investment. For an extensive summary of
the results the reader is referred to the sections concluding the chapters dealing with
each of these policies. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the non-standard part
of this thesis, the representative democracy. Besides, some ideas for further research are
given.
Representative democracy. Modelling the government in a representative democ-
racy framework has some interesting consequences when a dynamic model is used since
the term in office of a government is confined to one periodl. Each period the incumbent
government is replaced by a new one, chosen by the new constituency. However, the
current young generation is still present in the next period. Thus, future policies affect
the utility of this generation. This implies that behavioural assumptions with respect to
these future policy choices are necessary. Two possibilities can be distinguished. Either
future policy is taken as given ( Nash behaviour) or future reactions on current policy
choices are taken into account (Stackelberg behaviour). Because of the sequential order
in which the decisions of the different governments are taken, Stackelberg behaviour is
the most natural assumption. However, it is well-known that Stackelberg models become
insoluble analytically if production and utility functions are only slightly more compli-
cated than a linear or quadratic form. But, when analysing public debt policies, as is
done in Chapter 3, in the absence of altruism, the assumption of Stackelberg behaviour is
quite crucial because it prevents current generations from issuing the largest sustainable
level of public debt. Therefore, if the assumption of Stackelberg behaviour is made, the
analysis is often confined to two periods ( e.g. Persson and Svensson ( 1989), Tabellini
and Alesina ( 1990) or Tabellini (1991)). However, the drawback of a two period analysis
is that the solution may be strongly affected by end-of-time effects making the analysis of
dynamics impossible. 5ince the public debt has to be redeemed the second period, policy
in this final period is to a large extent determined beforehand. Besides, in these two-
period models each individuals horizon is equivalent and there is no inherent tendency
to shift taxes to future periods as these future taxes have to be paid by the individuals
themselves. Thus, the possibility for (some) generations to avoid the burden of debt is
absent. In Chapter 4, dealing with PAYG public pensions, Stackelberg behaviour is the
lIn reality elections are held more frequently than once every thirty years, which could lead to a
change in government. However, as the constituency nor its preferences change during a period (of
thirty years), this will not happen in the models in this thesis.
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point of departure but a comparison to Nash behaviour is made as well. In Chapter 5,
however, Stackelberg behaviour is replaced by the assumption of Nash behaviour to keep
the analysis somewhat tractable.
Two comparisons suggest themselves. First, to study the effects of the disregarding
of future generations, the policy chosen by the representative government can be com-
pared to the policy chosen by a social welfare maximizer, i.e. a government that not only
takes the utility of present generations into account but of future generations as well.
The second comparison is between the representative government in the market economy
and its command counterpart. This comparison reveals which instruments are needed to
obtain (if possible) the allocation chosen in a command economy, i.e. an economy where
a dictator can directly choose consumption and capital levels. However, when defin-
ing a command solution to serve as a bench-mark case, some conceptual problems arise.
Usually a command solution is derived by a dictator maximizing a social welfare function
where the utility of all present and future generations is taken into account. But then,
the following two points should be noted. First, in the representative democracy setting
as modelled in this thesis, only the utility of current generations is taken into account.
The utility of future generations is completely neglected. A social welfare maximizing
dictator does take the utility of these future generations into account. Second, in a social
welfare function, future generations are weighed with a social discount factor, which has
to be smaller than 1, if a maximum is to be well defined. The political weight attached
to the present young generation in a representative democracy framework, can, in prin-
ciple, take any value. These two points show that the difference between the command
and the decentralized allocation might also stem from the difference in the objective
function. The alternative is comparison to a myopic dictator that only takes present
generations into account and, thus, has the same objective function as the representa-
tive government in the market economy. Because some generations are still present when
the current myopic dictator is replaced by a new myopic dictator, future policy choices
matter for these generations. More concrete, for the two-overlapping-generations model
used in this thesis, the current young are present the next period as well. Thus, their old-
age consumption appears in the objective function of the current myopic dictator as well
as of the next-period myopic dictator. Since the next-period myopic dictator actually
sets this consumption level, like the current myopic dictator sets the consumption level
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of the current elderly, behavioural assumptions with respect to the next-period myopic
dictator are necessary. Again, Stackelberg behaviour is the most natural assumption.
In this thesis, comparisons to a social welfare maximizing government as well as to
a myopic dictator are made. However, in Chapters 3 and 4, only a comparison is made
to a social welfare maximizing government. After this comparison, the comparison to a
command solution is less interesting because the command solution of a social welfare
maximizer coincides with the decentralized solution of a social welfare maximizer. The
simplicity of the models used in these chapters makes the sets of instruments available
sufficient to obtain this result. In Chapter 5, a command solution is used as a bench-
mark case. Thus, the focus is on sufficiency of the available instruments to obtain this
bench-mark solution. This does not imply, however, that the comparison to a decen-
tralized social welfare maximizer is not interesting in this case. On the contrary, the
disregarding of future generations has serious consequences. As investment in public
capital is productive with a lag of one period in this chapter, current investment affects
future interest rates, which is beneficial to the current young, and future wages, which
benefits only future generations and none of the current generations. The present govern-
ment regards this effect on future wages as a spillover in which it has no interest and
prefers the spillover to be as small as possible. It is only interested in these future gener-
ations insofar it can confront these generations with the costs of current policy choices.
Taking the utility of future generations into account implies internalizing this spillover.
If such a social welfare maximizing government can use time- and age-dependent taxes,
it can even replicate the command solution of a social welfare maximizer (comparable
to the result of Calvo and Obstfeld (1988)). This contrasts with the result for the rep-
resentative government, when the availability of time- and age-dependent taxes leads to
a change for the worse. Also the possibility of using public debt would not lead to a
total crowding-out of private capital by public capital, as the case may be in Chapter 5,
if the utility of future generations is taken into account, because the negative effect on
their utility of their share of the debt repayments is taken into account as well.
A few results are worth mentioning again. In the models used here, myopia of poli-
ticians, i.e. the disregarding of future generations, is not necessarily `bad'. Compared
to a social welfare maximizing government, the representative government in Chapters 3
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and 4 may choose identical policies if the political weight of the current young happened
to be sufficiently high. Despite the absence of altruism towards future generations, the
fact that the current young have one extra period to live and take the effect of current
policy choices on future policy choices into account, implies that politicians may act
as if future generations are taken into account. A sufí'iciently high political weight for
the present young generation compensates for the disregarding of future generations.
Especially when dealing with public debt, if there is no altruism, the assumption of
Stackelberg behaviour prevents current generations from issuing the largest sustainable
level of public debt. Still, one would expect debt levels to increase in the course of time.
But this does not have to hold either, even debt levels that decrease in the course of
time may result. A similar result is obtained for PAYG public pensions which also may
decrease in the course of time.
Chapter 5 deals with investment in public capital. Different sets of policy instruments
are analysed and compared to the command solution for a representative government.
When the government is restricted to balance its budget each period, an inefficient low
level of public capital relative to the level of private capital results. The political influ-
ence of the current elderly, who have nothing to gain from investment in public capital,
is an important force behind this result. However, if the current elderly can be exempted
from taxation, because taxes are time- and age-dependent, even lower levels of public
capital result. By taxing both generations differently, the government can affect the
distribution of welfare between the two generations more efficiently without the large
spillover to future generations. However, a smaller spillover has strong negative conse-
quences for the steady state allocation because the lower future wage depresses future
savings and, thus, future capital and production levels. When the government is allowed
to use debt, it can confront the future generations with a share of the costs of public
investment. Thus, the spillover to these future generations in the form of higher wages is
`compensated' by a spillover in the form of more public debt to be repayed. However, this
not necessarily leads to overinvestment in public capital. This depends on the extent to
which the current young can avoid future debt repayments. Again, disregarding future
generations in the current decision-making process, does not have to lead to a complete
exploitation of these future generations.
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Further extensions. The homogeneity of the individuals of the same generation, the
absence of altruism, the assumption that politicians only care about their voters' pref-
erences and have no preferences of their own (including a long-term view based on some
ideology) or the exogeneity of the political weights, to name but a few, are strong as-
sumptions. The simplicity of the models used enables to derive analytical solutions
describing the evolution of public debt and public pensions respectively and to keep the
analysis on public investment tractable. But reality is more complex. In this thesis,
the political weights are exogenous. What determines the success of interest groups in
obtaining influence on the decisions of the government, i.e. this political weight, is,
however, an important question. There are studies in which the political weight is en-
dogenized. E.g. Coughlin et al. (1990) uses probabilistic voting models and assumes
that politicians maximize votes. But this seems to be an oversimplified view on the
behaviour of politicians. However, some of the explanatory factors, like size and homo-
geneity of an interest group, are likely to be important. More realistic are models based
on asymmetries of information between politicians and interest groups. Politicians rely
on information from specific interest groups for their policy decisions. Interest groups
will therefore try to steer the policy decisions in their preferred direction by providing
the `right' information to the politicians (e.g. Potters and Van Winden (1993)). Also,
endowing the models in Chapters 3 and 4 with a richer economic structure is certainly
preferable. E.g. more heterogeneity between individuals and a more detailed production
structure.
Part of the literature on endogenous growth is based upon public investement (e.g.
Barro (1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994a, 1994b)). Linking the literature of endoge-
nous growth to political decision making on public capital is therefore interesting. In
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) this is done by assuming that the decision on the level of
public capital is taken in a direct democracy where voters differ in their labour-capital
ratio. This leads to overinvestment in public capital relative to the growth maximizing
level. Investment in public capital is financed by a tax on capital income. The growth
maximizing tax rate is the tax rate preferred by a pure capitalist, i. e. an individual
with only capital income and no labour income. The less capital income the median
voter has, the higher the tax rate preferred, because more public capital raises labour
income which benefits the median voter more if he has relatively more labour income.
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This implies too much investment in public capital relative to the growth maximizing
level. It would be interesting to analyse the effect on growth if the decision is taken in
a representative democracy. This implies extending the model in Chapter 5 to allow for
endogenous growth. The conjecture is that, compared to the maximum level of growth
attainable, a lower level of growth results because of too little investment in public capi-
tal. The political weight of the current elderly depresses the level of public capital if
they have to pay a part of the costs. But also the current young do not prefer a growth
maacimizing level because of the spillover to future generations. They will therefore only
support the growth maximizing level of public capital if they can shift an adequate past
of the costs onto the shoulders of the present elderly or of the future generations by using
public debt. But this can also lead to an overinvestment in public capital compared to
the growth maximizing level. Further analysis is therefore very interesting.
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Samenvatting
Om diverse redenen grijpen overheden in in het economische proces. Veel overheids-
ingrijpen herverdeelt goederen en middelen tussen generaties. Deze intergenerationele
herverdelingen zijn het onderwerp van dit proefschrift. Herverdelingen worden niet alleen
ingegeven door onvoldoende marktwerking of ongewenstheid van een allocatie maar
ook, afhankelijk van het politieke systeem, door preferenties van politici zelf, pressie
van belangengroepen in de samenleving, etcetera. Er bestaan verschillende politieke
systemen waarin overheden opereren. De meeste westerse landen zijn representatieve
democratieën. Dit systeem is daarom het uitgangspunt van deze studie. De samenleving
bestaat uit vele groepen met conflicterende belangen die trachten hun stempel op het
overheidsbeleid te drukken door die politici te kiezen die het meest voor hun belangen
opkomen. Daarnaast oefenen ze voortdurend druk uit op de politici om het gevoerde
beleid in de door hen geprefereerde richting te sturen.
De studie wordt ingeleid in Hoofdstuk 1 waarin het bovenstaande in meer detail wordt
besproken. Daarnaast worden drie bronnen van intergenerationele herverdeling die in
deze studie geanalyseerd worden, te weten overheidsschuld, overheidspensioenen en over-
heidsinvesteringen, geïntroduceerd. Deze zijn kenmerkend voor een groot deel van de
intergenerationele herverdeling door de overheid.
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op het modelleren van het intergenerationele conflict. Eerst wor-
den de bouwstenen gegeven zoals overlappende-generatie modellen en speltheorie. De
individuele leden van de verschillende generaties zijn niet altruïstisch verondersteld. Dit
leidt ertoe dat Ricardiaanse Equivalentie niet geldt en het schuld- en belastingbeleid van
de overheid reële effecten heeft. De aanname van een representatieve democratie heeft
belangrijke consequenties. Omdat iedere periode het electoraat verandert, is er iedere
periode een nieuwe overheid, gekozen door het nieuwe electoraat. De beleidskeuzes van
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de toekomstige overheid kunnen echter gevolgen hebben voor (een deel van) het huidige
electoraat. Gedragsaannames van de huidige overheid ten opzichte van de beleidskeuzes
van toekomstige overheden zijn daarom nodig. Hiervoor zijn twee mogelijkheden: Nash
of Stackelberg. In geval van Nash gedrag worden toekomstige beleidskeuzes als gegeven
genomen; in geval van Stackelberg gedrag worden de toekomstige reacties op huidige
beleidskeuzes meegenomen bij de keuze van het huidige beleid. Gegeven de volgorde in
de tijd waarin de verschillende overheden opereren, ligt Stackelberg gedrag het meest
voor de hand. In Hoofdstuk 3, handelend over overheidsschuld, en in Hoofdstuk 4,
handelend over overheidspensioenen, is Stackelberg gedrag ten opzichte van toekomstige
overheden aangenomen. De complexiteit van het model in Hoofdstuk 5 noodzaakt echter
de aanname van Nash gedrag in plaats van Stackelberg gedrag. Een ander verschil is
dat in dit hoofdstuk de analyse beperkt wordt tot stationaire toestanden. In de Hoofd-
stukken 3 en 4 wordt daarentegen het hele tijdspad geanalyseerd.
Twee vergelijkingen zijn mogelijk. Ten eerste de vergelijking met een overheid die een
sociale welvaartsfunctie optimaliseert waarin niet alleen het nut van huidige generaties
vertegenwoordigd is maar ook dat van toekomstige generaties. Met deze vergelijking kan
het effect van het negeren van toekomstige generaties geanalyseerd worden. De tweede
vergelijking is die met een centrale planner die direct consumptienivo's kan kiezen. In dit
geval wordt geanalyseerd welke instrumenten de overheid nodig heeft om deze centrale
planner allocatie via de markt te bereiken. De eerste vergelijking wordt gemaakt in de
Hoofdstukken 3 en 4, de tweede in Hoofdstuk 5.
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert de effecten van het intergenerationele conflict op de evolutie
van overheidsschuld. Het conflict is als volgt: oudere generaties prefereren een zo hoog
mogelijk schuldnivo omdat zij, als de schuld afbetaald moet worden, er niet meer zijn
en dus geen last ondervinden van de hiervoor noodzakelijke belastingverhoging. Omdat
de schuld niet eeuwig doorgeschoven kan worden, de binnen- en buitenlandse beleggers
zullen dit voorkomen, zullen de jongeren wel geconfronteerd worden met een toekom-
stige belastingverhoging. Vanwege de preferentie consumptie gelijkmatig over hun leven
te spreiden, zullen zij nu een lager nivo van schuld prefereren dan de ouderen omdat dan
de toekomstige belasting lager kan blijven. Het pad dat het schuldnivo volgt door de
tijd is afhankelijk van de parameters van het model, te weten de bevolkingsgroeivoet, de
rentestand, het relatieve politieke gewicht van een jongere ten opzichte van een oudere
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en de discontofactor van de individuen. Afhankelijk van deze parameters zal een stijgend
of een dalend nivo van schuld over de tijd resulteren. In geval van een stijgende schuld
convergeert deze naar een maximum nivo wat bepaald wordt door de contante waarde
van de huidige en toekomstige belastingbasis minus de contante waarde van huidige en
toekomstige overheidsuitgaven. De vergelijking met een overheid die een sociale wel-
vaartsfunctie optimaliseert en niet alleen het nut van huidige generaties maar ook dat
van toekomstige generaties meeneemt levert het volgende op: ieder tijdspad dat gekozen
wordt door een representatieve overheid kan ook gekozen worden door een overheid die
toekomstige generaties meeneemt. Met andere woorden, een representatieve overheid
kan zich gedragen alsof ze toekomstige generaties meeweegt in haar besluitvorming. Het
omgekeerde geldt echter niet; er zijn dus tijdspaden die wel door een overheid die so-
ciale welvaart maximaliseert gekozen kunnen worden maar niet door een representatieve
overheid. Tot slot zijn in dit hoofdstuk geanticipeerde en ongeanticipeerde schokken op
de exogene parameters geanalyseerd.
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de evolutie van een Pay-As-You-Go pensioen systeem. In een
Pay-As-You-Go pensioen systeem worden huidige pensioenen gefinancierd uit huidige
belastingopbrengsten. Met andere woorden, het pensioen van de huidige ouderen wordt
betaald door de huidige jongeren. Oudere generaties zullen trachten, door middel van
hun politieke invloed, een zo hoog mogelijk pensioen af te dwingen. Jongeren, daarente-
gen, willen een zo klein mogelijk pensioen betalen aan de ouderen. Liever nog zouden zij
een overdracht van de ouderen afdwingen. Vergelijkbaar met het vorige hoofdstuk, zal
er, afhankelijk van de bevolkingsgroeivoet, de rentevoet, het relatieve politieke gewicht
van de jongeren en de discontofactor van de individuen, een dalend of stijgend nivo
van pensioenoverdrachten resulteren. Vervolgens is afgeleid wanneer huidige generaties
erop vooruitgaan in termen van nut bij de introductie van een Pay-As-You-Go systeem.
Daarna wordt een vergelijking gemaakt tussen Nash gedrag en Stackelberg gedrag met
betrekking tot toekomstige overheden. Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat het pensioennivo
onder Nash gedrag altijd lager is dan het pensioennivo onder Stackelberg gedrag bij een
gelijke uitgangspositie. Voor het nivo van besparingen geldt het tegenovergestelde. Dit
verschil wordt veroorzaakt door het positieve effect dat de huidige pensioenoverdracht
heeft op de toekomstige pensioenoverdracht. In geval van Nash gedrag wordt dit effect
niet meegenomen wat resulteert in een hoger spaarnivo en een lagere pensioenoverdracht.
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Uit de vergelijking met een overheid die een sociale welvaartsfunctie optimaliseert waarin
ook de nutten van toekomstige generaties zijn meegewogen volgt dat ieder pad gekozen
door een representatieve overheid ook gekozen kan worden door een overheid die toekom-
stige generaties meeweegt. Dit resultaat verschilt met dat in het vorige hoofdstuk. Dit
verschil wordt veroorzaakt door het feit dat pensioenen zorgen voor een herverdeling
tussen generaties binnen een periode terwijl schuld herverdeelt tussen generaties over
periodes. Verder is afgeleid wanneer, voor een gegeven nivo van besparingen, huidige
generaties beter af zijn met een representatieve overheid dan met een overheid die so-
ciale welvaart maximaliseert. Tot slot zijn de effecten van veranderingen in de exogene
parameters geanalyseerd.
Het intergenerationele conflict met betrekking tot overheidsinvesteringen wordt behan-
deld in Hoofdstuk 5. Omdat investeringen produktief zijn met een vertraging van één
periode zijn huidige ouderen niet geïnteresseerd in deze investeringen. Jongeren daarente-
gen zijn wel geïnteresseerd omdat investeringen een positief effect hebben op de opbrengst
van hun besparingen. Daarnaast veroorzaken investeringen ook nog een `spill-over' naar
toekomstige generaties omdat het looninkomen van deze generaties positief beïnvloed
wordt. De oplossing van het model voor een centrale planner dient als referentiepunt.
Uit deze oplossing volgt een voorwaarde voor efficiëntie, namelijk dat de marginale pro-
duktiviteit van particulier kapitaal gelijk is aan de marginale produktiviteit van over-
heidskapitaal. Om deze oplossing met behulp van marktinstrumenten te bereiken ís een
belasting voor de jongeren nodig. Daarnaast wordt schuld gebruikt. De inkomsten aldus
verkregen worden gebruikt voor een overdracht naar de ouderen en voor investeringen
in overheidskapitaal. Echter deze oplossing kan niet bereikt worden. De reden is dat in
dit hoofdstuk de overheid toekomstig beleid als gegeven neemt (Nash gedrag). Ongelim-
iteerd schuldgebruik zal dan leiden tot een maximaal gebruik van schuld. Daarom zijn
restricties gelegd op de beschikbare beleidsinstrumenten voor de overheid. Drie situaties
zijn geanalyseerd. De eerste situatie betreft een overheid die haar begroting iedere peri-
ode sluitend moet houden en investeringen moet financieren met behulp van een uniforme
`lump-sum' belasting. Beide generaties betalen dus hetzelfde bedrag aan belasting. Het
nivo van overheidsinvesteríngen is lager dan het referentienivo. Ook in verhouding met
het nivo van particuliere investeringen, is het nivo van overheidsinvesteringen te laag.
Een tweetal redenen kunnen hiervoor gegeven worden. Ten eerste is er de spill-over
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naar toekomstige generaties waarin geen van de huidige generaties in geïnteresseerd is.
Ten tweede betalen de huidige ouderen de helft van de investeringen hoewel ze er geen
enkele baat bij hebben. Dat de ouderen niet ontzien kunnen worden leidt tot een te
hoog nivo van besparingen en daardoor van particulier kapitaal. In de tweede situatie
kan de overheid beide generaties verschillend belasten maar moet ze haar begroting nog
steeds sluitend houden. Het gevolg is een nivo van overheidsinvesteringen dat zelfs lager
is dan bij een uniforme belasting. De reden voor dit resultaat is dat door de mogelijk-
heid generaties verschillend te belasten, de overheid de intergenerationele verdeling van
welvaart efficiënter kan beïnvloeden dan bij een uniforme belasting. Bij een uniforme
belasting moest ze gebruik maken van overheidsinvesteringen die een ongewenste spill-
over veroorzaakten naar toekomstige generaties. Nu kan ze die spill-over vermijden. Het
belastingsysteem werkt in dit geval als een soort Pay-As-You-Go pensioen systeem. Dit
leidt ertoe dat ook het nivo van particulier kapitaal lager ís dan bij uniforme belastingen.
In de derde situatie is een soort kapitaaldienst verondersteld. De overheid mag lenen voor
investeringsuitgaven maar is verplicht de aangegane leningen terug te betalen gedurende
de afschrijvingsperiode van de investering. Het investeringsnivo in overheidskapitaal is in
dit geval sterk afhankelijk van de mate waarin de lasten afgewenteld kunnen worden op
toekomstige generaties. Wanneer deze afwenteling voldoende hoog is, kan een inefficiënt
hoog nivo van overheidskapitaal het resultaat zijn.
Een stijging van de politieke invloed van de jongeren leidt in de situaties met een slui-
tende begroting tot een stijging van het nivo van overheidsinvesteringen. Ook een meer
efficiënte inzet van overheidskapitaal resulteert. Bij de kapitaaldienst speelde deze poli-
tieke invloed geen rol. Immers door het gebruik van schuld worden de huidige ouderen
niet meer geconfronteerd met de lasten van de huidige investeringen. Een stijging van
de discontovoet van de individuen betekent meer gewicht voor consumptie in de tweede
periode. In geval van uniforme belasting betekent dit een toename van de hoeveelheid
overheidskapitaal. Echter, besparingen, en daarmee particulier kapitaal stijgt sterker
wat minder efficiëntie betekent. In geval van een leeftijdsafhankelijke belasting daalt het
nivo van overheidskapitaal. In geval van schuldfinanciering, tenslotte, stijgt het nivo van
overheidskapitaal. Bovendien verbetert in dit geval de efficiëntie.
Hoofdstuk 6 vat de belangrijkste inzichten die dit proefschrift oplevert samen en geeft
een aantal aanzetten voor verder onderzoek.
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